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THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CENTER AND THE PERIPHERY:
JUSTINIAN'S PROVINCIAL REFORMS OF THE A.D. 530S
This dissertation analyzes the struggle between the imperial court and the periphery in the
context of Justinian’s reforms in the early A.D. 530s. The reforms targeting select Roman
provinces sought to reduce the size of the imperial bureaucracy while simultaneously
attempting to maintain imperial vertical authority. The reforms epitomize the imperial
court’s struggle to rein in the imperial bureaucracy in the provinces of the Roman Empire.
The analysis is framed within the cultural, social, political and economic evolution
occurring in Late Antiquity. It shall be proposed that the reforms are one example of the
imperial court’s attempt to limit the distance between itself and its provincial resources,
particularly with regard to fiscality. The reforms also embody the political dynamics
between the emperor and his bureaucracy, which is composed of the Roman elite.
Roughly two centuries earlier, the Tetrarchic reforms fundamentally changed the
relationship between both parties. Specifically, the upper stratum of the aristocracy saw
the balance of power tilt in its favor substantially.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The reign of Justinian is one of the most studied periods in Late Antiquity. This is the
case for many reasons. The sources are rather plentiful for the period and that cannot be
said of the reign of Anastasius, for example. Within thirty-eight years many
developments could be noted. However, many of these developments did not take root in
the sixth century, even less during Justinian’s reign. As E.H. Carr effectively contended,
the individual can only be a factor and not a primary causative force in the course of
history.1 I do believe that this is an appropriate statement with which this analysis should
begin. Justinian can only be understood as one piece in a complex jigsaw collection.
In the A.D. 530s, Justinian’s administration sought to reform select provinces
drastically, roughly in and around Asia Minor. Why these reforms were enacted serves as
the founding question of this inquiry. Asking that very question implies a multitude of
facets, which are bound to one another. The Roman capacity to administer an empire
effectively is one of the most eminent and fiscality is surely one of the most important
factors involved therein. However, the question implies much more than that. The
evolution of Roman social, economic and cultural dynamics are embedded in this
discussion. This includes changes to the fabric of Roman high society, the view of
effective governance, the emperor and his power, and political rhetoric. The composition
of the Roman elite underwent substantial change in Late Antiquity and the catalyst of this
evolution occurred under the Tetrarchs. In that same period, the nature of governance
changed significantly, altering the relationships between the summit of Roman society,
1

E.H. Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987).
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the emperor, and his government. With respect to the reforms themselves, the discussion
cannot negate the importance of the rhetoric involved. The legal discourse therein is a
testament to the relationships between the emperor and his court, and his bureaucracy.
With that, it is important to visit the scholarly views of the emperor in question. In
many cases, Justinian is regarded as a ruthless dictator, an absolute monarch and an
autocrat. These views are in part truthful, but in large part inaccurate. The image of the
emperor profoundly changed over the course of Roman history. At the inception of the
Principate, the princeps could be viewed as a rather limited monarch. By the third century,
the office had evolved, but would see its most significant transformation with the
Dominate. Thereafter, emperors were portrayed as Hellenistic despots, disjointed from
the realm of commoners. The religious ties to the office endured centuries and the
appropriation of Christian elements further cemented the imperial office’s sublimity. The
emperor was divinely sanctioned and, furthermore, first without equals.2 Ammianus
Marcellinus illustrates this when he describes the entry of Constantius II into Rome:
And as if [Constantius II] were planning to overawe the Euphrates with a
show of arms, or the Rhine, while the standards preceded him on each side,
he himself sat alone upon a golden car in the resplendent blaze of
shimmering precious stones, whose mingled glitter seemed to form a sort
of shifting light. And behind the manifold others that preceded him he was
surrounded by dragons, woven out of purple thread and bound to the
golden and jewelled tops of spears, with wide mouths open to the breeze
and hence hissing as if roused by anger, and leaving their tails winding in
the wind. And there marched on either side twin lines of infantrymen with
shields and crests gleaming with glittering rays, clad in shining mail; and
scattered among them were the full-armoured cavalry (whom they called
clibanarii), all masked, furnished with protecting breastplates and girt with
iron belts, so that you might have supposed them statues polished by the
hand of Praxiteles, not men. Thin circles of iron plates, fitted to the curves
of their bodies, completely covered their limbs; so that whichever way
they had to move their members, their garment fitted, so skilfully were the
2

For the emperor as God’s regent on earth, see Eusebius’ Vita Constantini. The trope is a wellestablished one, predating the rise of Christianity.
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joinings made. Accordingly, being saluted as Augustus with favouring
shouts, while hills and shores thundered out the roar, he never stirred, but
showed himself as calm and imperturbable as he was commonly seen in
his provinces. For he both stooped when passing through lofty gates
(although he was very short), and as if his neck were in a vice, he kept the
gaze of his eyes straight ahead, and turned his face neither to right nor to
left, but (as if he were a lay figure) neither did he nod when the wheel
jolted nor was he ever seen to spit, or to wipe or rub his face or nose, or
move his hands about. And although this was affectation on his part, yet
these and various other features of his more intimate life were tokens of no
slight endurance, granted to him alone, as was given to be understood.
Furthermore, that during the entire period of his reign he neither took up
anyone to sit beside him in his car, nor admitted any private person to be
his colleague in the insignia of the consulship, as other anointed princes
did, and many like habits which in his pride of lofty conceit he observed
as though they were most just laws, I pass by, remembering that I set them
down when they occurred.3
The imagery of this account, along with so many others, gives rise to a strange paradox in
modern scholarship. Scholars aptly discern rhetoric in prose and they understand the
panegyric, for example, to be a mere literary genre displaying a myriad of rhetorical
devices. Yet, many scholars do not distinguish the contrast with respect to the emperor’s
power in Late Antiquity. In theory, the emperor was a successor to the oriental despot,
God’s regent on earth and the embodiment of Caesaropapism. In practice, however, the
reality of the power attached to the imperial office was much more subdued. This
particular point is the premise on which this work is constructed. Specifically, the
reforms of the A.D. 530s will be examined to explain the evolution of imperial power and
its relationship with the administration.
Roughly, the two centuries preceding Justinian’s reign reveal profound changes to
the fabric of the Roman Empire. The relationship between the imperial court, the imperial
government and the people evolved. This is manifested in the Roman landscape, as
urbanization, one of the key features of the Empire, recedes. Some scholars view this
3

Amm. Marc. 16.10.10 (J.C. Rolfe’s translation).
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series of developments with a materialist lens. Specifically, some interpret the transition
occurring in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages as a transition with this
aforementioned method. 4 For example, J. Banaji proposes that the changing social
dynamics in the Later Roman Empire are for the most part due to the monetization of its
economy. This then enabled the emergence of a revamped aristocracy, which seized
control of the means of production.5 Yet, this interpretation does not account for the
expansion and stratification of the imperial bureaucracy beginning in the Tetrarchic
period. This institutional change actually had more to do with the transition from an
urban to rural landscape. P. Sarris, in a similar light, argues that class, particularly the
emergence of this elite, is responsible for decentralization.6
Two issues stem from this interpretation. First, the Egyptian great estate cannot
function as a template for the vast empire.7 Although P. Sarris indicates otherwise, one

4

P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: NLB, 1974); P. Anderson,
Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: NLB, 1974); Società Romana e Produzione
Schiavistica: Merci, Mercati e Scambi nel Mediterraneo, ed. A. Giardina and A. Schiavone, 3
vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1981); C. Wickham, "The Other Transition: From Ancient World to
Feudalism," P&P 103 (1984), 3-36; J. Haldon, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production
(New York: Verso, 1993); C. Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages Europe and the
Mediterranean 400-800, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); A. Giardina, "Marxism and
Historiography: Perspectives on Roman History," in Marxist History - Writing for the TwentyFirst Century, ed. C. Wickham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15-31; D. Rathbone,
"Review: The Roman Villa," The Classical Review 59 #2 (2009).
5
J. Banaji, Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity: Gold, Labour, and Aristocratic Dominance (New
York: Oxford, 2001).
6
P. Sarris, Economy and Society in the Age of Justinian (New York: Cambridge, 2006).
7
Owners of small landholdings are very much present in archaeology and cannot be
underestimated. It does not appear that magnates dominated the entire landscape across the
Empire. For small landholders living in the city, see: Les plus anciens recueils des miracles de
Saint Démétrius et la pénétration slave dans les Balkans, vol. 1: miracle 2, § 199, p. 185; R.S.
Bagnall, Egypt in Late Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For Greece, see
M.H. Jameson et al., A Greek Countryside: the Southern Argolid from Prehistory to the Present
Day (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); C. Kosso, "Public Policy and Agricultural
Practice: Archaeological and Literary Study of Ancient Greece" (University of Illinois at Chicago,
1993). For Nessana, see P. Mayerson, "The Agricultural Regime," in Excavations at Nessana
(Auja Hafir, Palestine), ed. H.D. Colt (London: British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem,
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can look at the archaeological finds in Northern Syria, for example, where G. Tate has
effectively indicated that there is little evidence confirming a widespread phenomenon.8
Yet, the genesis of this very elite is, for the most part, due to the center’s reforms. The
expansion of the bureaucracy, which embodies the state, created a new social class. In
other words, bureaucracy, categorically a superstructure, in effect altered the base. This is
an inherent problem with this line of interpretation. However, Banaji does address this.9
What both scholars fail to address is the origin of the mutation that occurs in the
period. It does not take into account the institutional ramifications of the Tetrarchic
reforms and thus only focuses on its subsidiaries. To draw from the well of capital, one
no longer had to be an important player in the city. In essence, neither class conflict nor
wage labor were the causative forces creating these social and economic conditions. On
the contrary, the institutions that restructured Roman society, particularly the elite, could
not be classified therefore as superstructure, when its causative force supersedes the
dynamics between social classes. Then again, the genesis of a social class is problematic
due the lack of objectiveness at its inception. A class, such as this “new” aristocracy
1962), 211-269. T. Lewit notes a rise in medium-sized landholdings and also underlines the
problem with the large estate argument: Agricultural Production in the Roman Economy A.D.
200-400 (Oxford: Tempus Reparatum, 1991), 31-35; Villas, Farms and the Late Roman Rural
Economy (Third to Fifth Centuries AD) (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2004).
8
P. Sarris, Empires of faith : the fall of Rome to the rise of Islam, 500-700, The Oxford history of
medieval Europe (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 260. Sarris
extrapolates from R. Bagnall’s article to defend his position (R. Bagnall, "Evidence and Models
for the Economy of Roman Egypt," in The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models, ed. J.G.
Manning and I. Morris (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Bagnall, however, does not
propose that the papyrological evidence found outside of Egypt corroborates the great estate’s
universality. This is the fatal flaw in Sarris’ monograph (2006) in which a very brisk survey
attempts to establish the Egyptian great estate as an empire-wide model. That is not to say that
Bagnall’s points are not succinct. On the contrary, they are, but they do not vindicate the fatal
flaw in Sarris’ argument. For G. Tate, see Les campagnes de la Syrie du Nord du IIe au VIIe
siècle, Bibliothèque archéologique et historique (Paris: Libr. orientaliste P. Geuthner, 1992), 287295.
9
J. Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation (Boston: Brill,
2010); J. Banaji, "Putting Theory to Work," Historical Materialism 21 #4 (2013), 129-143.
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Sarris and Banaji discuss, is subjective at its core. Its subjectivity stems from the
mechanism by which it is mobilized in the political field. The makeup of its constituency
is relative. Actors within the political field group members symbolically and a feeling of
identity is thereupon developed. Hence, a social class’ ontology casts doubt on its role as
a primary causative force in history. The insistence to label social classes as such ignores
the relativity of its existence. Moreover, the ruling class was comprised of the aristocracy.
The actors therein could be found in the imperial court, the bureaucracy and the Church,
amongst others. From the sources, one can deduce that the ruling class was not unified in
its efforts to maintain the status quo. On the contrary, the Tetrarchic Reforms granted an
enormous amount of power to the upper tier of the elite. Under Justinian, the imperial
court systematically attempted to undercut this very power that was granted and even
seized by this “new” elite. In essence, the ruling class was not a single entity; it was
conflicted among itself. The state did not seek to maintain the ruling class’ interests; the
state, divided between the imperial court and the bureaucracy’s interests under Justinian,
was at odds. Therefore, to use this as a foundation in an interpretative rubric is inherently
problematic.
Another interpretation, which in many respects, is prominent within the field
focuses on ideology and how it permeated the mechanisms of government and Roman
society.10 Much attention is given to the nature of imperial power and how it was

10

F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, 2
vols. (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1966); H. Ahrweiler,
L'idéologie politique de l'Empire byzantin (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975); M.
Maas, John Lydus and the Roman Past: Antiquarianism and Politics in the Age of Justinian (New
York: Routledge, 1992); C. Kelly, "Emperors, Government and Bureaucracy," in The Cambridge
Ancient History, ed. A. Cameron and P. Garnsey (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
138-183; A.R. Hybel, The Power of Ideology: from the Roman Empire to Al-Qaeda (New York:
Routledge, 2009), 20-43.

6

exercised. With respect to the provincial reforms of the A.D. 530s, M. Maas views them
as an expression of imperial ideology, stemming from the tension between Christianity
and Classicism. C. Ando’s work is from a broader standpoint, as his work examines the
relationship between the center and the periphery. He argues that imperial ideology was
the bond linking both and that it enabled a functional degree of subjugation.11 While this
interpretation does provide interesting insights into the political and social dynamics of
the Later Roman Empire, it does fall short in certain areas. For example, the
interpretation of laws as an expression of imperial ideology neglects the linguistic value
showcased in the codes. Rhetoric was a toolbox from which the author could draw upon
many of its resources. The tropes therein were used as templates to be applied in various
scenarios. H. Hunger, D. Olster and M. Kahlos’ works have conclusively demonstrated
that.12
Several scholars use a multi-faceted approach, often with more weight given to
institutional matters. 13 With an interpretative framework based on New Institutional
Economics theory, J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz examines the change occurring to the fabric of
the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity. He succinctly describes the effects of this the
administrative evolution in the period:
11

C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2000).
12
H. Hunger, Prooimion: Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden,
Wiener byzantinistische Studien (Vienna: In Kommission be H. Böhlaus Nachf., 1964); D.
Olster, "Justinian, Imperial rhetoric, and the Church," Byzantinoslavica 50 (1989), 165-176; M.
Kahlos, "Ditches of Destruction – Cyril of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Public Security," BZ
107 #2 (2014), 659-690.
13
J. Haldon, "The End of Rome? The Transformation of the Eastern Empire in the Seventh and
Eighth Centuries CE," in The Roman Empire in Context: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, ed. J.P. Arnason and K.A. Raaflaub (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); J. Haldon,
"Economy and Administration," in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian, ed. M.
Maas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also, l’histoire totale also offers a multiangled approach, but with less weight given to institutional history. See E. Patlagean, Pauvreté
économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance, 4e-7e siècles (Paris: Mouton, 1977).
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It was an essential characteristic of the Greco-Roman city that it
comprised both a built-up urban centre and a rural territory which was
administered and controlled from the center. This was something which
the Roman imperial authorities had found particularly useful, since it gave
them administrative machinery to collect taxes in the countryside. The
transformation of the classical city in many regions involved the breaking
of this unity.14
A. Laniado echoes much of this statement in his own work. However, while Liebeschuetz
focuses more on change, Laniado also gives attention to continuity.15
The first chapter of this work is centered upon the makeup of Roman government
in Late Antiquity. By necessity, it confronts the age-old issue of the Late Empire’s
governance. A litany of scholars has treated the topic, but it is a necessary backdrop to
the discussion. In order to discuss the provincial reforms of Emperor Justinian, it is
important to set them in their proper historical context. Within it, I hope to offer new
insight into the change occurring in the period. This period will cover roughly two
centuries, from the Tetrarchs ruled to the early sixth century. The administrative
difficulties will be at the center of this analysis. The examination will determine the
breadth of the Tetrarchic reforms and how they fundamentally altered the fabric of the
Later Roman Empire. The curia was the most important piece in the machinery linking
the center to the periphery. However, the reforms caused the dynamics between both
spectra to mutate beyond the scope of their creators’ intentions. The municipal council
not only permitted the capital to rule without excessive intrusion into the daily lives of
the provincials. More importantly, it enabled the capital to seek its fuel, namely taxes.
Yet, the reforms initiated under the Tetrarchs caused much more change than they surely

14

J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, The Decline and Fall of the Roman City (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 411.
15
A. Laniado, Recherches sur les notables municipaux dans l'Empire protobyzantin (Paris:
Association des amis du Centre d'histoire et civilisation de Byzance, 2002).
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hoped. Centuries-old Roman social, economic and political structures transformed
permanently.
The analysis moves from macro to micro in Chapter Two. Attention will
conveniently shift from Rome’s effort to govern through the curia to the curia’s actors,
the aristocracy. The echoes of the Tetrarchic reforms permeated Roman society and its
reach extended to the makeup of the elite. By redefining the relationship between the
center and the periphery, the stratified elite also changed by necessity. The
materialization of bureaucratic layers caused the restructuring of Roman social, economic
and political structures. Therefore a new and revamped social “currency” must have
followed. The reformed bonds between the capital and the provinces redefined social,
cultural and symbolic capital. For example, euergetism was no longer a civic hallmark of
the aristocracy. During the days of the Republic and the High Empire, private subsidies
from a local notable for public works were very common. The profound alteration to the
institutional value of the city in Late Antiquity explains the decline of this custom in the
Late Empire. The zenith of a political career was no longer in the municipal councils of
provincial capitals or of sizeable cities. It gravitated towards the imperial bureaucracy,
wherever it may be.
In Chapter 3, attention shifts to the imperial bureaucracy at the dawn of the sixth
century. The mechanics of the bureaucracy will serve as the basis to investigate the
dynamics between the aristocrats staffing it, the imperial court and the emperor’s power.
An inquiry into the relationship between the bureaucracy and the emperor will help
explain the state of the bureaucracy at that particular juncture in Roman history. The
High Empire saw a rather unbalanced share of power between the emperor and his

9

administration. The latter was much smaller in size and the bridge between local politics
and the Roman central administration was rather narrow. Hence, the emperor in theory
held almost absolute power over those who could cross it. Yet that very bridge changed
with the Tetrarchic Reforms and so it is important to determine the ramifications of that
development. In other words, it is imperative to determine whether the capital was able to
maintain verticality in governance and whether the balance of power changed if at all.
In the final chapter, the provincial reforms of the A.D. 530s will draw the
attention. These reforms are very fascinating for their seemingly contrarian presentation.
Justinian and John the Cappadocian decided to reduce the size of the bureaucracy in
select provinces. Moreover, provinces that once were created from larger ones were now
consolidated. This appears to be a drastic departure from the trend in the Late Empire,
when heavy-handed verticality appears to have been the norm. In the process, the rhetoric
included in the Novellae will be examined. The discussion of the emperor’s power in the
previous chapter will continue, but solely centered on Emperor Justinian. The
relationship between the bureaucracy and the emperor is once again fundamental in the
understanding of the reforms.

Copyright @ Mark-Anthony Karantabias 2015
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CHAPTER II:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ROMAN SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES

Evolving socio-economic conditions often pose new challenges to governmental
efficiency. The Empire itself evolved from a loose coalition of conquered kingdoms,
empires and city-states into an increasingly centralized monolith, most notably after the
fall of the Republic and more particularly after the Tetrarchic reforms. Emperors sought
to maximize income to meet external military challenges on the one hand and insure their
own security against revolt on the other hand. The heart of the complex bureaucratic
machinery rested on the foundation, which was a relic of the Mediterranean’s political
and cultural landscape of centuries past. It dated from the period prior to the Late
Republic during which the most significant territorial expansion took place. The curiales
were what may be called the vertebrae of the Roman Empire with respect to governance,
but most notably with regard to the fiscal system. These city officials’ most important
duty to the capital was to collect taxes. However, the drastic expansion of the
bureaucracy, which occurred under the Tetrarchs and Constantine, exacerbated fiscal
problems and also created an institutional crisis. An institutional vacuum materialized
due to a diaspora of provincial elites seeking entry into the newly expanded imperial
administrative apparatus, which offered highly lucrative careers.
Thereafter, the city and its vital importance within the machination of government
were in doubt. New social, political and economic dynamics led to a decline of this
institutional unit, which sustained the capital and by extension the empire. As a result,
curiales were subject to a plethora of legislation designed to control the broken dam that
11

in many respects stratified Roman society. The provincial elite, although important and
influential, had a ceiling with regard to social mobility. This was due to the exclusivity of
the somewhat smaller central imperial government, prior to the Tetrarchic reforms.
Evidently this is based on the comparison of the pre and post-reform sizes of government.
With the reforms, the new layers of bureaucracy permanently altered that rather rigid
division and blurred the distinction between the periphery and the center by further
bridging it. In this context, it is important to track the evolution of this prime fiscal unit,
the city and its curiales.
Libanius’ work is one of the most examined concerning the social, political and
economic dynamics in the East and this particular passage is one of the many that have
drawn much attention in the context of the debate: “The curia which once counted 600
members, now has only 60.”1 This particular passage expresses the core concern of this
study, which seeks to qualify and to quantify the evolution of the curiales, particularly
what has been labeled “the flight of the curiales” in scholarship. The ability to understand
this phenomenon has an immediate impact on the understanding of the empire’s decline
itself, which in many respects was due to a fiscal breakdown.
The topic itself has drawn an enormous amount of attention in the role of the
empire’s decline and thus much literature. M. Rostovtzeff is often considered to be the
scholar who really initiated the larger debate on the issue.2 With respect to English
scholarship, the great institutional historian, A.H.M. Jones, and his long lasting work
1

Libanius, Or. 2.33: “Ἀλλὰ τὰς βουλὰς ἐρεῖς. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ µηδὲν ἄλλο διέκειτο κακῶς, τοῦτό γ’ ἂν
ἔπειθε µόνον λέγειν οἷά- περ λέγω. ἀντὶ µὲν ἑξακοσίων τῶν τότε οὐδὲ ἑξή- κοντα νῦν. ἑξήκοντα
εἶπον; οὐδὲ µὲν οὖν ἓξ παρ’ ἐνίοις.” Also see, Or. 48.3-4
2
M. Rostovtzeff, The Social & Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: The Clarendon
press, 1926), 502-541. However, in the same year Abbott and Frost published their work in which
the same opinion was put forth: Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1926), 198.
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influence much of the discussion centering on the city and the curiales in the Late Empire.
Moreover, he also proposed that this particular institutional evolution led to the decline of
the empire itself. He proposed that the curiales quickly declined during the period
following the reforms and thereupon sank into irrelevance. 3 Many scholars succeeding
Jones, including T.F. Carney, J.-P. Sodini, J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, P. Diaz and M.
Whittow4 have also held this same view and have modified it in certain ways, but the
essence of the argument remains. There is also discussion of the culmination of this
aforementioned flight. M. Whittow argues for a disappearance of the curiales: “The
Justinianic Code and the Novellae still show some traces of their existence…But in
general they had disappeared throughout the Near East by the mid-sixth century. The
relative silence about their departure should not cause surprise.”5 Other scholars such as J.
Haldon and W. Brandes are more cautious and argue for a later date.6
On the other hand, many European scholars have examined this issue with a
skeptical eye. C. Lepelley has deemed the flight to be an exaggeration in his study of
North Africa. Contrary to what many believe, he proposes that the desertions of the curia

3

A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284-602, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), 737-757.
4
T.F. Carney, Bureaucracy in traditional society: Romano-Byzantine Bureaucracies Viewed from
within (Lawrence: Coronado Press, 1971), 95; J.-P. Sodini, "L'Asie Mineure," in Le monde
byzantin (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004), 358; J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch:
City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972),
174-186; P. Diaz, "Cities and Territory in Hispania in Late Antiquity," in Towns and their
Territories between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, ed. G.P. Brogiolo, N. Gauthier,
and N. Christie (Boston: Brill, 2000), 5; M. Whittow, "Ruling the Late Roman and Early
Byzantine City: A Continuous History," P&P #129 (1990), 9-10.
5
M. Whittow, "City," 12. M. Waelkens also argues for a mid-sixth century disappearance of the
curiales: M. Waelkens, "Die Stadt in der Spätantike: Niedergang oder Wandel?," in Geschichte,
ed. J.-U. Krause and C. Witschel (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 202.
6
J. Haldon and W. Brandes, "Towns, Tax and Transformation: State, Cities and their Hinterlands
in the East roman World, c. 500-800," in Towns and their Territories between Late Antiquity and
the Early Middle Ages, ed. G.P. Brogiolo, N. Gauthier, and N. Christie (Leiden ; Boston: Brill,
2000), 169-170 n.110.
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were much more limited.7 In another work, F. Ausbüttel does not note any form of
decline. He nevertheless indicates that some city councils did encounter difficulties, but
not to the extent many believe.8 The legal sources indicate that there was a sharp focus on
controlling the deluge at the municipal level. The amount of legislation has been
interpreted as a sign of a political crisis. However, J. Durliat denies this interpretation of
the sources.9 More recently, in an analysis focusing on the municipal elite, A. Laniado
concludes that there is no sign of an eroding curia in the East, contrary to what occurs in
the West. Thus, he concludes that the legislation and the capital’s concern are mainly
centered upon controlling social evolution.10 Hence, many questions immediately come
to mind when faced with polarized views such as: was the decline a rhetorical trope of
classicizing authors or of disgruntled authors nostalgic of the past; had the institution
itself failed to adapt to its challenges; was this due to an inversely proportional relation of
power between the periphery and the center? These are among many questions that can
be posed regarding the topic.
However one matter is made evident when examining the Later Roman Empire:
the pursuit for efficiency in the domain of fiscality through the rationalization of the
bureaucracy11 occurs concurrently with a rise in demand of income. How this pursuit and
rise in demand are related, is a question, which this entire work will seek to answer. For
now, it is important to explore the relationship between the provincial administration and
7

C. Lepelley, Les Cités de l'Afrique romaine au Bas-Empire, 2 vols. (Paris: Études
augustiniennes, 1979), 290-292.
8
F. Ausbüttel, Die Verwaltung des Römischen Kaiserreiches (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1998), 13-14.
9
J. Durliat, Les rentiers de l'impôt, Byzantina Vindobonensia (Vienna: Verlag der
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1993), 42.
10
A. Laniado, Recherches sur les notables municipaux dans l'Empire protobyzantin, 26.
11
Here I am using Weber’s definition, which involves the calculability, predictability, efficiency
and the control over uncertainties.
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institutional reform in the context of imperial fiscal solvency. First, I shall examine the
status of the curialis prior to Justinian’s reforms of the A.D. 530’s. In this particular area,
the examination of political corruption and the Tetrarchic reforms’ effects will be central.
Political corruption was a reality confronting Roman government for centuries and this
particular period is no different. Corruption plagued the imperial coffers in so many ways
and as such it is vital to examine. The Tetrarchic reforms happened in the span of a few
decades, but their effects were felt socially, economically and politically until the
collapses in both the West and East. Thereafter, a study of the attempted solutions
addressing the fiscal woes caused by the curia’s decline will be conducted. Numerous
attempts were made to redress the crisis through different means and with different
micro-objectives. However, these efforts, which will be examined, are all directly related
to the decline of the curialis.

THE TETRARCHIC REFORMS
To begin this inquiry, it is best to examine the Tetrarchic reforms since they initiate a
series of fundamental changes to Roman society. Although hinging upon centuries of
social, political and economic evolution, the chain of causation linked to the institutional
failure of the curialis in the Later Empire finds many of its roots in these very reforms.
The Tetrarchs and Constantine oversaw many changes, but the main areas affected were
government and the military. The intent of these changes was manifold. Decades of civil
war and political intrigues plagued the Roman Empire after the death of Marcus Aurelius.
Instability in domestic affairs translated into weakness in foreign affairs. The Roman
military unravelled many times in the face of invading tribes in the third century. The
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instability manifested itself in many shapes and forms. The constant need for manpower
to mount a rebellion or to fend one off necessitated many resources. This put unnecessary
stress on the fiscal system. Moreover, additional stress was added by the strife itself.
Battles were fought on Roman territory amongst Romans and against foreign invaders.
The dire need to meet increasing fiscal obligations was met with currency devaluation.
The repeated debasing of Roman currency was taken to all new levels. Soon, the Roman
Empire’s economy was stricken with hyperinflation.12
This general overview of the social, economic and political realities confronting
the Empire prior to the reforms directly relates to the one institution upon which most of
the fiscal weight rested. The curialis was presented with increasing demands on the part
of the imperial administration. The central government evidently needed to meet its needs
financially and thus the extractors were harder pressed. Yet, the demand for more income
cannot be linked with certainty to the decline of this civic institution. We shall soon
revisit this particular point of objection. Nevertheless, Diocletian, his imperial colleagues
and later Constantine would undertake the monumental task of reforming administrative
institutions to meet their fiscal needs and to forestall the epidemic of civil strife in
domestic affairs.
The central government was the least affected in this context. It did not see any
drastic changes in its operations generally, but saw its size quadruple due to the nature of
the Tetrarchy itself. The establishment of four emperors necessitated a fourfold increase
in central administration. Each Augustus and Caesar required a duplication of the central
government. However, some of the bureaucracy closely linked to the central
administration saw fundamental changes in their mode of operations. The bureaucratic
12
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layer and associated office which saw the most change was the Prefecture. Its power,
already considerable in itself, was expanded in the judicial and fiscal areas. Essentially,
the Praetorian Prefect saw his formidable powers remain constant, but they rested mainly
in the civil part of government.13
The noticeable expansion of offices permeated all layers of government and this is
why Lactantius made the following complaint: “…many officials and many offices were
forced upon each province and also almost every city. There were also many accountants,
magistrates and deputies of Prefects…”14 This growth could be seen in the number of
governorships, the creation of the vicariate and in other areas of administration. The
number of provinces multiplied significantly.15 As seen above, the central government
saw the emperor’s court four-fold. The layers created beyond the central apparatus were
considerable. Changes occurred at the provincial level, which necessitated intermediaries
between the center and the periphery. The reforms called for the governors of some
provinces, particularly in Asia Minor, to assume increasing administrative duties. In other
cases, governors saw their military responsibilities stripped. These civil governors were
charged with more financial duties to the center. The combination of these changes
rendered judicial responsibilities more tedious and so the Diocese was created to alleviate
the administrative burdens of the governorship. This new bureaucracy’s authority spread
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C. Kelly, "Bureaucracy and Government," in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of
Constantine, ed. N. Lenski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 186-188.
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over several provinces and its head, the vicar, assuaged the stress on the judicial system
at the provincial level.16
When the Tetrarchs and later Constantine conceptualized numerous means by
which to attain their objectives mentioned above, little did they know about the
magnitude of the fallout. These were most likely unforeseen and surely unintended.
Therefore, it is now important to examine the machinery of government, particularly the
fiscal apparatus, after the reforms were implemented. The curiales were an integral part
of the empire’s fiscal solvency. However, this administrative apparatus was not without
its problems. Political corruption was one of the most persistent troubles plaguing Roman
government for centuries. During the Republic and during the High Empire, one might
notice the rather small size of the imperial government overseeing such a large amount of
land, with the curiales at the center of the administrative machinery. Romans often saw
governmental appointments to the provinces as a venue for flagrant abuses of the locals.
There are a multitude of instances in the sources where we may note varying degrees of
political corruption. For instance, in the Late Republic, Cicero describes his predecessor’s
money lending scheme in Salamis, which was utterly fraudulent.17 Or, in the High
Empire one can read Juvenal lament this behaviour in his satires. The nature of the
narrative is evidently satirical, but the genre itself has its objective: constructive
ridiculing. The intent in this case is to ridicule the reprehensible facets of the Roman
administration of its provinces:
When you enter your long-expected Province as its Governor, set a curb
and a limit to your passion, as also to your greed ; have compassion on the
impoverished provincials, whose very bones have been sucked dry of
marrow ; have regard to what the law ordains, what the Senate enjoins ;
16
17
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Cicero, Ep. ad Atticum 5.21.
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consider what honours await the good ruler, with what a just thunderstroke
the Senate hurled down Capito and Numitor, those plunderers of the
Cilicians.18
Perhaps that is why the same satirist has Umbricius decry: “Since there is little room for
honest endeavors in Rome, and no benefits from true labor…”19 These are telling signs of
the political culture in Rome and how the provinces were seen as playgrounds where
imperial appointees could run rampant.
Above are merely a handful of examples of political corruption throughout the
three periods of Roman history. Yet, these examples do testify to the difficulty of
administrating the empire efficiently due to the poor oversight at the provincial level. The
lack of efficiency here signifies the inability of the central government to protect its
citizens from such abuses. More importantly, it also implies the ability to extract taxes
effectively without exorbitant skimming. Excess thereof would inevitably impoverish the
citizenry during future collection. The problem then translates into disturbances in the
vertical linearity between the periphery and center. Hence, political corruption at the
provincial level was often in the shadows and out of sight of the capital. As the empire
evolved, the pursuit of income grew increasingly due to a multitude of conditions, which
included corruption and institutional inefficiency. There was also the largest expenditure
in the imperial budget, the Roman military.
The reality reported from the periphery to the center could easily be fabricated or
exaggerated. This is of particular interest when related to fiscal affairs. The curiales were
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thus in some ways part of the systemic financial problems confronting the Roman Empire.
Political corruption, wars, the size of the army, maintenance of infrastructure and other
matters put a constant stress on the imperial coffers. At the local level, in the provinces,
the curialis was fundamentally the mortar holding the bricks together that compose the
imperial fisc. Hence, in any case, the curia would always bear the brunt of reforms
targeting imperial finances.
Yet, in Late Antiquity, the pursuit to rationalize the imperial administration did
not solve the laundry list of problems, for the emperors “manifestly had less and less
direct personal knowledge of affairs, making them easy to fool inside the palace and to
impersonate outside it.”20 This necessarily facilitated corruption on unprecedented levels.
Things had thus not changed very much after the Tetrarchic reforms with regard to
corruption. Ammianus Marcellinus recounts events at Tripoli in which he describes a
count’s extortion scheme and how this same count sought to hide his crimes by
cooperating with the Master of Offices in Rome at the expense of Tripolitans.21 Hence, in
this particular case, the military official at the provincial level was cooperating with a
centralized and newly created office, a product of the growth of government. Almost two
centuries later, the Justinian Code would again try to redress this problem with highly
charged rhetoric.22 This is a very stark indication of the persisting reality. Thus, the
reforms, which were aimed at increasing fiscal solvency amongst many other designs, did
not in fact accomplish one of its primary goals. The aim to have a more elaborate and
efficient control of the periphery in fact failed. It did succeed in other areas, such as the
20
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pacification of internal strife. This was achieved with the division of the civil and military
branches, along with the multiplication of provinces.
Apart from a few respites, financial woes persisted after the Tetrarchic reforms.
The curialis was subject to a multitude of legislation in the Theodosian Code as a result.
The reforms did not only affect the curia, but also caused a cultural, political and
economic shift. The evolution of imperial political power under the Dominate and
thereafter was in some ways unprecedented. The cult of personality or rather the charisma
associated with the emperor’s authority beginning with Diocletian translated into a
physical and social distance between the center and the periphery. The creation of
numerous bureaucratic layers between the emperor and the provincials is the reason why
this occurred. The available evidence in form of petitions originating from the provinces
and their associated rescripts is very limited in the period following Diocletian.23 This is a
result of the sudden elevation of the imperial office. The fluid and constant flow of
communication between the periphery and the center was no more. Thus, the oft-quoted
exchange between Pliny the Younger, the Governor of Bithynia, and Trajan concerning
Christians is symbolic of an emperor’s less lofty status prior to the establishment of the
Dominate.24 Although, in this case, the communications were between a governor and an
emperor, there is a clear indication of a leader, who is more in touch with the day-to-day
workings of the empire itself.
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A small government administrating a large empire without efficient oversight
appears to have maintained the same problem, namely corruption, while attempting to
achieve institutional efficiency. The government was now larger and the layers between
the center and the periphery permitted and even fostered an increasing amount of political
corruption. This context is of utmost importance to understanding the plight of the
curialis, who now found himself demoted in a large sea of imperial officials.
The Tetrarchic reforms as mentioned above created a whole new set of challenges
while attempting to redress one of the most pressing issues of the empire itself, political
corruption. The empire faced an increasing amount of fiscal woes due to a multitude of
issues such as the size of Roman-administered territory and its proportional relationship
to military spending. This is not to mention civil wars and administrative corruption,
amongst many other drains on the fiscal system. However large the military expenditures
were, there was little reason to reduce its size due to the perpetual threats from the Near
East, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Danube. Thus, the efforts to extract taxes
efficiently were a priority by necessity.
However, one thing remained constant over the centuries surprisingly, the curiales
and their duties at the local level. As quoted above, Libanius is one of the earliest known
literary sources that decry the plight of the old administrative institution of the municipal
council. Even more so, in this same context, he is also one of the first authors to lament
the dilapidated status of the civic-minded provincial administration, an irrefutable sign of
the restructuring of Roman society, an inevitable outcome of the Tetrarchic reforms.
However, questions remain when revisiting the scholarly debate in this context. Is
Libanius truthful about the statistics? Or is he partially telling the truth, masking the nub
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of his complaints with his expertise in rhetoric? It may be a possibility that the orator in
fact exaggerated the numerical decline in order to buttress his real concern: the demise of
the civic-oriented cultural and political structure.25 The notables had turned their
attentions away from the city towards the center. Distortion of reality is no novelty in
ancient sources. Libanius, a product of the educational system, paideia, was a very clever
rhetorician and his use of rhetorical devices such as a hyperbole would therefore be of no
surprise. When attempting to underscore a point, distorting reality as Herodotus’ figures
of the Battle of Thermopylae26 was by no means an academic or literary crime as it is
considered today. At the moment this is mere speculation, as the evidence must be
scoured in order to reach a verdict on the quantification of the curiales’ “flight.” To draw
comparable analogies, a state senator seeking to become a congressman is not one who is
fleeing the state senate. A member of the board of directors seeking to become CEO is
not fleeing the board. This is especially the case with the most eminent curiales. With
regard to this segment, the evidence in the sources does not substantiate a flight caused
by the most horrid conditions. On the contrary, these very notables’ finances were well
above any threat of imminent ruin. They had more than enough capital to buy their way
into the bureaucracy. However, the middling and more humbling curiales were left to
bear the brunt with a decreasing pool of wealthy colleagues that could pay for any
shortcomings during collection and whose properties were very much fiscal assets for the
treasury. Then again in some cases, property was not a determinant factor for curial
charges; the load was spread evenly irrespective of owned assets.27
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A FLIGHT OF CURIALES?
Arguably, the most used evidence to support this line of argumentation is found in legal
documents. First the Theodosian Code and then the Justinian Code provide a plethora of
legal evidence, which may be seen in the vein of a “flight.” The outcome of the
institutional reforms under the Tetrarchs was surely not entirely foreseen. The creation of
many additional layers between the province and the capital resulted in a socio-political
crisis due to the creation of power vacuums at numerous levels. Another glaring example
of the curia’s decline could be found in Athens. An inscription dedicated to Dexippus
numbers the Areopagus at 750 members in the third century, prior to the Tetrarchic
reforms.28
However, inscriptions of the second half of the fourth century demonstrate that
the attrition rate was very high, reducing this number to 300.29 Though one of the most
significant problems with this statistical anomaly is the historical context, which is
essential to the understanding of this substantial decline. The decrease is not in anyway
surprising, when we examine the empire as a whole. Jones, Bowman and Nichols have
convincingly demonstrated that the average size of a curia during the period of the High
Empire was far below 300. They varied in size, anywhere from 50 to 100.30 The
chronological gap is evidently a factor, but the fact that the city’s council was rather
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sizeable for the third century is anomalous. For centuries, Athens was a shell of its former
self in size due to a multitude of events such as its sacking by Sulla or later by the Heruli.
Thus, this particular case cannot be taken as evidence of a broader phenomenon.
The city of Timgad in North Africa provides us with one of the most interesting
documents related to this topic. The album of Timgad dates from the second half of the
fourth century. It was either composed under the reign of Julian or Valentinian I.31 If it is
dated in the reign of Julian, it may serve as a testimony to the emperor’s efforts to
decentralize the imperial administration by restoring the office of the curialis and the
lands seized by the imperial administration to the city councils. The album lists 263
names (at the most 284).32 For the purpose of this study, one figure draws attention. This
city of North Africa reinforces the notion stated above. No more than 10,000 to 15,000
inhabited the city at its peak in the later phase of the High Empire, while the council itself
numbered at least 149 according to the album, which is dated to the later fourth century.33
The total is evidently above the average stated above, but the number is still relatively
low compared to Athens and thus highlights the anomaly in the Attic city. Then again,
the proportion between the city’s population and the number of curiales is not troubling.
For such a city to have that amount of curiales over half a century after the Tetrarchic
reforms elapsed does indicate that the flight of the curiales may not have been as
substantial as believed.
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Libanius also provides us with some statistical figures of another town in the East.
In his correspondence with Celsus in Cilicia, the subject of discussion is once again the
size of the curia. According to the letter, Celsus found Alexandria ad Issum with “but one”
curialis and then sought to rectify the situation by augmenting the total to fifteen.
Libanius recounts the predicament as such:
Immediately from the start, you seemed worthy of our hopes for you when
you found but one man - I hear who was disabled - in the curia of
Alexandria. In the span of two days, not by force, but by clear
expectations, you caused this number to grow to fifteen. Because you
showed the curiales that they would not be prey to those who plunder
cities, you brought back some from the mountains and you coaxed others
hiding under their beds to serve their city as if it were for profit.34
Libanius, being the clever rhetorician he is, seemingly injects a rather glaring hyperbole
into his correspondence once again. The description of curiales hiding in the mountains
and even under beds demonstrates the level of his abilities in expressing his political
opinion effectively. In reality, what is most likely occurring in this particular episode is
not represented in Libanius’ words. It is more plausible that the arrival of the governor
did not cause any enthusiasm amongst the curiales.
A. Laniado states that this “chiffre anecdotique” is not a representation of reality:
“On aurait cependant tort d’en conclure que la curie ne comptait qu’un seul membre.”35 It
is more conceivable that Celsus sought the curiales out to establish communications,
being the newly appointed governor of the province, but they did not feel the obligation
to greet him. Moreover, another possibility may be considered. Those who were in the
34
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mountains may have been monks, who were once curiales.36 Moreover, the size of the
curia is another concern. Alexandria ad Issum is by no means a substantial city center.
However, at the Council of Nicaea, Hesychius of Alexandria Minor was in attendance
and there is also evidence for Bishop Aristion in the Acta Sanctorum.37 Therefore, it may
be deduced that the presence of a bishop in a city is directly related to the city’s size.
Hence, Alexandria ad Issum was not an inconsiderable population center. As a result,
Libanius’ words may not be taken at face value once again. In this particular instance, the
employment of a rhetorical trope, a hyperbole, is in all likelihood used to express the
rhetorician’s opinion on the given topic.
The difficulty is twofold when examining Libanius’ figures. First, he is very much
opposed to innovation. The dread of innovation was a rather common characteristic of
Roman civilization. The pivotal fourth century saw monumental innovations, notably in
the areas of religion and government. Yet, the orator had no difficulty adapting the new
governmental system to his own interests. It appears that the distaste for any innovation is
genuine, until Libanius himself could be its beneficiary. This leads to the second
difficulty, which lies in his associations with imperial high society. Although he
developed some form of a friendship with Emperor Julian, Libanius demonstrates a
repeated support for the former more decentralized system of government, which hinged
largely upon the curia.38 The rhetorician was connected within the network of high

36

CTh 12.1.63.
A.K. Bowman, The Town Councils of Roman Egypt, American studies in papyrology (Toronto:
A. M. Hakkert, 1971), 22.; B.H. Cowper, Syriac miscellanies, 1 vols. (London: Williams and
Norgate, 1861). In this particular case, the city of Alexandria ad Issum is also known as
Alexandria Minor and Alexandretta.
38
Or. 18.147-148 where Libanius champions the curia and Julian’s efforts to restore it. He then
proceeds to denounce Constantius II whom he alleges to have fostered the decline of the city
council. According to Libanius, the emperor enabled the wealthier curiales to abandon their posts.
37

27

society, particularly the imperial families. When he was at the zenith of his career,
Libanius was in the close entourage of Theodosius I. Yet, there is no evidence of him
wielding significant power in the imperial court. His trepidation and even scorn aimed at
innovation and at Christianity is rather unmistakeable. Innovation was a clear threat to
τάξις and Libanius amongst many others deplored any changes to “the same old, same
old” mindset.

THE RESTRUCTURING OF ROMAN SOCIETY
The contempt of innovation held by such figures as Libanius directed itself towards the
vast expansion of the imperial bureaucracy at the turn of the fourth century. Innovation
was a clear threat to τάξις, as it was the case for Cato the Elder, Symmachus and John
Lydus, who deplored any change to the established ways, whether it be in Greek culture,
the Altar of Victory or the imperial government, respectively. This was surely the case
for Libanius only until it was advantageous to his own machinations. The creation of new
bureaucratic layers in government offered the aristocracy new venues for prestigious
political careers. Yet, the expansion of government that occurred under the Tetrarchs and
Constantine restructured social, political and economic structures. This thus required an
evolution of the social hierarchy. The political field would witness a logical
reorganization due to the prospects, and the evolution of cultural, social and economic

In the same Oration (Or. 18.192-193), Libanius proceeds to commend Julian’s humble ways. He
then describes the curiae’s vanity in trying to outdo one another with crown gold contributions to
the emperor (undoubtedly, a clever rhetorical juxtaposition). Other attempts to relieve the cities
financially are highlighted by the rhetorician: Or. 2.58, 18.135-139; Julian, Misop. 365b, 367d368b.
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capital. The upper stratum of the curia could now maintain its prominence, but more
importantly expand it into a new frontier.
Yet Libanius was but a simple curialis, not a principalis. His family’s preeminent
status in Antioch was diminished by the time he was born due to participation in political
intrigue.39 He attained such heights in Roman society due to the social and cultural
capital he gained from the educational system, which enabled him to mingle with high
society. Moreover, it also demonstrates the other side of this institutional evolution
occurring in Roman government. With the help of well-to-do parents, high education
enabled the individual to enter the imperial bureaucracy.40 Libanius complained about his
contemporaries’ penchant for vocational training. However, the traditional form of
education in Greek rhetoric still offered the best access to the imperial bureaucracy.41
Hence, education was the primary driver, but near impossible to access without sufficient
pedigree. This was a viable alternative to the paradigm mentioned above, which is
primarily centered on social class.
Nevertheless, the reproduction of social hierarchy achieved through the
educational system or through social class now favoured the well-educated aristocrat and
the principalis. A new system of subtle social exclusivity was created as an inevitable
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corollary of the restructuring process.42 The curia was one institution, but its members
were far from one and the same with regard to cultural, symbolic and economic capital.43
The social stratification within it is well attested in the sources, particularly in the context
of flogging. Principales could oppress and physically discipline less prominent curiales.44
Libanius evidently benefitted from these changes. However, many of the local aristocrats
serving in the curiae could only still gaze at a ceiling. This ceiling once stratified the
aristocracy on a local level, but now it stratified it on a much broader level geographically.
The wealthier component now drew away from local politics and could have privileged
access to transformed social, economic and cultural capital.45 The re-stratification of the
aristocracy was now based along civic and imperial lines. This is in contrast to P. Diaz,
who proposes that this evolution produced curiales who “belonged to a genuinely urban
middle class.”46 The term used is inaccurate due to the sheer nature of the anachronism.
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However, P. Garnsey, with whom Diaz agrees, correctly points out that the curial class
was downgraded in the social scale.47
The innovation was problematic, for it caused a series of fundamental changes.
This expansion of central authority effected one of the most fundamental political
institutions of the Roman Empire, the curia. A structure that endured the test of time was
to undergo a monumental transformation. The institution of the municipal council
epitomized in the curialis was an emblem of one of the most fundamental structures of
Antiquity. The decentralized nature of the Roman Republic and the High Empire
thereafter was embodied in these civic-centered political institutions. The individual and
the city were at the center of a larger conglomeration of microcosms, that is, the Roman
Empire. The imperial capitals relied on the health of this intrinsic network of local elites
to fuel the many endeavours of the emperor. The civic-minded citizen was exemplified in
the curialis and this same centuries-old political office was the fiscal foundation of the
imperial coffers.
What had been not only the administrative heart of the imperial taxation machine,
but in many regards the cultural and political trademark of Antiquity, was now relegated
to near institutional obsoleteness. In any given province, the citizen was disposed to
gravitate towards the city in diverse areas, notably in the political field. This was not only
due to the social norms because the political actors did indeed have some form of agency.
Despite some form of a rubric to which the political actors were subjected, individuals
could not be ignored in their capacity of agency. Emperors like Diocletian or Constantine
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demonstrated this in their ability to cause a monumental cascading effect. Their decisions
permanently and fundamentally altered the political, social and economic fabric of the
Roman Empire. In the case of the Tetrarchic reforms, the political power wielded by the
emperors set a mechanism of rapid evolution into motion, restructuring long-established
socio-political structures. This was obviously not well received by many including
Libanius himself, as stated just above, who undoubtedly disdained innovation, until he
could reap any benefit from it.
Many different socio-political structures of Antiquity did not endure institutional
change unscathed because a whole new set of challenges caused some to evolve and
others to disintegrate ultimately. The Tetrarchic reforms revamped a whole set of social,
economic and political structures, which had already undergone centuries of a rather slow
evolution. The result of these developments was felt quite strongly at the local level
where the reforms necessitated drastic change. In this context, the curialis would
eventually succumb to these new developments. What was civic-oriented was now
capital-centered; what was a provincial curialis was now an imperial bureaucrat; what
was centrifugal was now centric. Therefore, it is important to determine what immediate
impact the reforms had on the curialis himself.
Therefore, the theory, which stresses the flight of the curiales is not entirely
accurate, due to the stress put on the historical evolution of the office and the tendency to
acknowledge the panoply of changes caused by the reforms themselves. The reforms
were not only conceived to address fiscal issues. They were also conceptualized for many
other reasons, one stemming from a century-long period of civil wars in which the loyalty
of aristocrats, commanders and soldiers was often in doubt. It was also a period in which
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both the threats from within and without were proportionally linked to the size of the
army and thus by extent military expenditures. Undoubtedly, military expenditures were
by far the largest expense in the imperial budget. Hence, political and fiscal stability were
at a premium. This same theory, which emphasizes vacancies at the city level, examines
the deterioration of the curialis office as a result of a failure to perform essential duties.
There is a stress on impoverishment, but this interpretation is in some respects
downplaying the larger context, stated above. In essence, the curiales are seen as a cause
of the Roman Empire’s decline instead of a subsidiary of a drastic restructuring of once
what seemed to be everlasting political, economic and social structures. In the following
pages, we shall visit a few instances in which we might note this development.
At the municipal level, the institutional vacuum created by the reforms of the
Tetrarchs and Constantine had many unintended consequences, as so many reforms do to
this day. The ceiling for the provincial elites was suddenly raised to unparalleled heights.
While in the past, provincials would generally obtain promotions through the military or
through imperial subjective favour based on some form of qualification. In the High
Empire, participation in Roman politics was a contentious issue as the Lyon Tablet
proves.48 Claudius Pompeianus is one good example among many that testify to the
qualification-based promotion. A Syrian of rather humble origins with respect to high
society, Pompeianus soon rose through the military hierarchy and was later betrothed to
the daughter of Marcus Aurelius in marriage.49 However, with the Tetrarchic reforms
social mobility amongst elites was much more institutionalized and widespread and less
ad hoc as it was prior to Diocletian. The period immediately following the reforms did
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necessitate social mobility in high volume. Moreover, social mobility was possible in the
era following the expansion of government, but much of it was illegal or soon made to be
illegal. Therefore, we are presented with a panoply of evidence in which we may note a
movement of curiales into the revamped and expanded imperial administration.
In Side, a city in the province of Pamphylia, epigraphic evidence testifies to a
certain Bryonianus Lollianus, who fits the paradigm, conceptualized by M. Rostovtzeff.
The evidence for Bryonianus’ life is dated to the late third and early fourth centuries.50
Bryonianus escaped his duties to Side as a curialis. One might examine this piece of
evidence and immediately categorize it as undeniable proof of the flight of the curiales.
However, being from a family of senatorial lineage, Bryonianus married into another
senatorial family only to receive employment in the imperial bureaucracy. Before this
rise to prominence in the imperial system, Bryonianus and his family were no strangers to
euergetism in Side, a cultural hallmark of the now revamped social, political and
economic structures. For example, Bryonianus’ family was responsible for the restoration
of the vital municipal aqueduct.51
The issue with this case is rooted in the identification of causation. This evidence
can easily be taken out of context, due to the fact that Bryonianus is allegedly fleeing his
duties as a curialis in his city. Yet, that does not appear to be the case, for the noted
motion does not indicate it. The motion is initiated by attraction and not by repulsion. In
other words, the system of causation is not internal, but external; eminent curiales were
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drawn out to greener pastures and not driven out by economic and political conditions in
the city. Therefore, this phenomenon must be viewed from an entirely different angle and
that is rather difficult because the scholarly trend has in some respects shaped the
understanding of such evidence. The initial attraction into the bureaucracy and the
Church then caused secondary problems. The lesser curiales left behind still had to
shoulder the responsibilities. With the departures, these duties, particularly with respect
to fiscality and to finances, were not easily born by the remaining civic officials. These
curiales in all likelihood sought an exit.
Nevertheless, in the case of Bryonianus, he was not fleeing his duties. On the
contrary, he was doing something that many would do in this period or even today for
that matter. He sought to advance his career in a society which had until recently been
quite restricted to local affairs. The creation of layer upon layer of imperial
administration offered new possibilities to provincial elites (hence the pull and not the
push). Therefore, it is no surprise that Bryonianus, a curialis, would seek to better his
standing in Roman society by exploiting these new openings created by the Tetrarchic
reforms. In this case of Bryonianus, it is difficult to envisage some form of flight as J.-P.
Sodini does.52 In no form or fashion can this be labeled a flight when the administrative
office (curialis) is not causing flight. The term “flight” insinuates some form of escape
from a source that is problematic in nature. There is no convincing basis to validate this.
The incentive of promotion is the source of movement in this case. The distinction must
be made with respect to this development between positive and negative vectors. This
once again relates to the social, political and economic transformation of centuries-old
structures that takes place at the end of the third and beginning of the fourth centuries.
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The motion of attraction was in large part created by the creation and expansion of
imperial bureaucracies. Being a local elite and a leader of one’s city was now a much less
attractive and lucrative proposition. Hence the prospect for career advancement was the
primary source of movement in this case.
Instances of ambitious aristocrats such as those above are plentiful in the sources.
Again in Asia Minor, in the mid-fourth century, a certain Hyperechius of Ancyra’s53
career tells a similar story to that of Bryonianus. What is also of interest here is the fact
that this same local aristocrat was one of Libanius’ favourite students, despite the latter’s
lack of pedigree.54 Libanius subtly indicates this social reality in the opening lines of his
letter to Modestus.55 Interestingly, the rhetorician provided some form of career guidance
to Hyperechius, suggesting that he might remain in the provincial administrations of the
empire, specifically in Galatia. This particular piece of advice given to his disciple
reflects Libanius’ ethos discussed above in which the orator was very much an advocate
against innovation within the imperial administrative system (until he could be its
beneficiary). Yet, Hyperechius, perhaps a product of his generation, which was evidently
younger than Libanius’, viewed the expanded imperial bureaucracy as fertile grounds for
career advancement.56 He thus turned his ambitions away from the provinces to the
central apparatus of government in the army. Due to the relationship between the two
men, Libanius gladly helped Hyperechius in his pursuit. Yet, these efforts did not bear
the fruit he expected.57
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Hyperechius and his desire to establish himself in the expanded Roman
administrative machine did not end there, however. In A.D. 362, Maximus, his father,
fuelled his son’s ambitions further by suggesting that he petition for entry into the Senate
of Constantinople. Yet once again Libanius was not so supportive of Hyperechius’
pursuits. Not surprisingly, the orator urged his student to remain in Ancyra as a provincial
politician.58 His family’s prominence would ensure a great political career, but one that
was restricted to the periphery of the Roman Empire. Hyperechius was delayed in his
quest to become part of the political landscape in the capital. Later in the same year,
Hyperechius pursued entry into the Senate. Yet his father transferred the family’s
property to him. As a result of this, Hyperechius was now liable to curial duties, but that
did not stop him from persuading his city to absolve him from his duties so that he might
continue his path.59 Unfortunately, the aspiring politician did not have an ideal ending, as
he would eventually lose his life due to a poor choice of allegiance.
At any rate, there are two important details that emerge from his story. First, we
may note the generational gap between the student and the teacher (Hyperechius and
Libanius, respectively). This generational gap is important, for it offers a telling contrast
between the old and new social, political and economic structures. Hyperechius
welcomed and even relished the new opportunities for career advancement in the Roman
Empire’s expanded administration. On the other hand, Libanius as seen above on a few
occasions was not much of a proponent of the increasingly centralized government, as he
lamented the transfer of power from the periphery to the center. This is rather clear in
several of letters in which either he clearly supports the older system of governance,
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which was centrifugal, or he laments the change that has occurred through the use of
rhetorical devices. He twice urged Hyperechius to maintain the old tradition by remaining
a local elite. Libanius’ opinions and his advice are directly related to increasingly
obsolete political, social and economic structures that were restructured with the
Tetrarchic reforms. Hyperechius adhered to the innovations of the reforms and was not
reluctant to explore the new possibilities offered particularly to a man of his pedigree.
The Tetrarchic reforms, restructuring centuries-old structures, are clearly present in this
instance where the transition has been accomplished but not fully; not fully because there
were still remnants of the old system represented by the likes of Libanius.
Despite this rather quick evolution, which was triggered by the Tetrarchic reforms,
the reality on the ground could not be ignored by the capital. Financial woes were still to
plague the Roman Empire for centuries on end, with the exception of a few shortly lived
periods of prosperity. The two main problems confronting the imperial government were
paramount. On the one hand, the sudden expansion of the imperial bureaucracy at the
turn of the fourth century caused a notable institutional crisis in which many curiales
naturally sought some form of promotion in the newly revamped hierarchy of the
imperial administration. This eventually created an institutional vacuum at the local level
where the curiae were still responsible for taxation. On the other hand, the lack of
revenue at the center was still a persistent problem. Much legislation was issued to
address these problems.
In Ancyra, there is another conflict into which Libanius is drawn. Achillius, one
of his former students, left his native city to pursue his studies and ultimately practice
medicine in Palestine. When his father died in A.D. 362, by law, Achillius was compelled
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to return to his city to assume the curial duties of his father. However, he attempts to
circumvent this new reality by seeking exemption for these inherited duties to his city.60
We thus find ourselves with another letter written by the pen of Libanius but this time to
the Governor of Galatia, Maximus. In this letter, Libanius attempts to exercise his
influence on the governor while acting as a mediator for his friend. This being a simple
act of patronage remained one of the longstanding traits of Roman society.
This is not the only act of patronage where Libanius intervenes for the benefit of
Achillius. Libanius again corresponds with this same Maximus (Governor of Galatia), but
for the purpose of recommending an unidentified doctor. If we were to follow R.
Foerster’s argument, in Ep. 756, the unnamed doctor mentioned is Achillius.61 With
respect to the curial duties, C. Foss and J.-P. Sodini both view Libanius’ intervention on
behalf of Achillius as a sign of the flight of the curiales. Foss states that Achilius had
taken his curial duties “so seriously that he had drained his resources,” while Sodini,
citing Foss, in this context claims “le poids des affaires de la cité est ressenti non comme
un honneur mais comme un fardeau.”62 However, it appears that both scholars in this case
have interpreted Libanius’ rhetoric at face value and by extension have overlooked the
context.
Achillius is clearly a client of Libanius’ patronage network and the latter is thus
exerting his influence on two separate occasions, surely at the behest of his client.
Therefore, the correspondence with Maximus concerning Achillius’ curial duties in
Ancyra poses another distinct explanation instead of both Foss’ and Sodini’s
interpretation. It is more likely that Libanius was employing a rhetorical device in his
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letter, specifically a hyperbole, in order to persuade Maximus to relieve Achillius of his
civic duties. It is very plausible that Achillius was not the least interested in leaving his
livelihood in Palestine out of compulsion to return to his home city for a career that
differed drastically than his own. Although he could practice his profession, as may be
noted in the other letter to Maximus cited above, his time would eventually be shared
between both functions.
Scholarship is almost unanimous when examining the curial class in the period
following the Tetrarchic Reforms. That has thus created a fundamental problem due to
the rapidity with which a scholar might label any evidence relating to the curialis leaving
his civic duties as a “flight.” However, the context, the rhetoric and the lucrativeness of a
position within the expanded imperial administration must be accounted for. Yet, when
presented with evidence that appears to indicate some form of “flight” as seen above in
many different cases, it is quickly assumed that the office of the curialis is the least
lucrative and most burdensome position one could have in politics and thus it must be a
push and not a pull factor involved. The historical problem lies not in the sudden change
in the outlook of the office (from a boon to a bane), but in the changing demographics
occurring at the local level. The reforms created a new objective for the particularly
young local elite and this objective was not in the provincial capital, even less within his
native city. The revamped and expanded imperial administration was the object of desire
of many aspiring politicians and civil servants in the periphery. The culture of the empire
changed very quickly in what seems to be less than a decade. The structures, which had
long been defining characteristics of imperial Rome and even to a certain extent Classical
Greece, were now turned on their head. Euergetism, civic pride and local independence
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were now becoming a relic of the past. This is rather clear in the West where many
aristocrats receded from the capital and from the limelight of public life. They withdrew
to their estates and either took part in the administration in a much more isolated fashion
or simply joined the Church. The long-term effects of the reforms amongst other things
can be seen in the letters of both Sidonius Apollinaris and Ruricius of Limoges. The once
confrontational, factional and extraordinarily ambitious aristocrat of Rome was
increasingly harder to find in urban settings. Noblemen increasingly communicated
through correspondence, and neither in a city council nor a forum.

UNFETTERED SOCIAL MOBILITY, ITS CONSEQUENCES AND THE
IMPERIAL RESPONSE
The results of the Tetrarchic reforms have been discussed at length above, notably the
social, political and economic effects. How these reforms restructured what seemed to be
timeless structures caused a significant social crisis that affected governance and thus
fiscal solvency. Presented with this new and surely unforeseen challenge, the Roman
Empire could only react to the unintended consequences of the Tetrarchic Reforms. In
this context, it is important to begin with the imperial administration’s attempt to control
the institutional vacuum created by the reforms themselves. These gaps in the curia left
by the notables compounded many enduring problems such as the increasing need for
revenue, rampant corruption and the lack of tight oversight.
Legislation was issued in scores to control the social and economic crisis caused
by this unbridled social mobility. The problem could only be addressed through law for
the most part as we come to notice an attempt to fossilize the classes in Roman society,
notably at the local level, whether it be in the military, in the curia, in professions or in
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the fields. A new pattern begins to emerge in which the Roman citizen was in many cases
destined by law to inherit the trade of his father. However, this brief moment in which the
imperial court permitted some form of social mobility was immediately followed by a
very strong pendulum swing in the opposite direction. Laws were issued in many forms
and fashions with one object in mind: limiting the flood from the curia to the imperial
bureaucratic apparatus. Yet, at the same time, many of the local aristocrats were able to
gain some form of immunity by entering the upper echelons of Roman government,
notably at the senatorial level. In the following pages, we shall examine the capital’s
attempt to curtail the exodus of local aristocrats, particularly the curiales, into the
imperial bureaucracy.
Many different methods were employed to stall the flood of curiales pushing its
way into the imperial administration. One of the main concerns in this particular social
trend was the loss of fiscal revenue. Hence, the emperor and his legislative apparatus
attempted to target an area, which could harm any provincial noble the hardest: property.
In an attempt to discourage the local aristocrats from exiting their cities and leaving
behind their curial duties, the government sought to regulate their property holdings. In
A.D. 396, when the son of a curialis would not follow his father’s career path, emperors
Valentinian and Theodosius permitted the curia to seize up to a quarter of the son’s
property.63 This legislative move made by the imperial court could only minimally
dampen the effects of the institutional vacuum. The loss of wealthy aristocrats to the
upper echelons of the imperial machine of governance was in many cases permanent. The
curia would lose essential manpower and by extension vital sources of revenue. The
whole property would not be subject to the curia any longer. Instead of a certain amount
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of very wealthy local aristocrats serving on the city council, namely as chief curiales, in
many cases an urban center’s government would be destitute of the very wealthy
citizens.64 Many would acquire fiscal immunities through numerous methods as will soon
be examined. One must then consider the significantly negative implications of the
Tetrarchic reforms. They may have been conceptualized to address serious fiscal and
political problems, but, in fact, they appear, at this point in the analysis, to have
exacerbated the fiscal crisis.
Taxis was considered to be a necessary feature in the Roman Empire. However,
the reforms, which sought to address social crises, particularly civil wars stemming from
usurpations, actually caused another disruption to the ever so valued taxis. Essentially the
Tetrarchic reforms necessitated further reforms, surely an undesired outcome of the initial
legislative intentions. The cursus honorum was one of the key features of the Roman
Republic’s political landscape. Although it diminished in importance over the centuries
and its mention in the sources decreases over time, the stability it provided is not to be
underestimated. Already at the beginning of the fourth century, in A.D. 317, the imperial
court was fully aware of the social crisis the Tetrarchic reforms created. The expansion of
the bureaucracy muddled the promotion system and thus caused chaos due to the
privileges associated to some honorific titles.
In a law of that same year (A.D. 317), Constantine and his legal team were
already confronted with this reality and thus promulgated a law to restore some form of
order in the cursus. In the confusion, curiales were purchasing ranks such as
perfectissimus, ducenae, centenae and egregiatus without respecting the due course.
Their objective in this instance was “to dodge their civic duties” and that evidently
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included fiscal advantages.65 In this same law, the imperial court explains that there is a
proper and honourable way to attain these titles. This way involves “paying one’s dues”
in the system itself without any form of circumvention. The law also discusses other
situations in which one can obtain these honorific ranks, but the curiales are of interest
here. The law states if the curiales were to fulfill “all the duties of their native city”66 only
then would they have a legitimate claim to their honorific ranks.
However, in other cases, the curiales were seeking to explore the new
opportunities created by the reforms by buying their way into the expanded bureaucracy.
This was far from a novelty. The venality of offices was a political reality since the days
of the republic. For example, in the first century B.C., Caesar almost bankrupted himself
in the process of securing the office of Pontifex Maximus. Suetonius described the vast
amounts of bribery and money that was spent in the process.67 However in the Roman
Empire, the social, economic and political restructuring of centuries-old structures
enabled what was surely an astounding amount of cases, for Justinian would issue a
cornerstone piece of legislation to address the issue almost six-hundred years after
Caesar.68 In between, it would be no surprise to find cases of rampant venality of offices.
In the same law stated above addressing the fulfillment of curial duties, that particular
problem is highlighted.69 For the wealthier and more ambitious aristocrats, it should not
be a surprise at all to find them in the sources seeking better opportunities, especially
when taking into consideration the effectiveness of purchasing offices. This was seen
above in the case of Hyperechius when his father, Maximus, encouraged him to seek
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entry into the imperial administration. Not to mention there is another characteristic that
is rather noticeable. Money seeks the least amount of resistance and that lesser amount of
resistance could be found in the imperial bureaucracy. There were too many lucrative
reasons not to stay in the local administration. The ceiling was now raised and therefore
an illustrious political career in a city became an early stepping-stone in the scheme of
things for more fortunate individuals. Roman culture by necessity changed as a result.
What was the civic-minded local elite investing his resources in the city itself and more
importantly collecting taxes for the imperial fisc was no more than an intermediate phase
in a career.
Hyperechius becomes relevant to another systemic problem in the Roman Empire.
As explained above, his pursuit of a career within the imperial administration was
facilitated by the assistance of his father, Maximus, and Libanius. Due to his connections
and also due to the prestige associated with his family, Hyperechius was able to petition
the curia to absolve him from his curial duties. Again, the imperial administration was
forced to respond to this undesired release from curial duties. In the case of Hyperechius,
due to his family’s eminence within the locale, he was able to sever his ties to the curia.
Curiously, several decades prior to these events, Constantine issued laws attempting to
thwart such movements in A.D. 313, 315 and 326. The emperor sought to eradicate the
possibility of exemptions, stating poverty as a possible cause for the petition. Any such
petition could no longer be brought before local authorities, but before the imperial
court.70 Strangely in the case of Hyperechius, poverty was far from an issue and
furthermore he could still be excused from his curial duties. Then again, in A.D. 325,
Constantine again issued a similar law, but this time prohibiting the movement of curiales
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from one city to another. The result of such an action would require the curialis to assume
the duties of both cities.71 The imperial government was desperately trying to reform the
unanticipated fallout of the Tetrarchic reforms.
What appears to be occurring on the ground is a total loss of institutional control.
The reforms necessitated further reforms to address the unmitigated crisis caused by the
former. The capital promulgated many laws to address the revenue problems created by
the constant flow of wealthy aristocrats into the imperial administration where often they
would be immune to taxes and/or to compensate for any deficit in tax collection. Hence,
as these same wealthy local noblemen flocked to the more lucrative positions offered by
the expansion of the imperial administration, more modest citizens would take their place.
Yet, the curiae were still required to meet the same demands fiscally by the imperial court,
but without the same taxable resources (i.e. the principales). Constantine issued a law in
A.D. 320 and then again in 329, which was very telling although it is from a different
context:
A constitution was issued which directs that henceforth no decurion or
descendant of a decurion or even any person provided with adequate
resources and suitable to undertake compulsory public services shall take
refuge in the name and the service of the clergy, but that in the place of
deceased clerics thereafter only those persons shall be chosen as
substitutes who have slender fortunes and who are not held bound to such
compulsory municipal services.72

71

CTh 12.1.12.
CTh 16.2.3: Cum constitutio emissa praecipiat nullum deinceps decurionem vel ex decurione
progenitum vel etiam instructum idoneis facultatibus adque obeundis publicis muneribus
opportunum ad clericorum nomen obsequiumque confugere, sed eos de cetero in defunctorum
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consortio sociaverint. (I use C. Pharr’s translation here.) CTh 12.1.49 also highlights the
fraudulent alienation of property in the case of curiales making their way into the Church.
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Despite the fact that this law treats the curiales and their entry into Church, there is one
important element that underscores the main issue with the institutional crisis caused by
the Tetrarchic Reforms. The imperial court is particularly interested here in the affluence
of the individuals involved and not only in their assigned civic duties. The less affluent
were also barred from entering the Church, but the stress on the assets of the candidate is
telling. The central administration was not enthusiastic to see principales depart for a
career in the Church. The casualties suffered at the local level are further highlighted
when Constantius and Constans mandated that any curialis who moved on to another
career ought to reimburse the financial loses incurred by the curia due to his departure.73
In A.D. 364, Valentinian and Valens were still attempting to curtail movement
into the upper echelons of the imperial administration. In this instance, vast wealth is
once again of concern. Entry into the senate required the candidate to possess a handsome
sum of money. Moreover, entry into the senate most often involved immunity from
taxation. Both emperors in this case reiterate the need for taxis in the administrative
hierarchy. Any senator had to have fulfilled all curial duties before being officially
accepted. In addition, he had to have all the legitimate documents to substantiate the
promotion. The mention of this once again underscores the rampant cases of venality of
offices and the flagrant disregard of assigned civic duties.74 One can only guess the
amount of principales who made their way into the imperial bureaucracy legally and
illegally. The drain on the curiae across the empire must have been ruinous as a result, if
there was an insistence on the particular wealth of the curialis and the debt owed to the
municipality again and again in the laws. It seems at this point that the imperial court
73

CTh 12.1.29; over a decade later (A.D. 353 and 357), Constantius II was still issuing legislation
attempting to thwart the movement of curiales (CTh 12.1.40).
74
For venality: CTh 12.1.57.

47

created a permanent drain on fiscal revenue due to its inability to control the movement
within the social hierarchy. The wealthier elements of the aristocracy easily circumvented
imperial law to enter the imperial bureaucracy:
Provision has been made not to permit decurions and sons of decurions to
cheat the best interests of the municipal councils, even though they should
give themselves with real interest to the compulsory duties of the imperial
service. When, therefore, they take refuge in the oaths of imperial service
only for the purpose of refusing to perform their compulsory duties for the
advantage of their municipalities, the falsehoods of such fraud will be
easily suppressed. For We have learned that very many of the aforesaid
persons have given their names to the imperial service or have resorted to
the support of patronage, with the purpose that, after a short time, they
might be given honorable discharges…and to the performance of the
compulsory public services of their municipalities, they shall direct the
attentive care of their zealous minds.75
This passage is accentuates the point in many respects. First, it highlights the migration’s
scale from the municipal councils to the imperial bureaucracy. Second, it underscores the
wealthy curiales’ value to their respective municipia (surely financial above all). Lastly, it
discusses the methods used to exit the municipia honorably in a questionable way
(namely social capital). Nevertheless, the control of fiscal revenues was one of the
primary objectives of the Tetrarchic Reforms ironically. It appears that the intentions
were rational, but the implementation seems to have given rise to a fundamental paradox
between theory and practice.
With the Tetrarchs also came the expansion of another institution, the Church.
With the legitimization of its status amongst the Roman pantheon under Constantine, its
already considerable growth accelerated. The opportunities it offered were also lucrative
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to the curiales of all types. To be specific, in A.D. 313, Constantine absolved all
clergymen from curial duties.76 However, the imperial government quickly realized how
this hindered their ability to exact taxes efficiently. The same emperor therefore reissued
another law in A.D. 329, stating that the rich were obligated to fulfill their secular duties
and the Church’s wealth had to assist the poor. Moreover, those who served the Church,
but were eligible to serve the municipal council were to be relocated to the latter.77
Therefore one ought to question the lucrativeness of a position within the Church. The
sources do confirm that a considerable amount of curiales made their way into the clergy.
The incentives to leave the city council for the Church, though, are difficult to define.
There is not one sole explanation for the occurrences. Nevertheless, one pattern in the
sources is rather noticeable: the financial allure.78 This can be confirmed by examining
the situation from the opposite angle. As it was the case for the migration to the imperial
bureaucracy, the central government was alarmed by its loss of revenue stemming from
this phenomenon. Eventually, the imperial government would relax its grip over this sort
of mobility, specifically to the high clergy.79 Though, it must be noted that C. Rapp
correctly points out that the phenomenon’s explanation cannot be oversimplified with a
materialist interpretation.80
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When examining, the migration from the curia to the Church, the latter’s
requirements were not rigid. Although there was a loose form of a cursus, it was not
always respected. The sources often tell of men that were not qualified, but still attained
the heights of the episcopate. Moreover, the secular way of conducting business carried
over into the Church, as political competition was not uncommon. It is then not surprising
that cultural, economic and symbolic capital enhanced the chances of those aspiring to be
bishop.81
Therefore, from a broad view, there was undoubtedly some form of incentive to
enter the Church. For the more affluent Romans, the high clergy was very lucrative. It
offered the power of cultural, economic and symbolic capital. In the case of the high
clergy, the fact that simony and nepotism were common testifies that there were many
incentives to seek access to the Church.82 For some more modest curiales, the Church
was an escape. The curia, having lost most of its eminent members, still had to meet the
same demands. Hence, the lower clergy and monasteries offered relief. Although, the
high clergy may have been a possibility for some, it was not an easy venture considering
their lack of capital. The curiales who entered the high clergy would eventually see a
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decline in issuances of laws on their social mobility. However, that was not the case for
the rest. As one could see in the Codex Theodosianus and the Novellae of Valentinian and
Majorian, the decrease in debit did not occur concurrently. There are institutional reasons
for this that will be addressed in a subsequent section. The loss of personnel in the
municipal councils, particularly the wealthier elements, could not be compounded by a
decline in middling and more humble individuals. Such a deficit was to be avoided: “But
We prohibit by the present law that in the future a decurion shall be received for the
ecclesiastical ministries, so that fiscal necessities may be fulfilled the more easily by a
large number of decurions.”83
The expansion of imperial political culture better describes the movement
between the municipal councils and the bureaucracy. The provincial civic-minded elite
was the political foundation of the Roman Empire until the Tetrarchic reforms. However,
around the turn of the fourth century, the curiae in the provinces became increasingly
hollow, but nevertheless they still technically formed the foundation of the empire itself.
The term flight cannot be used in this particular structural evolution, for the evidence is
more layered. The numerous laws issued attempting to control the political hierarchy’s
stability show a chronological trend. A. Laniado correctly points this out. In the
Theodosian Code, the frequency of laws culminates in the fourth-century, particularly at
its end, while the fifth-century sees a steady decline. This analysis ends with Anastasius,
who himself only published two laws concerning the curiales and their social mobility.84
The reforms of the Tetrarchs opened the floodgates to uncontrollable social mobility
83

Valentinian, Nov. 3.3. (I here provide Pharr’s translation.)
CJ 7.39.5; 10.32.66; for Theodosius II: Theodosius, Nov. 3.6; 7.2.1-2; 7.4.2, 5-6; 9; 10.1; 15.12; 22.1-2; CJ 1.3.21 (=10.32.60); Marcian: CJ 1.39.2; 12.2.1; Leo I: CJ 1.3.27; 1.36.1; 5.27.4;
10.32.61-63; 12.57.14; Zeno: CJ 10.32.64-65; 10.34.3.
84

51

mainly geared towards careers in the imperial bureaucracy. However, as decades passed
and these positions were eventually filled and even cemented for many families, the debit
of imperial legislation slowed to a halt. The central government seemed to abandon its
pursuit of control, but, in reality, the social mobility in this area stabilized.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
The loss of revenues caused by wealthy curiales seeking promotions into the imperial
system was no longer a socio-political problem that needed to be rectified as much as a
reality to accept. This further reinforces the notion of a total restructuring of Roman
social, political and economic structures. The elite’s ambitions within the Roman Empire
were no longer quenched by careers in the curiae, but within the verticality of the Roman
administration. The central government seems to have accepted this actuality in the fifth
century when the aforementioned restructuring of structures had already been
accomplished. As a result, it is rather difficult to accept a disappearance of the curiales in
the sixth century as M. Whittow and M. Waelkens propose. On the contrary, this most
likely occurred after the seventh century collapse(s) when fundamental restructuring took
place yet again.85 Their institutional value and their numbers may have changed, but their
existence cannot be questioned.
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The increasing silence in the sources with respect to curiales starting in the fifth
century is most likely simply due to the restructured social, political and economic
structures, which shifted the focus from the city to the imperial center. An attempt to
associate silence to disappearance is mere conjecture based upon the notion of a “flight.”
Once the premise is accepted, namely that there was a “flight,” the conclusion can be
made that the silence in the sources is the result of the “flight’s” climax. The debate has
therefore devolved into forcing the association of an assumption with any somewhat
correlative evidence. In the same vein, one might faultily associate the closure of the
Academy in Athens and the increasing silence about paganism in the sources to the total
eclipse of polytheism. Since the curiae did indeed survive in numbers, but not in wealth,
and since the city was no longer a foundation stone of Roman political, social and
economic culture, it is rather normal not to find an emphasis on the office, as it once was
in the Republic or the High Empire. The silence should be associated with the tectonic
shift in the fabric of Roman civilization, which occurred with and after the Tetrarchic
reforms. A curialis was not a celebrated office as it once was and this is directly related to
the decline in construction of civic monuments. Moreover, the exodus of principales
from the municipal councils is a glaring testimony to the phenomenon. The most telling
information in the case of the municipal councils is their sudden diminishment to
irrelevance with respect to high culture, but not at all with regard to fiscality. The void at
the local level was left unabridged in certain areas until the later fifth and early sixth
centuries.

mentioned in Pope Vitalian’s letter to Archbishop Paul of Gortyn in the seventh century: R.
Schieffer, "Kreta, Rom und Laon. Vier Briefe des Papstes Vitalian vom Jahre 668," in Papsttum,
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The acceptance of this reality on the ground necessitated new institutional
solutions in the imperial fisc’s capability to extract taxes. Hence, under the reign of
Anastasius, a seemingly cornerstone reform was made, which appears to have restored
the Roman Empire on solid financial footing briefly. The creation of the office of vindex
during the early sixth century may have permitted the imperial government to re-establish
some form of financial solvency in the cities.86 Two problems stem from the emergence
of this office and they are both intrinsically connected. First, its breadth and impact are
not easy to quantify. Secondly, the creation of this office is not very well attested in the
sources. There are only a handful of literary sources describing its creation, but they are
not too sympathetic to the reform itself. Hence, there is a discrepancy between the literary
sources and the evidence provided by the Roman economy itself. Procopius writes that
this reform enabled the emperor to accumulate a hefty sum of 320,000 lbs. of gold.87
However, Procopius’ statement is only in part truthful. Anastasius’ success was also due
to an ensemble of initiatives.88 Yet, for the sake of this study, the provincial
administration at the municipal level will be the focus.
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Not surprisingly, the literary sources that mention the vindex are not too
enthusiastic about its creation. John Lydus writes that Marinus, Anastasius’ Praetorian
Prefect of the East:
…paralysed the municipal councils of all cities, by selling the subjects to
all at random, if only one were to offer more to him, and instead of the
curiales who established the orders of payments, he appointed those whom
we call vindices…these officials, who took the contributers for themselves,
treated the cities as nothing less than enemies.89
The resentful tone of Lydus will be revisited, but for the moment, it is important to note
some key elements. Lydus’ claim that the curiae were stripped of their political powers is
redundant to say the least, as we have seen above. However, there is no evidence to
validate the usage of the verb παραλύω.90 Surely, the verb is used in this case for
rhetorical effect. The curiales had already long become insignificant in a social sense
when Anastasius was at the helm. As mentioned above, the office’s insignificance was
limited to its perception by elite. It had become a stepping-stone that in some cases could
be bypassed.
Yet, John Lydus was not the only author to make rather critical comments on this
institutional development. John Malalas is similar in his description, but adds a key
element: “He was the man who did away with all city council members and created in
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their place those whom we call vindices for every city in the Roman Empire.”91 Thus, he
does allude to the same meaning Lydus expressed who used παρέλυσε when using the
verb ἐπᾰείρω. Yet, once again these appear to be hyperboles. Malalas is employing
several earlier sources to write his chronicle. It is more than possible that he is using a
source or several that reflect the resentment expressed by Lydus and/or other authors. In
addition, John Malalas adds the important words “for every city in the Roman Empire”
when describing the implementation of the vindices. This addition may once again be the
result of his sources that are now lost to us, such as Eustathius of Epiphania, amongst
others. This raises a significant problem, for the sources are quite thin with regard to the
institutionalization of this office. More specifically, they are rather silent about its reach
and its application.
Evagrius is the only other known author that does specify the universality of the
office’s application. Yet, he is also writing at a later date in the sixth century and thus
may be using the same source(s) as Malalas. J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz proposes that the
office was not universal. On the contrary, he argues that the vindices were only assigned
to troubled cities.92 Then again, A. Laniado suggests that the implementation of the office
was limited to the Prefecture of the East.93 The sources do not give us any certainty that
the reform was instituted empire-wide and thus Laniado does indeed have a tenable
argument. There is one law that further reinforces this line of argument and it was issued
in A.D. 545. The law is addressed to the Praetorian Prefect of the east and it states that
the vindex was not even universally applied in the Prefecture of the East, at least in the

91

Malalas 16.12 (ἐπί+ἀείρω): ὅστις τοὺς πολιτευοµένους ἅπαντας ἐπῆρε τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ
ἐποίησεν ἀντ’ αὐτῶν τοὐς λεγοµένους βίνδικας εἰς πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ῥωµανίας
92
J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, "The Origin of the Office of the Pagarch," BZ #66 (1973), 41.
93
A. Laniado, Recherches sur les notables municipaux dans l'Empire protobyzantin, 29-33.

56

context of tax collection.94 Therefore, both Liebeschuetz and Laniado do indeed propose
compelling points about the breadth of the institution. Due to the fact that the evidence is
rather thin, there is a distinct possibility that the office was not as widespread and did not
entirely revamp the taxation apparatus at the local level. Not only is the evidence
insufficient, but also the evidence itself does not support the claims of Lydus, Malalas
and Evagrius.95 Moreover, the claims of Lydus and Malalas are thus highly suspect
regarding the dissolution of the curiales as an institution. In this case, the literary authors
possess less credibility in the details, for the laws do not validate their rhetoric. It appears
that the authors are either using a common source, which is critical of the new office, or
they themselves possess a common trait of the period. This trait is the disdain of change
and the idolization of tradition. John Lydus’ entire work De Magistratibus is a great
example of this social structure, namely classicism. This will be discussed at length in the
final chapter.
Pursuing this point regarding the scope of the reform just above, the vindex is not
often mentioned in the sources. During the reign of Anastasius, there is one letter written
by Severus, Patriarch of Antioch (A.D. 512-518), to Stephanus, the Bishop of Tripoli.
The letter was composed when he was patriarch, but the date is unclear. In it, Severus
mentions a certain Theodore, the Governor of Coastal Phoenicia. According to Severus,
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Theodore is not only the governor, but also a vindex of Tripoli.96 Otherwise, many of the
references occur after the reign of Anastasius. Yet, this does support the theory that the
reform was exclusive to the Prefecture of the East, as Coastal Phoenicia is a province
within its administrative area.
Returning to the discussion about the creation of the vindex, two other sources
allude to the creation of the vindex. Evagrius, who has just been mentioned above, also
writes a scathing account in which he opines: “The result was that the revenue fell off to
a great extent, and the local dignitaries sunk into abeyance.”97 His description of the
transition within the city’s structure is somewhat different than both Lydus and Malalas,
for he strictly mentions that the curia’s fiscal duties were the only ones lost to the
vindices. He does not mention the municipal councils’ dissolution as an institution, as
does both Lydus and Malalas.
To further complicate the discord between the sources treating the inception of the
vindex, Novel 38 states that the creation of the office was designed for one reason that
ironically contradicts the statements of Lydus, Malalas and Evagrius. The law dates from
the reign of Justinian (A.D. 536) and principally concerns curiales. However, in the
prooimion it is stated that the vindex came about as a result of the curia’s increasing
inefficiency at performing its fiscal duties.98 Therefore, it is a situation rather similar to
this inquiry. The issue of causation is problematic. In this particular chapter, it is
proposed that the curiales did not flee the curia, but flocked to the imperial administration.
In the case of the vindex, the former authors argue that the vindex is in some shape or
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form causing the decline or reduction to obsoleteness of the curia. While in the case of
this law, the innovation was designed to redress the decline of the municipal institution.
With the uncertainty revolving around the creation of the office, it is rather difficult to
examine not only its goal and its relationship with the municipal councils, but also, by
extension, with Anastasius’ monumental success in the area of fiscality. It cannot be
argued in these circumstances that the vindex was the reason for the accumulation of such
a large treasury. There are so many other reforms that were implemented under the same
emperor that it is impossible to isolate any of them and then with confidence provide a
compelling case for the vindex’s impact.
In sum, neither the range of the vindex’s presence nor its institutional impact can
be remotely quantified with any accuracy. This is further complicated by its presence in
the sources, which leaves much to be desired.99 We are left at a loss to explain Anastasius’
fiscal success. The inability to isolate this particular variable safely renders the discussion
rather hopeless. There are so many contingencies in this particular case of the municipal
councils that it hinders the conceptualization of a lucid argument. We cannot safely argue
that the reform was instated throughout the empire, nor can we determine its fiscal impact
by extension. However, the sources do provide us with one important detail that endures
little less than a century (i.e. until the seventh century collapse). After Anastasius, the
same symptoms re-emerged, particularly beginning with Justinian.100 Emperor after
emperor until Heraclius saw the imperial fiscal house in disarray. Difficulties paying the
99

Prior to the reign of Justinian, there are only five individuals who are said to have held the
office (PLRE II, Vindices). However, two of them are mentioned in the letters of Saint Nilus (Ep.
2.282; 2.327). The consensus on these early usages of the term vindex has been deemed to be
interpolations. See PLRE II, Dracontius 1; Martyrius 9; A. Laniado, Recherches sur les notables
municipaux dans l'Empire protobyzantin, 30.
100
Procopius claims that the fiscal woes returned in short order during the reign of Justin I, when
Justinian’s influence began to take root (Proc., Anecd. 19.7).

59

troops, funding campaigns, purchasing the loyalty or services of tribes, fielding
appropriately sized armies, etc. were common. One might recall John the Cappadocian
conceptualizing a tax on air (aerikon) in a scramble to fuel Justinian’s spending spree.101
Then again, there is the episode when Heraclius beseeched Sergius for the Church’s
precious metals to finance his campaigns against the Persians.102 Hence, the fiscal impact
of the vindex may be an overstatement in many cases. Fiscal discipline was not
Justinian’s forte, but the same cannot be claimed for his successors who were much more
stingy with the imperial coffers. As a result, it may be deduced to some extent that the
reform barely alleviated, if not at all, the crisis at the local level in the city councils. The
other reforms may have masked the symptoms at the local level due to the enormous
treasury amassed. Hence the interpretation of scholars was molded by the end result (i.e.
the vast treasury) and the interpretations of the sources, however meager they are, with
regard to the vindex are bent to fit the narrative.
The central government also found another solution, which appears to have been
more universal. As discussed above, many curiales found themselves in the Church.
When the Empire was struggling with fiscal health, it turned to the high clergy. In some
respect, it mirrored the secular institution of the imperial administration with its breadth.
Most if not every sizeable city came to have a bishopric. Emperors quickly noticed that
bishops could fulfill some secular roles. The fact that some of these high clergymen had
previous careers in the imperial bureaucracy further facilitated their adoption into the
realm of civil affairs. This may be a compelling reason why, as discussed above, the laws
on social mobility between the municipal councils and the high clergy were eventually
101
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relaxed. The secular institutional value of the bishop could not be overlooked despite the
eventual loss in taxable income that entailed.103

The provincial administration, particularly at the municipal level, was in disarray. The
developments, which occurred with and after the Dominate, were detrimental to the fiscal
solvency of the Roman Empire, despite the fact that the Tetrarchic reforms were
conceptualized in part to address financial woes. Instead of addressing this particular
ailment of the empire, the reforms themselves had initiated something beyond the scope
of intelligibility, at least in that moment. The reforms restructured centuries-old structures
that had served as the social, political and economic foundation stones of the Roman
Empire itself. In an attempt to gain a firmer grip on the civic governments’ taxable
resources, the capital actually did the opposite. It entirely transformed the fabric of
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society at the local and imperial levels. The cities once formed the nucleus of the empire,
through its ability to tax and administer land in such a vast empire. At the heart of this
city lay the civic-minded elite. In many cases, a stellar political career in the curia was the
zenith of public life. The curia was itself a socially stratified entity. Curiales came in
many shapes and forms economically and at their most eminent were the principales.
This civic social order endured but morphed into something different, yet that same thing
was in many respects unchanged.
With the advent of the reforms of the Tetrarchs, the paradigm entirely shifted. The
civic-minded elite was now coveting positions within the newly expanded imperial
bureaucracy, which offered much more lucrative careers to the elite. The Church was also
an attractive proposition for the elite. As a result, the curia became a disdained stepping
stone and in some cases a frustrating obstacle in the pursuit for a much-desired career in
the imperial bureaucracy. A career in that area often enabled the local elites to gain tax
immunity and also to possess more political power. This in turn enabled families to
expand their patronage networks to heights that had never been seen. An elite family,
which was once at the helm of a given region, could spread its web throughout imperial
administrative institutions and thus wield great influence. Therefore, the office of curialis
suddenly became in many respects the minor leagues of a political career. Then again, the
provincial municipia became an afterthought.
At the same time, this change carried much of the same. Political culture was
reproduced in this era of transition. The upper tier of the curiae throughout the empire
was progressively emptied. This select elite found itself in more lucrative offices with
considerable power, which manifested itself in tax exemptions, interprovincial patronage
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networks, the prospects of further promotions in the vast bureaucracy, and other
profitable perks. However, one reality persisted. The social and political culture found in
the Roman cities was now reproduced on a grander scale. On the one hand, the less
influential and less wealthy members of the curia maintained their clout at the municipal
level. On the other hand, the more powerful members benefited from their own cultural
capital to gain ascendancy into the inflated imperial bureaucracy. The process, which
involved the fundamental restructuring of Antiquity’s social, political and economic
structures, did maintain some of its older features. The cultural capital of the more
powerful local aristocrats enabled continuity. A structural reproduction of social
hierarchy concurrently occurred with the reforms. The principales used their own cultural
capital to maintain the hierarchy and this allowed them in turn to preserve their social and
political power over the inferior curiales, not to mention Roman culture in general. The
fact that the exclusive class of curiales possessed this cultural capital enabled a quick
adaptation and exploitation of the new conditions created by the reforms.
The imperial government’s intent with the reforms was to magnify its institutional
control over the local economies, particularly through taxation. This was amongst other
main objectives such as the prevention of systemic mutinies and rebellions in the military.
However, the reforms did not achieve the envisaged results. On the contrary, the
Tetrarchs had only worsened the situation by enabling unfettered social mobility, in
particular an exodus of principales from the municipal councils across the empire. The
institutional efficiency sought out by the expansion of the imperial administration
actually reproduced the curia on a grander scale with the more powerful families of the
curiae preserving their exclusive class but in the bureaucracy. The cursus honorum was
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thoroughly revamped and even more importantly unchained. With the exodus of the
privileged class from the municipal landscape came also the departure of this cultural
capital, which in many ways had been manifest for centuries in the numerous civic
monuments and facilities that the Roman city donned. However, that is another
discussion in itself.
Corruption could now reach unseen levels with such a sizeable bureaucracy and the still
untamed municipal councils. Powerful families were now even more potent and could
use the increased layers between the emperor and the periphery to their own ends.
Emperor after emperor in the fourth century issued a panoply of legislation attempting to
restrict the emigration from the curiae, particularly the wealthier members. The loss of
the wealthier curiales became permanent and as a result the makeshift curiae that
remained across the empire were further impoverished by their absence. The fifth century
saw a significant reduction of legislation when the dust had settled, but the financial
damage was already done and it seemed to be permanent. In the years that passed after
the reign of Diocletian, only one specific moment saw some form of hope in the fiscal
affairs of the empire. Anastasius’ reforms did replenish the coffers, but it appears that the
institutionalization of the vindex did little to address the financial problems in the cities.
Though, the appropriation of the bishop into secular affairs appears to have been wise.
Even when the Muslim armies were on the march in the seventh century, the curiae had
still not recovered their economic vibrancy. The emperor’s powerlessness in the face of
this fiscal meltdown was due to the systematic restructuring of what seemed to be
everlasting social, political and economic structures dating from Antiquity. The Roman
city was no longer the pulse of the imperial system. It became a hollow image of its
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former self, as the Roman Empire’s efforts to centralize political power demonstrated
how this very power was inversely proportional between the center and the periphery.
The decline of the Roman city is a testimony to the colossal restructuring of Roman
civilization. Taxis was undone and the system became unrecognizable. The critical words
of such writers as John Lydus and others surely reflect the absolute disdain for this
cascading effect of innovations.

Copyright @ Mark-Anthony Karantabias 2015

65

CHAPTER III:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROMAN ELITE AFTER THE TETRARCHIC
REFORMS

The Roman city as it was once known had thoroughly changed by the sixth century. A
restructuring of the social, political and economic structures began with the Tetrarchic
reforms. The provincial elite was not unaffected by this development as the Roman
aristocrat came to see a career in public life differently. This very restructuring in many
respects transformed the inherent definitions of social, cultural and symbolic capital.
Politics were now centered upon the imperial administration, particularly its expanded
bureaucracy. The municipal councils, which were under the control of this apparatus, no
longer offered the prestige, power and wealth to the affluent provincial aristocrats. The
whole development was not only unforeseen, but also undesirable in the eyes of the
imperial court. As a result, for approximately one century, the Roman Empire was intent
on reversing the development through social engineering, but to no avail. Throughout the
process, the Roman Empire still struggled to meet its financial needs. Fiscality was still a
pressing issue and this aforementioned phenomenon was directly associated to it.
However many woes the imperial court endured, we often still encounter a rather
successful upper tier elite in the sources. Therefore, there is a significant lacuna in the
understanding of the socio-political development of the period. The disconnect between
individual and governmental wealth is undeniable. Hence, in this particular inquiry, in the
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context of the early sixth century, the relationship between the provincial elite and the
imperial government will be defined.1
There are many theories treating the evolution of the Later Empire’s aristocracy.
One particular subject is in many respects bound to the present inquiry and that is the
exploitation of land and its social ramifications. Marxist theory is one of the most
commonly used methods to interpret the evidence. Both P. Sarris and J. Banaji argue for
the emergence of a new aristocracy in the Late Empire. The former proposes that this
phenomenon began with the imperial responses to the third-century crisis. This new elite
monopolized political power and flagrantly abused it to the point where the Empire
suffered irreparable harm. Yet, Sarris’ theory largely hinges upon the magnate of the
Egyptian great estate; a proposition that is in many respects difficult to accept as an
empire-wide phenomenon.2 Banaji holds a very similar position on the topic, but focuses
much of his efforts on the economy itself, particularly the monetization of the economy,
and less on social dynamics, as Sarris. The analysis leads Banaji to conclude that the
great estates increasingly caused the dispossession and proletarianization of the peasantry.
Moreover, he sees the monetization of the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity as the
causative force behind social and political change.3 However, one of the immediate
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For an excellent and up-to-date discussion on the scholarly debate concerning the definition of
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problems posed by these interpretations are the conceptualized extrapolations based on
Egyptian evidence.4
The institutional interpretation of the Late Empire has produced two cornerstone
surveys. A.H.M. Jones in many respects followed the footsteps of E. Stein due to similar
opinions held in terms of political ideology.5 Essentially, both historians provide much
coverage of the achievement, which is the Roman bureaucracy of the Late Empire.6 Their
fascination with respect to the functionality of the Roman administration stands in stark
contrast to their treatment of social realities. Both saw the Roman elite as corrupt and
self-interested, but paradoxically the bureaucracy was the reason for Rome’s survival in
the East. This same elite was different in the East, they argue, because the administration
was able to safeguard the Empire’s interests before those of its individual members, who
were for the most part from the aristocracy.
J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz has also contributed to the institutional interpretation of
the topic at hand. In his work, The Decline and Fall of the Roman City, there is a strong
emphasis on the de-urbanization and on the decline of civic government. He focuses
much of his efforts on the relationship between the evolution of Roman institutions and
the transforming social dynamics. He argues that the city declined and this was embodied
4
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(Boston: Brill, 2008), 49-53.
6
E. Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, trans. J.-R. Palanque, 2 vols. (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer,
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in the change from municipal councils to oligarchies. Liebeschuetz, however, commits
the same mistake Sarris and Banaji would later make. In his analysis of the post-curial
government, he formulates his argument out of conjecture:
No attempt is made to prove [the administration of Egypt functioned on
the same principles as other regions of the Empire], but it does emerge that
that as far as municipal administration is concerned the evidence of the
Laws and of the papyri is compatible… But it is suggested that in broad
outline the model of post-curial government of cities by notables that can
be constructed for Egypt is also applicable to cities elsewhere in the
Eastern provinces of the Empire.7
Despite, the statement, most of the analysis is indeed executed through extrapolation.
Based on this premise, Liebeschuetz concludes that a long-term institutional development
caused “the change from government by decurions to government by notables.”8 Though
his treatment of the Roman urban and rural landscapes’ evolution is fairly compelling.
Offering a similar opinion to those above, which rest much of the blame for the
Late Empire’s failures on the elite, R. MacMullen uses somewhat of a different method.9
Using post-modernist theory, he proposes that the elite’s acquisition of unparalleled
powers due to the expansion of the bureaucracy accelerated the decline of the Roman
Empire. Soft power enabled the destabilization of the social order and of the patronage
networks, which resulted in the decline of the army’s size and growing inefficiency of
government.
Offering a relatively new method to the field, G. Ruffini’s Social Networks in
Byzantine Egypt is a pioneering work.10 Employing social network theory, Ruffini
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identifies different patterns within Egypt itself. As a general rule, he states that the Great
Estate was a central hub of its respective nome, which was centralized with respect to its
economy. In Oxyrhynchus, he proposes that the urban elite spent most of its time away
from its own rural properties. Moreover, he sets forth the argument that this same elite
possessed and cultivated vertical connections throughout the network, but links of a
direct and horizontal nature were rare. In Aphrodito, however, horizontal links were well
established and the social hierarchy was decentralized. If we were to accept his line of
reasoning, we would be presented with two rather dissimilar microcosms within Egypt.
This would then render the assumptions made by Banaji, Sarris and Liebeschuetz even
more problematic.
The problem, which is presented to the Byzantine scholar, is quite daunting. The
extraordinary amount of evidence to be found in Egypt is far disproportional from what
can be found in other regions of the Empire. Taking into consideration Ruffini’s
interesting analysis, it can only make the issue even more difficult to those who wish to
base their analysis on a premise of applicable universality grounded in one single
region’s evidence. This then leads to one of the more fundamental works conducted on
the issue of the Great Estate. Taking into consideration the contributions listed above, J.
Gascou’s work still endures despite the literature that followed his groundbreaking paper,
“Les Grands Domaines, la cité et l'état en Égypte byzantine.”11 This is especially true

Networks and Religious Conflict in Late Roman Syria (Berkeley: University of California Press,
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l'état en Égypte byzantine," Travaux et Mémoires 9 (1985). In essence, Gascou thoroughly and
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after T. Hickey’s recent work vindicated the great French scholar’s thesis after a barrage
of criticisms.12 This leaves a rather foggy picture of the sixth-century aristocracy.
These are just a handful amongst the numerous scholarly contributions in this area.
To begin this inquiry, it is necessary first to accept the limitations due to the evidencerelated issue stated above. That is not to state that Egyptian evidence must be ignored. On
the contrary, it must be scoured, but it cannot be applied as a universal to particulars,
which remain undefined due to lacunae in our banks of evidence. In essence, the scholar
cannot state with certainty that any of the particulars belong to the one universal, which is
modeled after Egypt. If Egypt were to serve as the archetype to construct the universal
while it were simultaneously a particular, the scientific method would entirely be
undermined. Essentially, to categorize almost blindly what are many more particulars
under such a universal exposes the proposition to a plethora of weaknesses and by
extension objections.13 The evidence in other geographical regions is often thin, but there
are possibly patterns to be uncovered in hagiographies, law codes, epigraphy, seals and
narrative accounts. At any rate, it is necessary to determine the relationship between the
upper tier elite and the state in the Late Empire. In doing so, it must be determined how
different forms of capital evolved, if they did at all. In the following pages, an inquiry
will be conducted into Late Roman social, cultural and symbolic capital. Economic
capital remains relatively the same, as it is the cumulative amount of economic resources
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possessed by a given individual. Hence, the focus will largely be on the three forms of
capital listed above.

THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL: SOCIAL CAPITAL
Economic capital was not addressed directly in the previous chapter, but was only alluded
to indirectly. Repeated mentions of the lucrative nature of a position within the imperial
machinery as opposed to civic government were made. One of the more interesting
developments in Late Antiquity occurs in this particular area. The boundaries, which
subdivided the summit of the social hierarchy, shifted. The bulk of the elite could be
found in the curiae across the empire. Their members did not have the same economic
capital, however. The principales possessed far better financial portfolios than the rest of
their peers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many if not most of the principales
found their way into the imperial government after the Tetrarchic reforms. The line,
which separated the principales from the rest of the elite, became much more pronounced,
as they were no longer involved in the same brand of politics. The collection of their
actual and potential resources became linked to an elaborate and institutionalized social
network, which was the imperial government. However, disparities were to exist within
this group as some could marshal more clout than others, depending on the economic,
cultural and symbolic capital of those linked to an aristocrat’s network. The curiales on
the other hand was left behind in a much smaller network, comparatively only able to lay
claim to very little social capital.
A great example of social capital in action could be found in the famed incident at
Aphrodito. In this instance, the exploitation of land and its ownership cannot be
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universally applied to the Empire due to the peculiarities of the region and due to the
evidence found elsewhere. The incident unfolds in Egypt, but the fact of the matter
remains that there are different players within the social hierarchy wielding
disproportionate amounts of capital. The episode revolves around taxation and the status
of the village, Aphrodito. Dioscorus, who was a scholasticus educated in rhetoric,
grammar and law in Alexandria, was a native of this very village.14 Upon the death of his
father, Apollos, he became head of his family in A.D. 543 or 544 and was also
responsible for the family’s land.15 Dioscorus becomes drawn into the incident due to the
fact that he held the title of πρωτοκωµητής of his village.16 One of the central points of
tension lies in the official fiscal status of Aphrodito. The village was able to collect its
own taxes and submit them directly to imperial officials without the intervention of a
curia. This civic right in question is called autopragia.
This appears not to be well received in the region, as pagarchs were in charge of
taxation duties in the neighboring areas. The institution of the pagarchy appears to have
been an integral part of the Egyptian taxation machine. As was the case with curiales, the
pagarch was held liable for any shortcomings during tax collection. To aid in the
accomplishment of this duty, the pagarch had a staff. With respect to the candidacy,
powerful men of the province, including magnates and ex-officials, elected pagarchs.17
After the Praetorian Prefect or the governor appointed the candidate, the emperor ratified
the nomination. The provincial governor delegated instructions to the pagarchs, but the
office itself was accountable to the emperor. Moreover, only the emperor could terminate
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a pagarch.18 The distinctiveness of the position was its status. It appears that the office
was in some ways civic due to the “election,” and in other ways imperial for its
accountability.
Returning to Aphrodito, in A.D. 551, two pagarchs from Antaeopolis, Julianus
and the gloriosissima Patricia seemingly attempted to infringe upon Aphrodito’s
autonomy. This was not a novelty, as similar events occurred when Apollos, Dioscorus’
father, was πρωτοκωµητής in A.D. 540. He travelled to the capital to petition the imperial
government on behalf of the villagers, who were complaining about local pagarchs.
These very pagarchs allegedly exceeded their jurisdiction. Apollos thereupon received
the official protection of Empress Theodora for the village.19 In an imperial rescript of
A.D. 551 to the dux of Thebaid responding to Dioscorus and his village’s petition,
Emperor Justinian provides the details about the scandal. The rescript’s main intention
was to confirm the village’s status (autopragia) to repel the pagarchs from assuming the
taxation control of the village. The Emperor mentions an incident that occurred when his
father, Apollos, was in the capital. The µεγαλοπρεπέστατος Theodosius collected and
kept the taxes of Aphrodito. Justinian strangely admits that Theodosius’ conspiracy
outdid his imperial commands.20 Unfortunately for Dioscorus and the village, imperial
officials were sent to collect the taxes once again to “resolve” the situation. This episode
in which fraudulent taxation occurs seems to be more common than one might think in
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Egypt, as the Emperor specifically denounces the practice elsewhere.21 The emperor
emits an aura of powerlessness in this context. His authority, however vertical it might
have been, was impeded. Theoretically his power was at the summit and emanated to the
periphery through this verticality, but this was not always the case, as might be noted
here.
The conflict appears to have continued in some ways similar to a vendetta.
Julianus had already locked horns with Dioscorus years before, over the latter’s
inheritance tax.22 The situation devolved rapidly for Dioscorus after his initial victory
over his inheritance. His father had developed important political connections with a
certain Flavius Ammonius. He was a powerful man who gained the titles of both vir
gloriosissimus and comes sacri consistorii, and had considerable wealth and land.23
However, Aphrodito’s patrons, Empress Theodora, Ammonius and Apollos died and left
the village fully exposed to the ambitious pagarchs. Moreover, the status of the pagarch
seems to have been enough to thwart Justinian’s intervention and even Theodora’s.
Julianus was attempting to “annex” Aphrodito to his pagarchy.24 Dioscorus, who was still
at a disadvantage in the face of local officials, was now in a complete position of
weakness.
21
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In many ways, Dioscorus’ trip to Constantinople demonstrates how strongly the
scales had tipped to his disadvantage. Not only is there evidence of him petitioning the
imperial government to rectify the political turmoil, there is also a sudden spike in
composition, particularly of poems.25 The intent of his poems is rather clear: to flatter his
audience. The ulterior motive can be deduced from the circumstantial evidence listed
above. Dioscorus had very little social capital at this point. His attempts to plug into new
social networks, which were of value to his political goals, would remedy the deficiency.
No longer was he in a defensive posture as he was prior to the recent deaths. He and his
village found themselves to be easy prey. The pagarchs in Antaeopolis became much
more confrontational and aggressive in the pursuit of their objective.26
The story above is much abbreviated, but it captures the essence of social capital
in the sixth century. Local politics often remained local prior to the Tetrarchic reforms.
Feuds and such would be resolved locally or perhaps with the intervention of the imperial
judicial system. Social capital was always at a premium. However, with the expansion of
the imperial government, matters became much more complex. Social capital evolved
and took on a whole new scale. The institutionalized acquaintances that developed
simultaneously with the bureaucracy enabled a village to fend for itself by acquiring
patrons that could intervene on their behalf. Yet, this capital was not only defined by a
social web comprising of institutional relationships, but of the office held. This office had
to be acquired with social capital, as it was in the case of Menas, who eventually
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succeeded his patroness, Patricia. Or even in the case of Dioscorus, we might note an
inherited office of πρωτοκωµητής and a relationship with a powerful aristocrat.27
However, the ability to acquire an office such as that of a pagarch enabled an individual
to possess near institutional immunity. Not only did the pagarchs in Antaeopolis assault
the fiscal status of Aphrodito several times, but they also ignored the fact that Justinian
and Theodora were involved. Their titles garnered such an amount of social capital that a
man like Theodosius would not succumb to the imperial hand of law. Moreover, as
mentioned above, Constantinople appeared to be impotent in the face of corruption at the
local level in Egypt; at the very least, the link between periphery and center left much to
desire. The proioimion of Edict 13 demonstrates to what extent corruption plagued Egypt.
In the case of Aphrodito and Dioscorus, the network of relationships hinged upon
three powerful political figures, which included Justinian, Theodora and Ammonius.
Particularly Theodora and Ammonius appear to have been the guardians of the city,
notably with respect to its independent fiscal status. While the village and Dioscorus were
surely on the low end of their patrons’ networks, their ability to mobilize a considerable
amount of resources was vital to the maintenance of its status, not to mention Dioscorus’
livelihood. Unfortunately for Dioscorus, his network and that of his village’s quickly
dissolved once Theodora and Ammonius passed. In this case not only is social capital
useful to a given man or village, but vital in a political conflict. This is why we might
note the sudden output of encomia in the form of poetry. Furthermore, Dioscorus was
attempting not only to maintain his village’s defense against the pagarchs, but he was
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also vying for his own safety.28 As the situation became increasingly dire, Dioscorus
called upon the dux of Thebaid to intervene, but to no avail. We finally find Dioscorus
without a viable group to mollify the situation and, as a result, he joins the office of the
dux, as a nomikos.29 There seems to have been no other resort, for he no longer had the
social capital to thwart or to undo the machinations of his political adversaries. Therefore,
the pagarchs went unchecked due to the defenselessness of his village and of himself.
One might contend that this is not a novelty. Patronage was always a distinct
feature of Roman civilization. That is indeed accurate. However, the expansion of the
bureaucracy revamped the social hierarchy’s structure. The new development exhibited
itself in many different areas, but, particularly here, it is reified in social capital. One’s
office, family and acquaintances, whether familial, useful or institutional, are irrevocably
related to the amount of actual and potential resources a given individual possessed. The
growth and power of the imperial government was inversely proportional to the fate of
civic politics. This development helped usher in a new reality. No longer were local
aristocrats drawing the lines between political factions within the city. The Roman
Empire was composed of a series of microcosms, that is, an amalgamation of cities. With
the fundamental reforms initiated under the Tetrarchs, the expanded verticality inflated
this network system to unprecedented levels. This paradigm shift caused the social
networks to become increasingly more formidable in the political field. Great ambitions
were easier to realize by twisting arms or by flattering of individuals in or outside one’s
28

In P. Cairo Masp. 67002, thirteen landholders of the village are imprisoned due to the conflict.
In it, Dioscorus also tells that his life in Antaeopolis is a form of exile. It is also revealed in P.
Lond. v 1677 that Menas seized Dioscorus’ land and redistributed it to his associates. Moreover,
he demanded that Dioscorus pay taxes on the seized lands. Bell proposes that his other holdings
were not affected (Greek Papyri in the British Museum, 5.69).
29
L. MacCoull, "Dioscorus and the Dukes: an Aspect of Coptic Hellenism in the Sixth Century,"
BS 13 (1986), 30-40.

78

network. These networks and the imperial bureaucracy more often than not overlap. Thus,
a local notable’s best recourse might be an official in the provincial capital and a senator,
while the two latter also have their own series of acquaintances. The more powerful the
acquaintance, the more intricate and formidable the network, the more a given agent
within the grid has useful relationships from which a situation like Dioscorus’ may be
resolved effectively and swiftly.
These relationships require maintenance and create a mutual acknowledgment
through numerous types of exchanges. For one to be admitted, the beseeched must be
benefitted. It might be in the form of a flattering poem in the hopes of receiving the
protection of a notable, as it has been discussed above with Dioscorus. Effectively, it
creates a sense of belonging to a certain group through the possibilities to pool one
another’s resources in the case of peril, for example. In sum, this phenomenon granted
the aristocracy the opportunity to assume immeasurable power.30 The words of Emperor
Justinian echo this reality in Edict 13.31 The imperial government no longer contended
with powerful notables at the local level. That alone was problematic for the capital. The
evolution of the political and social dynamics exacerbated this reality, as these aristocrats
could defy the will of the emperor without reprimand in some cases.
30
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When taking this all into consideration, we might note glaring problems with P.
Sarris and J. Banaji’s theories concerning the Late Antique elite.32 The focus on
landholding in many respects discounts the importance of many other determinants. The
insistence on land and the power derived from it ignores some of the more fundamental
issues in Late Antique society. The emphasis on the logics of the economy falls short on
its dismissal of other forms of capital.33 Economic capital does indeed give power, but
can leave a particular agent vulnerable nevertheless. Dioscorus, although a powerful man
in his microcosm, was insignificant in the grander scheme of things. Social capital may
be a derivative of economic capital, but that equation can easily be inversed. Economic
capital can be derived from one who is fortunate enough to be in the right social group.
That is not to mention that other forms of capital, which pose fundamental challenges to a
materialist interpretation. The institutional failures here are paramount. The imperial
government’s verticality, which was a creation of its own, enabled a total disconnect
between the periphery and center while its objective was the opposite. To provide an
analogy, the imperial government’s solutions often fail because it introduces the cane
toad to control the cane beetle.

THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL: CULTURAL CAPITAL
One must also take into consideration cultural capital, which is often a causative
determinant. Cultural capital in Late Antiquity involves somewhat of a novelty. The
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individual’s know-how can be an important factor in its accumulation. Other fundamental
characteristics include institutionalized titles and the possession of artifacts, which
possess inherent cultural value. The former may consist of titles such as spectabilis or
those obtained through education such as Dioscorus.34 Yet, these characteristics are
valueless if they are not recognized nor perceived by other social agents. With respect to
the heuristic characteristic, evidence is rather compelling during the reign of Emperor
Justinian.
What we might note as a new development during his reign is the imperial
government’s insistence on selecting candidates to important offices, based on
meritocratic principles. It is a novelty in the sense that it seemed to be more of a policy.35
To better understand Justinian’s appointments to high offices based on meritocratic
principles, it is important to understand why the designee is of utmost importance.
Justinian was a very ambitious man with regard to his grand design as emperor. A
tremendous amount of expenditures were made in many areas. One of the hallmarks of
his reign cost a tremendous amount to the imperial coffers. Hagia Sophia’s silver-leaf
revetment required 40,000 lbs. of silver, while the silver for the altar, the ciborium, the
chancel, the ambo, the synthronon and the doors approximately 35,181 lbs. of silver.36 E.
Stein estimates the whole enterprise cost the imperial government between 1.04 and 1.3
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million solidi.37 This is but one structure, albeit one of the most costly, in his building
campaign. These figures are very considerable when examining the cost of the Vandalic
Expedition in A.D. 468, which Procopius lists at 1,300 centenaria.38 Then again, the Fifty
Years Peace, which was agreed to by Justinian and the Sassanids in A.D. 562, was said to
have cost the Romans 30,000 solidi per year.39 Taking into consideration the enormous
amount of spending, the appointment of an official such as the Praetorian Prefect of the
East was of utmost importance. The man who took the office was asked to do the
impossible. Balance his superior’s ambitions with a dire fiscal reality.
The Praetorian Prefect had become in essence a financial official of the first order
and a prime minister for the emperor. Two Praetorian Prefects of the East, who were as
notorious as they were effective at performing their duties, serve as great examples. John
the Cappadocian is peculiar in this sense due to his origins. We do not know much about
his pedigree, but there is one element that appears to be very revealing. Procopius,
although scathing in his account, reveals that the Cappadocian “was entirely without the
advantages of a liberal education; for he learned nothing while attending the elementary
school except his letters, and these, too, poorly enough…”40 H.B. Dewing here uses
“liberal arts” for the term “παιδείας” in the text. Although tangible evidence is not
available, there is circumstantial evidence from which it can be deduced that this
rhetorical attack on the Prefect’s intelligence is mere character assassination.
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In both the Wars, and in the Anecdota, the author relentlessly smears the Prefect.41
Hence, it should come to no surprise that Procopius would take every liberty to disparage
John’s intelligence when given the opportunity, however false the insults or accusations
might be. His account of John’s education and intelligence, and his outstanding heuristics
demonstrate a clear contrast. Whereas he states that John did not receive the traditional
education for the aristocratic young man, he then takes full liberty to use this fact to
manufacture an ad hominem attack. For paideia was a hallmark of the Roman aristocracy
and therefore the lack thereof can serve as a contrasting tool and as an opening for
derision. This system of education was a paramount form of cultural capital, almost
exclusive to the elite. In other words, it is a key marker of social status. Then again, it is
also a form of symbolic capital in Roman society. Paideia was universally regarded as a
determinant of one’s prestige within the social arena. Procopius targets this particular gap
in John’s resume due to the fact that he is being viewed as an outsider to his new social
group.42 He does not have the same amount of capital as others do within high society.
John’s only claim to fame, in the eyes of Procopius, is his ability to execute his tasks
skillfully.
Then again, Procopius was not the only one to attack John the Cappadocian
vehemently. John Lydus was as scathing as the Caesarean in his treatment. Although we
do not know in detail the lives of both ancient authors, there are very important pieces of
evidence, which provide circumstantial evidence. Both were highly educated and thus the
41
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likelihood of them being from relatively well-established aristocratic families is not
negligible. Procopius only once mentions his family in his explanation for producing the
contrasting literary piece that is the Anecdota: “Indeed, I was unable to feel confidence
even in the most intimate of my kinsmen.”43 This subtly reveals that members of his
family also had their own powerful social networks. As it has been noted above, social
networks are indicators and generators of capital and thus power. There are other
indications of Procopius’ wealthy background scattered throughout the sources, as he is
said to have been a lawyer and rhetorician.44
Despite the repeated attacks against John the Cappadocian, Procopius cannot hide
the one telling fact about his subject’s character. Sandwiched in between the tirade cited
above, the author writes: “…but by his natural ability he became the most powerful man
of whom we know. For he was most capable in deciding upon what was needful and in
finding a solution for difficulties. But he became the basest of all men…”45 This passage
clearly contradicts Procopius’ statement about John’s intellectual capacity. It would not
have been possible for a man with little intellectual prowess to climb the bureaucratic
ladder to such heights. Moreover, this same passage also indicates that the Cappadocian’s
heuristics enabled his rise to power. John Lydus indicates that John the Cappadocian rose
through the ranks first as a scrinarius of a magister militum, where he entered Justinian’s
entourage. He thereupon became logothete, a senator (illustres) and finally Praetorian
Prefect of the East, respectively.46 Indeed Procopius was correct in his appraisal of John’s
skills, but his treatment of John’s “lack” of education is a half-truth. It is not surprising
43
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that John received a rudimentary education. It is unlikely however that he did not receive
further education due to lack of intelligence. On the contrary, there is a very distinctive
possibility that John’s family did not have the resources to support such an endeavor.
John the Cappadocian’s story offers us a considerable amount of insight into the
development of social relations in Late Antiquity. His distinctive know-how, which
Procopius begrudgingly mentions, enabled him to acquire immeasurable cultural capital.
This in turn enables what appears to be a man from an obscure family that seems to lack
distinction to enter the bureaucracy and obtain arguably the most powerful position in the
Roman Empire, short of the imperial throne. In sum, Procopius seems to be resentful of
John the Cappadocian’s rise to power due to a combination of elements. On the one hand,
in Procopius’ mind, he himself did everything that was expected to garner prestige and
rank in Roman high society. He did well and made his way into the entourage of the
highest circles. However, he did not become a Praetorian Prefect, a Count of the Sacred
Largesses nor did he become any other official of the highest order. On the other hand, he
views John as one who bypassed the system of unwritten rules and procedures, which he
himself respected and followed. It was something that seemed to defy the logic, which he
had inherited, and perhaps he felt cheated as a result. This would explain the vitriol-laden
passages referring to the Cappadocian.
Procopius is not the only author to hold John in such high contempt. John Lydus’
is rather similar to the Caesarean with regard to upbringing. He too was a product of the
paideia system. Leaving Philadelphia for the capital, he intended to become a memoriales
under the authority of the magister officiorum. This is by no means the ambition of a
commoner. But while awaiting his post, he studied under the philosopher Agapius.
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However, once again, he was distracted, but this time by a friend who obtained high
office. Zoticus became Praetorian Prefect of the East and asked that he be his tachygraph.
Lydus enriched himself in the process. Furthermore, to reinforce his place in Zoticus’
social network, he admits writing a panegyric for his patron for which he was
handsomely rewarded. This was not the only time, as he also delivered a eulogy to
Emperor Justinian.47 At any rate, Lydus’ resume is considerable.48 When writing about
John the Cappadocian, Lydus appears to be as resentful as Procopius concerning the
Cappadocian’s pathway to power. His description of John’s rise to power includes such
idiomatic expressions as ὣσπερ κατ᾽ ἑπιβάθραν and ἀθρόως εἰς τήν ὓπαρχον ἀνηρπάσθη
τιµήν.49 The diatribe continues with Lydus’ sharp tongue maintaining if not increasing
the tone.50 There is a striking similarity between Procopius and Lydus’ accounts of the
Cappadocian. They are filled with resentment and even a subtle hint of jealousy. The
latter may be found by reading in between the lines. Lydus’ words used to describe the
Cappadocian’s rise seem to confirm this. Once again, the author followed the standard
operating procedures, as did Procopius but saw himself outdone by an outsider. He saw
his opportunities grow upon his arrival in the capital, but never actually attain the heights
he surely coveted. Just as Procopius, he was born into an aristocratic family, received the
highest education and offered his services to the imperial government. He had all the
necessary assets to be successful. He therefore saw this man from Cappadocia as a cheat
to the system, which he cherished. However this very man from Cappadocia possessed a
characteristic, which stood out from the typical Procopius, Lydus and all the other
47
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aristocrats that were cut from the same mold. The ability to get the task at hand
accomplished effectively was prized by Justinian. The account above is eerily similar to
Peter Barsymes with respect to ascension and infamy.51 Writing encomia, literary works,
being tutored by famed philosophers or attending law school in Berytus were
commonplace in Roman high society. These were part of the obstacle course on the way
to grander things.
Procopius’ disdain of new men can be confirmed in a few places. When he
discusses the tenure of office of the Praetorian Prefect of the East, he declares that all
were rapacious “with only two exceptions, namely Phocas…and Bassus…”52 Not by
coincidence, Phocas is known to have been ἀνὴρ εὐπατρἱδης,53 but we cannot say as
much for Bassus whose pedigree is unknown.54 However, we may deduce that he was
indeed part of the Roman elite as were Phocas, Procopius and John Lydus. Surely they
did not receive as much negative attention from the pen of Procopius due to the affinity.
The ancient author then pursues his narrative and in many regards his contempt for new
men is confirmed when he discusses the methods by which the emperor selects
candidates for office: “…Justinian’s method was as follows. Picking out the basest
men…”55 Procopius’ sentiments about new men entering the administration with the least
common cultural capital, that is of the heuristic type, are very effectively summarized in
the two previous passages.
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The cases of the Cappadocian and Barsymes appear to be a novelty to some extent.
Such things were seen particularly in the fifth century when Germanic and other foreign
warriors made their way into the high ranks of the Roman army.56 Yet that was not as
much of a breach of standard operating procedures as it was in the cases above.
Interestingly, the heuristics of these warriors afforded them such honors. Moreover, the
fact as they were portrayed as destructive outsiders seems even more similar to John’s
case. The Cappadocian was far from a typical member of the “boys’ club.” He was an
outsider based on the norms of social space and not cultural or religious ones. Here, we
have a clear example of the causality of cultural capital in which economic capital is but a
derivative. Thus, once again, it is rather difficult to accept a premise in which economic
capital is the unique prime mover in Late Roman society. Furthermore, one must remark
the other elements in John’s story that add to the difficulties in accepting such an
interpretation. John’s social class clearly did not in any way hinder his meteoric rise to
power. Furthermore, his class did not grant him his opportunities. On the contrary, at best,
the Cappadocian may have been from an aristocratic family of humble origins or from a
family of merchants. His family did not have the resources to have its son educated in the
traditional aristocratic way. His effectiveness at executing bureaucratic tasks enabled him
to add one of the most significant agents to his network, the Emperor. A combination of
know-how and networking enabled this uncanny rise to power.57 In this equation,
economic capital is relegated to a derivative, while cultural capital serves as the
foundation.
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There is one last important subtheme to examine under this subject. Education has
been mentioned above in the context of Procopius and John Lydus careers. Education per
se was still and even more so a form of cultural capital during the period. Education
enabled both authors to obtain rather important offices. Lydus maintains that men of
letters were prized. He would soon find a patron in Emperor Justinian.58 That is one
example amongst many others. We have already visited Dioscorus above, who utilized
his education to seek new patrons after his social network collapsed. Otherwise, there is
the story of Evangelos of Caesarea, whom Procopius mentions in his Anecdota. He was a
well-accomplished lawyer who amassed such a considerable sum that he was able to
purchase a village called Porphyreon in Palestine.59
One persisting structure in Antiquity was the value of education, more specifically
paideia. It enabled many to obtain the patronage of powerful men and women from the
realm of politics, amongst others. However, with the expansion of the imperial
government, patronage was indeed prevalent but not for the same reasons. Before, the
individuals who patronized educated men obtained symbolic capital, as that was more of
a commonality. With the need for well-trained individuals in the bureaucracy, figures
such as Tribonius were valued. Tribonius was a standout product of the great law school
of Berytus.60 His talents were noticed and consequently he soon became part of the
imperial bureaucracy. He first served as a lawyer under the Prefecture of the East, before
he was commissioned to compose the Codex along with other legal experts. His erudition
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then gave him access to high posts in the imperial government. He was twice quaestor
and once magister officiorum in between.61 As it was proposed above, educational
credentials played an important role in career prospects. Tribonian is one great example
of how education in many respects opened doors, but at the same time his career also
serves as another contrasting illustration to John the Cappadocian and Peter Barsymes’
success. Nevertheless, the cultural capital garnered by such a man like Tribonian was
considerable and this, in turn, enabled him to attain the summits of imperial government.
With regard to the aristocracy, it is still possible to note the traditional pathway to
success. The political field is still predominantly composed of aristocrats from well-to-do
families who have similar upbringings despite regional variances. Thus, men such as
John the Cappadocian and Peter Barsymes are not the norm, but not rarities either. The
contrast here is economic and social capital on the one hand, which is wielded by the
traditional aristocrat, and cultural capital, which can overlap. Cultural capital is a
marquee of the aristocracy notably in the field of education. However, it is not restrictive,
as it can offer opportunities for advancement to an individual of a lesser background if
the right patron values heuristics. In sum, the aristocracy is stratified along the lines of
civic and imperial government. Yet, admittance into Roman high society is not
impossible. Then again, such an entry might not be well received by the group. It appears
that such individuals were viewed as nouveaux riches and as outsiders. This phenomenon
details to what extent this brand of capital had evolved. John the Cappadocian and Peter
Barsymes’ positions in the social arena prior to their rise to power are not inherent but
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relational. The discrepancy of capital between them and the likes of a Procopius, John
Lydus or a member of the Apiones is considerable. However, the former group can
bridge the gap and be subsumed into the latter with valued heuristics.

THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL: SYMBOLIC CAPITAL
In the account of Dioscorus above, we have seen that economic capital is sometimes if
not often insufficient in a conflict amongst aristocrats. The individual’s social capital is
thus vital. It has also been argued above that economic capital can stem from both social
and cultural capital. However, there are a few important developments that occur in Late
Antiquity that must be underlined. Wealth was often finite for the provincials unless there
was a prospect for admittance into Rome’s senate, amongst other lucrative offices and
honors. There are three phenomena that occur in the two centuries leading up to the reign
of Justinian, which shaped the aristocracy. There was an evolution of the city’s status and
role within the imperial administrative framework. The destabilization of the curia, which
is linked to the former development, occurs. Lastly, once again related to the two former
are tax exemptions. There are many more important events, reforms, laws and other
instances that shape the aristocracy, but these three have exceptional implications.
Shortly after the Tetrarchic reforms were conceived and implemented, the
secondary effects became visible. Fiscality and centralized control necessitated
fundamental changes to the fabric of the Roman administration at the micro level. In a
scramble to restore fiscal health, imperial laws were tyrannical. The imperial government
did not only cause the disintegration of the empire’s nucleus, the cities, by inadvertently
detaching the principales from their respective municipal councils. As it was proposed in

91

Chapter 1, the Tetrarchic reforms stripped the wealthiest components from the curiae and
this harmed tax revenues. Interestingly, a series of laws that are often mentioned in
passing and not given much weight in the debate over the decline of the curialis
institution are of utmost importance. The Empire had varying institutionalized
relationships with its cities. One in particular, which granted tax immunity and a status of
freedom (civitates liberae et immunes), was rather lucrative for the locals. This advantage
was not to be found in most cities’ constitutions, but it nevertheless enabled many cities
to thrive such as Berytus, Heliopolis and Palmyra amongst others. More widespread was
the ius italicum, which granted similar fiscal privileges. These privileges were rapidly
taken away in the Later Empire.62 The push for increased revenue could only see an
inversely proportional equation unfold, as the increase in revenue at the center translated
into decreased wealth in the periphery’s political institutions (i.e. not the individual’s
economic capital).
One of the more causative imperial laws with regard to the city occurred in the
fourth century. Cities across the Roman Empire possessed large stretches of civic lands,
which were valuable to the curia for fiscal purposes. However, notably under Constantius
II, the imperial government confiscated these civic lands to enrich its own coffers. Then
again, Constantine also confiscated the temple lands. Despite a brief respite under
Emperor Julian who attempted to revitalize the municipal economies, the reform
endured.63 The implications of these developments in fiscal policy are very extensive.
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The aristocracy, which was stratified at the civic level with the principales at the summit,
was fragmented under the Tetrarchs. Principales and other fortunate members of the elite
were able to enter the imperial government. However most of those left behind not only
had to cope with the loss of their wealthier colleagues’ financial assets, they also had to
maintain the expected cadence with respect to tax collection without the municipality’s
lands. Hence, it is not as much an institutional failure due to the aristocracy as much as
the imperial government’s actual policies that stripped the heart of the Roman Empire’s
fiscal livelihood in more ways than one. The combination of these losses at the civic level
was debilitating to say the least. As a result, the Roman Empire’s elite was not only
divided along institutional lines, but also along capital lines. The discrepancy particularly
in economic and cultural capital was substantial. An imperial official could wield
exceptional power. For example, in Aphrodito, a local politician such as Dioscorus was
no match for a pagarch, an imperial official, in a political conflict. The culmination of
decades of laws and imperial policy, which had cascading effects upon the curia,
destabilized it to its foundations.
To further compound this socio-political development, the segment of the
aristocracy, which fragmented off to enter the imperial government gained additional
economic benefits to the ones listed above. Their departure simultaneously unfolded
while the municipal council was undercut by imperial policy. In the case of those who
migrated to the imperial government, the benefits were many. However, one does indeed
stand out and it is tax immunity. The illustres were granted immunity from the sordida
munera and the extraordinaria in the early fifth century. Otherwise only those of the
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highest orders were fortunate to receive reprieve from the latter tax.64 Yet, the senate in
the East does not become a hereditary caste as it did in the West. Successive generations
inherited wealth and privileges, but not ranks and titles.65 The result of this is perhaps not
as significant as is often argued. The rank of illustres was not as sizeable a segment as the
clarissimi and spectabiles. Hence for only those who were at the very peak of the social
order were there advantages in that sense. The advantages at this point when contrasting
the imperial and civic aristocracies lied in the potential social and economic capital
available to those in the former group.
Magnificence is an attribute of expenditures of the kind which we call
honourable, e.g. those connected with the gods-votive offerings, buildings,
and sacrifices-and similarly with any form of religious worship, and all
those that are proper objects of public-spirited ambition, as when people
think they ought to equip a chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a
brilliant way...but it is right expenditure that is virtuous. But great
expenditure is becoming to those who have suitable means to start with,
acquired by their own efforts or from ancestors or connexions, and to
people of high birth or reputation, and so on; for all these things bring with
them greatness and prestige. Primarily, then, the magnificent man is of this
sort, and magnificence is shown in expenditures of this sort, as has been
said; for these are the greatest and most honourable. Of private occasions
of expenditure the most suitable are those that...[interest] the whole
city...for the magnificent man spends not on himself but on public objects,
and gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings. A magnificent
man...will spend by preference on those works that are lasting...66
This passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics embodies an enduring social and
political structure of Antiquity, which steadily underwent transformation until it was
more of a rarity than anything else. Euergetism was one of the predominant forms of
symbolic capital during Antiquity. Symbolic capital essentially incorporates social,
economic and cultural capital, but it distinguishes itself as following. It inherently
64
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functions as a key marker by it being known and recognized as defining and contrasting
the classifications within the social field. In other words it is illustrative of the
distribution of capital. Aristotle effectively summarizes how euergetism in the ancient
city was a paragon of symbolic capital when asserting the link between patronage in
public life, the quantity of wealth and the prestige the two former garnered.
By the time Justinian came to the throne much had already changed in that regard.
The division between the civic and imperial elite assured the restructuring of this
particular structure, which was that of public life within the ancient city, particularly with
respect to the elite and local politics. The agôn amongst aristocrats and political factions
within the curia manifested itself in baths, temples and other monuments. The structure,
which seems in some respect, less impactful than others, was indeed the opposite. Civic
politics shaped the urban landscape of the ancient world and simultaneously fueled the
fisc. Yet, the departure of the wealthiest segment of the municipal councils fundamentally
changed this centuries-old structure. There were no longer any pertinent reasons for the
wealthiest of the elite to patronize the construction of public works if the incentive, which
was political power in the city, was no more. There are other elements, which must not be
ignored that also contributed to this phenomenon. Above, it has been noted that the
imperial government assumed the control of civic and temple lands. It also in some cases
abolished special statuses granted to cities with regard to taxation. The civic elite was still
required to pump revenue into the imperial coffers despite the combination of these
aforementioned losses.
The result of these events were manifold, but the broader trend rather self-evident.
The tremendous push in Late Antique archaeology over the last two decades have
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revealed many realities of the empire’s urban landscape, not to mention so much more.
The evidence largely points to urban decay and even in many cases ruralization;
essentially a reversal in the Antique trend. Sewers and aqueducts were abandoned for the
likes of improvised trenches. Burials were found increasingly within the city walls, which
they themselves were not maintained. Houses also fell victim to the trend. This
development manifested itself throughout the entire Mediterranean region.67 The
Tetrarchs initiated a domino effect, which had far reaching consequences. The structures
of Antiquity were in some cases restructured rapidly, but in other instances slowly. One
of the hallmarks of the period, urban life, fell into the latter category. Ruralization really
took hold of the empire in the sixth century, but not uniformly due to the geographic
variances. For example, shortly after A.D. 530, Athens’ agora assumed a rural role, as
two agricultural presses were constructed within it. The machinery itself was uncommon
to the urban setting, as it was more of a feature of the rural landscape. In addition,
imports of ceramics were increasingly rare.68 Asia Minor’s great coastal centers suffered
decline, as did the inland cities. Italy and North Africa’ archeological remains also tell the
same story.69 The plague, which gripped the Roman Empire under the reign of Justinian,
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is often mentioned in this context. However, it appears that the classicizing ways of
Procopius are largely responsible for the over-estimation of its impact in his Thucydideslike account.70 The material evidence largely does not support the magnitude of the
literary evidence.71
Another event, which occurs under the reign of Justinian, epitomizes the trend.
The Roman consulship was a relic of the long past days of the Republic. Its evolution as
an institution reflected the political trends of Roman civilization. It became an apolitical
office, whose responsibilities lied mainly in the distribution of largesses. On the first day
of January each year, the consul was responsible for the games and the distribution. This
was a costly endeavour. In A.D. 541, the office was abolished, as its significance was null

(1986), 435-475. For Italy: L. Paroli and P. Delogu, La storia economica di Roma nell'alto
Medioevo alla luce dei recenti scavi archeologici, Biblioteca di archeologia medievale (Florence:
All'insegna del giglio, 1993). For North Africa: W.H.C. Frend, "The End of Byzantine North
Africa," Bulletin archéologique du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques 19 #2 (1985),
387-397.
70
Proc. Wars 2.22-33.
71
For the contradiction in the sources: J. Durliat, "La Peste du VIe Siècle: Pour un Nouvel
Examen des Sources Byzantines," in Hommes et Richesses dans l’Empire Byzantine, ed. V.
Kravari, J. Lefort, and C. Morrisson (Paris: Lethielleux, 1989), 107-119. Durliat also points out
the fact that Procopius fails to mirror his famous account effectively in the Anecdota. That would
have conveniently fit his agenda in the latter work, which was largely a diatribe aimed at
Justinian and the empress. The stressing of divine retribution against the emperor in the form of
the plague is absent. Taking into consideration the long list of fictional tales the author writes
about the emperor and his consort, the omission is rather telling. G. Tate blames economic
stagnation on overpopulation and not on the plague. However, he does maintain that the plague
did have an effect: Les campagnes de la Syrie du Nord du IIe au VIIe siècle, 75-77, 335-342.
Other authors underline the prosperity of the fifth and sixth centuries: A. Walmsley, "Byzantine
Palestine and Arabia: Urban Prosperity in Late Antiquity," in Towns in Transition: Urban
Evolution in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, ed. N. Christie and S.T. Loseby
(Brookfield: Aldershot, 1996), 126-158. Banaji proposes that the economic prosperity endured
until the seventh century: Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity: Gold, Labour, and Aristocratic
Dominance. Outside the literary evidence, there are tenuous references made to such laws as Nov.
122 to support the magnitude of the plague detailed in the literary sources. However, articles by H.
Hunger and C. Mango testify to the usage of literary tropes to describe contemporaneous events
are more revealing than anything else: H. Hunger, Prooimion: Elemente der byzantinischen
Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden; C.A. Mango, Byzantine Literature as a Distorting
Mirror (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

97

and faded in comparison to the office during the Republican period.72 Interestingly, this
event, which is in many respects insignificant politically, is simultaneously noteworthy
due to the cultural implications. The abolition of the office is representative of the
centralization of political power, which occurred over centuries. Just a few years before
the abolition of the consulship, Justinian distributed 288,000 solidi to the Roman people.
That does not include the games, which involved twenty lions and thirty panthers. This
was done as part of the celebration of his consulship in A.D. 521.73 Euergetism was
increasingly centralized and was thus an undisputable sign of the destitution of civic
politics and, by extension, the urban landscape.
Interestingly, the centralization of political power, which is responsible for the
erosion of civic politics, the abolition of the consulship, the general phenomenon of urban
decay coupled with the decline euergetism, manifested itself as a weaker substitute in the
city. Due to the amount of public works, which were in need of maintenance, and the
decline of euergetism, a void was left. The structures were in need of attention and this
translated into the need of funds and of an institution to fill the void. The pater civitatis
was not a new office, but it evolved to meet these needs at the local level.74 The
appointment of the official is somewhat obscure. The pater was probably nominated by
the curia, but formally appointed by the imperial government. In some ways similar to the
pagarch, the official was both imperial and civic due to the appointment and also due to
the following. The curia held no authority over the pater; that responsibility was in the
hands of the governor. The maintenance of public works was largely transferred to this
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office.75 One key passage, which C. Roueché mistakenly interprets, describes the office’s
duties:
You must also care for the necessities in the city and its public works,
granting the necessary civic funds to the fathers76 to repair bridges, roads
and ports; likewise you must care for the walls of the ports in the
provinces over which you preside; you must consider, give your attention
and report to us anything that is useful to the public or to the cities.77
Roueché argues that the terms patres and πατέρας are not used in this law as references to
the Fathers of the Cities. She maintains that the introduction to the section of the law
supports her assertion. However, the prooimion states that this law details the way in
which to execute mandates dutifully. In Chapter iv, it is clearly instructed that any abuses
when on mission to repair public buildings are prohibited. Therefore, the sequence of
logic does not preclude a reference to the office in question. On the contrary, it does not
provide a disconnect from the law’s context.
Hence, with regard to maintenance, the imperial government began to assume the
role of the curiales within urban centers. Only few exceptions can be found throughout
the empire, notably in Asia Minor. In its western portion, the construction of monuments
funded by the local elites increased while those of the governors decreased.78 The general
trend however indicates a pattern of shrinking urban centers. G. Dagron proposes that the
change in the urban landscape did not equate in comprehensive emigration to the
countryside. He instead suggests that there may have been a development of suburban
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areas. In other words, the shrinking city centers resulted in an increase of villages.79 This
may be or may not be the case, but the fact of the matter remains that for the many
reasons that caused the elite to evolve, the Roman city’s landscape underwent a
fundamental transformation as a result. And here I must point out that J.H.W.G.
Liebeschuetz incorrectly proposes that material evidence defines the curiales and that it is
traceable archaeologically. He thus proposes that the curia was extinct in the fifth century.
Yet, he presumes that material culture defines the curiales,80 while it is the opposite,
notably when taking into consideration the data above. The city, which was a cornerstone
of Antiquity, serves as a testimony to the cultural vibrancy at the local level, notably its
aristocracy’s involvement in municipal politics. Whether urban decay was only a sign of
suburbanization does not fundamentally alter the understanding of the city’s structural
evolution. The civic monuments, which were emblematic of both Greek and Roman
civilizations, were clearly declining. The architectural feats of the Church testify to a
“passage d'un type de civilisation à un autre, en l'occurrence d'une civilisation de la cité à
une civilisation de la ville.”81
Not only was the imperial government assuming the role of the municipal
notables, the Church was also to a certain extent involved. There is evidence, which
indicates that bishops were also attempting to alleviate the situation. With the decline of
public monuments, either renovations or new structures were needed. Theodoret of
Cyrrhus writes of his involvement in such affairs. He patronized the construction of
porticoes, baths and bridges.82 Although not much of a highly publicized public work in
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the sources, a bishop of Gerasa was responsible for the construction of the city’s prison.83
Again in Mesopotamia, the bishop of Edessa was in charge of the fortifications’
renovations, but the emperor funded the enterprise. The emperor also provided the funds
to build fortifications at Birtha Castra, which was overseen by Bishop Serghis.84 At Kom
Obo in Egypt, a public place was cleaned at Governor Arsenius’ expense. In addition,
with respect to the renovations an inscription reads: “And at the suggestion and dictation
and by the virtue of the Bishop…the same place was renewed and rebuilt from
foundation to roof…”85 Again in Egypt, the bishop of Philae was involved in the
construction of a harbor and fortifications.86 Supervision seems to be more common than
actual patronizing as there are other instances in Trebizond.87 In Bostra, the bishop was
responsible for securing the funds for public buildings from Justinian after he personally
petitioned the emperor through an embassy.88 Lastly, there is an odd incident in Edessa.
Bishop Ibas of Edessa is said to have had a member of his entourage organize chariot
races.89 Despite the fact that these bishops were not actually funding some of these
enterprises, they were still celebrated in the inscriptions. This does not follow the custom
of personally financing public monuments, but nevertheless it still falls under the
definition of euergetism, which literally translates as “performing good works.” Yet there
are instances just listed above, which indicate that the bishops financed public works.
Moreover it is important to underline that the cities’ notables, who were commonly
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mentioned in this context, are relegated in the grander scheme of things.
This development is further noted in Nov. 128 (A.D. 545). The law applies to the
Prefecture of the East, specifically to the cities in which there are bishops. By default,
such cities are often important in size. Two important details emerge from this law in this
context. The bishop, the leading men of the city and landowners are designated to appoint
the father of the city, the head of its grain supply and other similar administrative offices.
In addition, the bishop and the five leading citizens of the city were tasked to verify the
financial accounts of the administrative officials they have appointed.90 It is another
telling sign of the fundamental transformation of the Roman urban landscape, not to
mention its social fabric. The curiales surely had some part in the first, but most likely
did not take part in the latter process. The leading citizens of the city were most often part
of the upper tier elite, which had dissociated itself from the curia.
The change that occurs in the city does not equate to an impoverishment of the
elite. On the contrary, wealth is abundant, but its footprint is less opulent. Again, the
aristocracy was fragmented along the lines of local and imperial. Many members of the
imperial elite are indeed local, but not necessarily the other way around. The civic elite,
which formed the remnants of the curia after the exodus to the imperial aristocracy, is not
as fortunate. As explained above, the chasm of economic, cultural and social capital
between both segments is significant. The fragmentation of the civic elite gave way to an
irrevocable fracture. Yet, the imperial aristocracy of the Late Empire is not “new” by any
means, as some propose. It consists of men who benefitted in most cases from the
imperial government’s initiatives in the late third and early fourth centuries, and
thereafter. This process saw the cultural reproduction of a portion of the social hierarchy
90
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fill the materialized void created by the expanded bureaucracy. The very top tier of city
councils (i.e. principales) saw their prominent position reproduced on a broader scale,
transitioning from local to imperial clout. Many families would become entrenched
socially and maintain their prominence over the course of time. Therefore P. Sarris is
mistaken in his treatment of the phenomenon. The flagrant corruption of the upper tier
elite, which he underlines, did not reach the point of ebullition in the late sixth century
when “the private authority of the great landowner and the public authority of the Roman
state had…become essentially indistinguishable.”91 The provincial elite had always been
indistinguishable from the central apparatus in the Late Empire; in essence, it was the
central apparatus.
Therefore, we are left with a perplexing question. If the competition amongst the
civic elite once manifested itself in euergetism, how did economic capital manifest itself
in symbolic capital in Late Antiquity? E. Patlagean argues that there was a transition
from euergetism to Christian charity. She also maintains that euergetism remained a
feature of Late Antique customs.92 There is evidence for euergetism throughout the
period but not in the same volume as the previous ones. Many aristocrats of the highest
echelons instead spent their monies on the acquisition of land, charity and on the
patronage of Christian structures.
The elite however not only sought entry into the imperial administration due to its
lucrative nature. Some also entered the Church, which also assumed some of the
administrative tasks delegated from the center. Due to the controversial nature of the
subject, it is difficult to deem the trend to be attributed to ulterior material motives,
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particularly that of economic, cultural and social capital. On the one hand, due to the
injection of faith into the mix, it hinders the interpretative process making it much more
muddled than anything else. On the other hand, the interpretation of the general trend of
wealthy aristocrats moving from the periphery to the center with respect to politics offers
the historian more latitude. In the latter situation, the historian is to a far lesser extent
questioning the subject’s heart. Nevertheless, there is evidence for such members of the
elite practising Christian charity such as Cyrus. A former Consul and Praetorian Prefect,
he fell out of favour due to the machinations of Chrysaphius. He became Bishop of
Cotyaeum and gave much of his wealth to the poor.93 Basil of Caesarea was himself a
bishop from a wealthy family. He himself stated that if an individual were too poor, he
should be seeking charity from the wealthy.94 In other instances we might find a bishop
regularizing and formalizing the alms destined to the poor. In Gaza, Bishop Porphyry
instituted such a program, which offered six obols to each poor man on a daily basis.95
These are amongst many examples of Christian charity that can be found throughout the
period. In addition, it also indicates that euergetism was not exclusive to the emperor and
his consort, and the local elite. The Church, which assumed secular duties for the
government, also took on the role of politicians, who would distribute largesses to the
masses. Hence, in many respects, symbolic capital was thoroughly transformed. It no
longer was the physical manifestation of political ἀγώνες.
Public buildings were no longer valuable representations of the elite’s symbolic
capital, but other areas would compensate. As seen above, charity was one form of
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symbolic capital. With the exponential growth of the Church during the course of Late
Antiquity, structures were needed to adapt to the growth. The evolution of symbolic
capital can be seen in the patronage of churches and monasteries. In some respects, this
demonstrated some form of continuity with the past. However, the motives were far
different. Political competition within the curia and even amongst cities was not the
causative determinant. Yet, the continuous growth in numbers of such structures is a clear
indicator of continual wealth.96
Not only was the elite patronizing the architectural endeavors of the Church and
investing in land, it also appears to have been hoarding its money in some cases. In the
sixth and seventh centuries, the Sassanids laid waste to the eastern portion of the empire
several times. Their armies extorted money from Roman cities repeatedly. In A.D. 540,
Khosrau I negotiated with the leaders of Apamea and reached an arrangement, which
included 1,000 lbs. of gold in tribute in exchange for the city’s safety. However, once he
entered the city, he betrayed his word and proceeded to seize all the precious metals. Less
than twenty-five years later in A.D. 573, John of Ephesus reports that the city amassed
considerable wealth and was distinguished as one of the more wealthy cities of the
Empire, when the Sassanids returned to sack the city again.97 In A.D. 540, the city of
Edessa was also targeted by Khosrau I, who exacted two centenaria of gold from the city
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in exchange for its safety. In A.D. 542, another event unfolded demonstrating the elite’s
accumulated wealth. Belisarius had given the most influential and wealthy member of the
city, John, the son of Basilius, as hostage to Khosrau I. John’s grandmother attempted to
purchase her grandson’s freedom by offering the Sassanid king 2,000 lbs. of silver.98
Shortly thereafter in A.D. 544, Khosrau returned to Edessa and was able to extract five
centenaria of gold from its people. The city fell victim to the Sassanids once again, but
this time to his son, Khosrau II in A.D. 609 when 120,000 lbs. of silver were extorted.99
What emerge from these seemingly standard events of war are signs of
accumulated wealth. Gifts to the public were often very costly, as it has been noted above
for the consulship. Justinian gave over one quarter of a million solidi to the Roman
people. Hence, these potential expenditures could be saved for other purposes. In the
cases above in Syria, it appears that some members of the elite were hoarding vast sums
of wealth instead of patronizing the Church or purchasing additional lands. It may be
possible that such a woman as the grandmother of John of Edessa was able to accomplish
all three (patronize, add to her family’s estates and accumulate wealth). Nevertheless, it is
rather clear that the elite was not hamstrung financially during this period. On the
contrary, calamities such as earthquakes and invasions of Syria did not impede the
accumulation of capital. On a side note, it also demonstrates what taxable resources were
potentially available to Constantinople.
The decline of the curia can be seen through the events listed above that pertain to
Syria. The curia and its members were stripped of much of its capital in many respects.
This inevitably entailed a diminution of their symbolic capital. As representatives of their
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cities, it would have been standard to lead the negotiations. However, the reductions of
their economic and cultural capital translated into a significant drop in symbolic capital.
Roman society’s perception of these developments discounted what must have been a
customary choice. In Apamea, Khosrau I did not negotiate with a curialis. A priest of the
city was sent to initiate the discussion about the city’s fate.100 There is other evidence,
which is listed above examining the euergetism of bishops, which further testifies to this
phenomenon. The reduction in the curiales’ symbolic capital is manifest in hagiographies.
For example, in the Life and Miracles of Saint Thecla, there is only one reference to
curiales and they are not from Seleucia, which is largely the urban focus of the
narrative.101 The curia’s importance appears to have receded within the city’s fabric. It
was no longer pivotal domestically and in the city’s foreign relations. In addition, this
once again demonstrates how much of a chasm developed between the civic and imperial
elite with regard to capital after the reforms of the Tetrarchs. On the one hand, the upper
tier elite possesses a tremendous amount of capital. On the other hand, it must be noted
that there is a proportional relationship between the capital of the remnants of the civic
aristocracy and its importance in the social, political and economic arenas, which is
epitomized in symbolic capital.
From a broader standpoint, the Late Antique aristocracy was further fragmented
along the lines of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. The division along
capital lines within the curia was not only pronounced with the reforms of the late third
and early fourth centuries, but grew exponentially. The imperial government itself
authored the fragmentation, which is manifest in the dichotomy between civic and
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imperial or between peripheral and centralized. Surely the results were unforeseen, but
the reforms that restructured centuries-old structures thoroughly affected the strata within
the elite. With these fundamental changes came the re-definition of social, cultural and
symbolic capital. Social networks expanded greatly and intrinsically tied the periphery to
the center, but not according to the preference of the imperial government. These
complex social networks enabled key agents within it to wield enormous power often to
the detriment of the center. With respect to cultural capital, it has been noted that there
was a greater emphasis on the heuristics of a given individual. Hence, this increased the
likelihood of new men piercing the summit of the Roman social order. Yet, due to the
other enduring elements that defined cultural capital, there was somewhat of a conflict.
Education, pedigree and economic capital were still the cornerstones in that area. Lastly,
the chasm between the imperial and civic elite manifested itself in symbolic capital. No
longer were great public monuments shaping the urban landscape. The notables of the
municipal councils did not express their competitiveness in the patronage of such
monuments. Their wealthiest segment had already emigrated to the imperial government.
Symbolic capital was now visibly less discernible. Churches were indeed the most visible,
but simultaneously the architectural trademarks of the ancient city were declining at a
rapid rate.

Therefore, the conclusions made with respect to class-related issues on this topic are
generally problematic. Both P. Sarris and J. Banaji faultily extrapolate their findings in
Egyptian evidence, particularly papyri, to paint a broader picture of the whole empire’s
social and economic machinery. The magnates of great estates in Egypt were not
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emblematic of the Empire as a whole. On the contrary, Egypt had its own set of social,
economic and cultural conditions. Much scholarship has been produced that validates this
objection. The archaeological work of G. Tate in Syria indicates that the small landholder
was dominant.102 Then again, M. Kaplan convincingly proposes that the small landholder
dominated the rural landscape of the Empire until the Middle Period of Byzantium.103 On
the economic side of things, Sarris fails to underline the contrast between the reigns of
Anastasius and Justinian. The vast treasury amassed by the former vanished in the reign
of the latter. This was no coincidence. Justinian’s monumental effort to recapture Roman
lands and fend off the Sassanid juggernaut to the East cost exorbitant amounts of money.
That is not to mention his building campaign. John the Cappadocian was quick to voice
the financial reality of his overlord’s designs.104 Yet, Sarris mistakenly proposes that the
large landholders were common and that by virtue of their land they were responsible for
the fiscal decay of the Late Empire through institutional abuse. The latter argument is in
the tradition of A.H.M. Jones, amongst others. This does not account for the fiscal
discipline under Anastasius. First, as mentioned above, there was not a “new” elite, as it
was just a fragmented and evolved one. The restructuring of Antique structures under the
Tetrarchs enabled the top segment of the elite to reach unparalleled heights. Second, it is
highly unlikely that from the year A.D. 518, a sudden incapacity to exercise fiscal
discipline gripped the Empire due to this very elite. The imperial government was the
agent, which caused the restructuring and enabled this transformation in the social arena.
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In addition, it is also responsible for the expenditures. In the case of Justinian, the
contrast between Anastasius and Justinian is immense.
Lastly, from an even broader perspective, this method fails to acknowledge the role of
social, cultural and symbolic capital by secluding itself to economic capital as the source
of causation. It also fails to acknowledge the agency of individual actors that cause
cascading effects by instead focusing on class. For instance, the Tetrarchs initiated a
series of institutional reforms that were not only due to fiscal interests, but also to
administrative control and political security. These events, which transpired over less
than a quarter century, had far-reaching consequences, such as the accumulation of
capital within the hands of the upper tier aristocracy. If that were a consequence, which it
is, it would be problematic to base a system of causation upon it; this is especially the
case since this system of causation does not stem solely from economic logics. Moreover,
it has also been pointed out that economic capital is often a derivative of cultural and
symbolic capital, thus inhibiting any argument for it being the sole source of causation.
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CHAPTER IV:
THE ROMAN EMPIRE ON THE EVE OF JUSTINIAN’S REFORMS

As it has been noted in the previous chapters, the imperial administration did not
anticipate many of the Tetrarchic Reforms’ consequences. The reforms created a social,
political and economic crisis. Varying forms of capital evolved simultaneously as a result
of the reforms. This thus altered the complexion of the Roman elite, particularly its upper
tier. Administrative control, which was one of the primary objectives of the reforms, was
tightened theoretically, but not in practice to the extent which was desired. The notables
wielded much more power in the provinces, as their assets grew considerably. Though,
political security was achieved while the desired fiscal stability was not.1 The fiscal
health of the Roman Empire continued to deteriorate with only a few exceptions that
were rather brief. Anastasius’ reign is one of the remarkable exceptions. However, that
moment of fiscal solvency was short lived as the treasury he had amassed dwindled in the
early reign of Justinian. Thus, the administrative framework that Justinian inherited was
quite dysfunctional and inefficient. Yet fortunately he benefited from Anastasius’ fiscal
efforts. Though that fortune was quickly squandered in less than two decades. In the
midst of an ever-increasing need for revenue, the imperial administration saw a portion of
its empire, as a great testing ground for fundamental institutional reforms. This would
largely be carried out in Asia Minor in the A.D. 530s.

1
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However, before examining the reforms themselves, it is necessary to determine
what was the shape of the administration in these administrative areas. In the following
pages, an inquiry into the relationship between the imperial administration and
bureaucratic efficiency will be launched. The analysis will cover the period stretching
from the Tetrarchic reforms up to the early reign of Justinian (prior to his provincial
reforms of the A.D. 530s). The first part of this inquiry is short and is focused upon the
makeup of the administration, particularly with respect to its size. By imperial
administration, such elements as its verticality and its numerous layers will be surveyed.
In particular, the diocese, the vicariate, the appeals system and the provincial
administration will be scrutinized. With that established, the analysis will proceed to an
evaluation of performance. With regard to bureaucratic efficiency, many areas will be
targeted: redundancy, corruption, hollowed magistracies and intra-bureaucratic
cooperation amongst others. A relationship between both the size and efficiency is the
aim of the following pages.
The scholarship on the subject is plentiful, as are the interpretations and methods.
However, there is a general consensus regarding the state of the administration prior to
the reforms. Most scholars agree that the there were glaring issues in the administration
of the provinces. The difference lies in the system of causation chosen by the scholar. C.
Kelly proposes that the position of the emperor at the summit of the Roman world in Late
Antiquity was ensured by its shift to an oriental despotate, that is, the Dominate. The
ideological expression of the emperor’s power simultaneously caused his position to
weaken due to an elaborate bureaucracy. However, Kelly argues that imperial power
persisted through conscientious decisions: “Administrative responsibilities were
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arbitrarily split or shifted; personnel were moved between departments; promotion was
based on a set of often conflicting criteria…”2 In other words, emperors wittingly
sacrificed bureaucratic efficiency for the maintenance of power at the center. His work,
Ruling the Later Roman Empire,3 expands upon the previous paper quoted just above
from the thirteenth volume of The Cambridge Ancient History. The difficulty with this
proposition lies in the stated motivations of the emperor. This would insinuate an
enduring imperial agenda to which most emperors subscribed. Then again, it would also
postulate that all reforms were conceived with this very power play in mind, which does
not appear to be likely. Institutional problem solving was a priority and this can be seen
in the appointments Justinian made for the Prefecture of the East.
Many scholars see the Empire’s institutions as the cause for administrative
difficulties. Two of the better-known historians in the field see the evidence in this light.
A.H.M. Jones and E. Stein pay particular attention to complex judicial problems, which
stemmed from the status of provincial governors and the appeal system.4 More recently,
historians have pursued the same line of thought. J.A.S. Evans views the failures as
symptoms of a systemic issue. Specifically, he sees the imperial administration as a selfinterested entity, oblivious to its roles: “’Parkinson’s Law’ had affected both the civil
service and the church.”5 Similarly, J. Haldon asserts that the imperial center attempts to
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reclaim its power over the bureaucracy were nullified due to institutional stasis.6
Narrower arguments focus on the internal workings of the government. In this regard, G.
Tate emphasizes corruption in the provincial administration, particularly with respect to
the venality of offices.7 Others focus on the decline of the governorship.8
Others view a systemic problem stemming from social dynamics, particularly
with respect to class. J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz and P. Sarris see a new social phenomenon
undermining the administrative framework. The former sees the transition from a civic
government of decurions to that of notables. This development, he proposes, rendered the
system less systematic and the notables who ran it less accountable.9 However, The
Decline and Fall of the Roman City is not limited to a materialist approach, as he tends to
lend much of his focus to institutional history. In a similar fashion, P. Sarris argues that,
during Diocletian’s reign, a new aristocracy emerged and it abused its political authority
for personal gain. More specifically, the emergence of this “new” class fomented the
decline of the imperial administration. More specifically, this very class systematically
undermined the imperial administration:
…the consolidation of this new elite’s social and economic preponderance
threatened to undermine the basis of empire…to engage in acts of largescale tax evasion and thereby to interrupt and diminish the flow of tax
revenues on which the structures of the Roman state and, above all, the
Roman army depended.10
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Unlike Liebeschuetz, his method is almost exclusively rooted in Marxist theory.11
Similarly, J. Banaji discusses a transition within the aristocracy. However, he applies
economic theory to the evidence while Sarris’ energies are mainly spent on social history.
Banaji, though, proposes that this new aristocracy exploited a dispossessed peasantry in a
new labor system. He too argues that this new aristocracy engaged in “widespread and
systematic bureaucratic profiteering, involving the kinds of speculation and rentseeking…”12 The emphasis on the mode of production and the control of the means of
production lead this theoretical model to encounter many challenges. It forces the
evidence to adapt to itself instead of the opposite.13 The evidence at our disposal does not
corroborate the universal application of social norms in Oxyrhynchus to the rest of Egypt,
even less the rest of the Empire. Therefore, the proposition that the proliferation of the
great estates led to its monopoly of the means of production is tenuous at best. In addition,
the great estates model proposed insinuates a concept of economic capital, which is
somewhat flawed. The means of production were not solely rooted in agrarian production
and the exploitation of its associated labor. Cultural capital could precede social,
economic and symbolic capital, as was the case for John Lydus. Moreover, J. Haldon
appropriately indicates:
The élite drew its wealth from three possible sources: from rent derived
from the exploitation of agriculture and pastoral farming; from
involvement in commerce and trade or production of goods; and from
service at court and in the imperial administration. Of these there can be
no doubt that the last-named provided, throughout most of the history of
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the empire, the greatest portion of the élite incomes for a significant
number of individuals…14
Hence, it can be argued that the great estates were but a subsidiary of realities in the
capital. The great estate may have contributed capital to the notable’s repertoire, but it
was not necessarily its determinant. The capital generated by participation in the political
field could make an aristocrat; possessions in real estate much less so. It can therefore be
argued that the means of production were found more so in government than in
agriculture itself.
An interpretative method employed by R. MacMullen is also of interest. His work,
Corruption and the Decline of Rome, uses an interesting hermeneutical approach based
on Parsons’ theory of power. MacMullen argues:
By “power” I mean only the contrary of obedience…Local or central
government was able to transmit its will through an armature of influence
and obedience joining urban, provincial, and imperial leaders and their
dependents. It functioned effectively because a generally accepted code of
obligations pervaded both its public and private relations...Gradually,
however, a competing code made converts among leaders and dependents
alike and diminished the capacity to transmit and focus energy.15
He also maintains: “public and private power came to be treated as a source of profit.”16
Unfortunately, his work does not account for the continuity of illicit practices dating back
to the Republic. Then again, the first point of ebullition that occurred in the first century
B.C. did not lead to the decline of Roman civilization despite rampant venality and selfinterested politicians. These very same politicians of the Late Republic did not even
remotely adhere to a code of honour. On the contrary they eliminated their rivals in civil
wars or with proscription lists. They also flagrantly abused the rules of office tenure and
14
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they saw politics as a means of obtaining further capital. Therefore, an important element
appears to be lacking in the application of this interpretative model.
Less than a decade later, J.E. Lendon published his work, which is inspired by the
same method, and, in it, he furthered the line of R. MacMullen’s argument. To be more
specific, he proposes that the dysfunction of the Roman administration stemmed from a
societal breakdown caused by the distinction of honors. He proposes that such a
distinction between the authority and its subjects is effective until the subject wields more
prestige.17 However, once again, precedents in the Late Republic undo this theory. The
cursus honorum was not an effective tool to control the ambitions of a plethora of
politicians. It can even be argued that the bottleneck at the praetorship created a
breakdown in the cursus in the Late Republic.18 Moreover the focus on symbolic capital
as a causative force denies the structuring properties of the Tetrarchic reforms. The
reforms structured long-established structures, including the construction of the
aristocracy. As a result, the system of causation cannot originate in a breakdown of the
honors system. More broadly, both scholars appear to be more centered upon the
causative role of conditioning. It does not account for the agency of the actors and their
ability to define their constraints. Without constraints conditioning cannot be operational.
In other words, the individual will seek to recognize his constraints in order to exploit
whatever freedom he might have and with it, he will attempt to outwit the system.
Gaming the system was no novelty; its size and scope however vary.
Drawing on the same cause, namely power, C. Ando attempts to rest the
efficiency of Roman governance on imperial propaganda, as a unifying force between the
17
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periphery and center: “this book argues that the charismatic power of the imperial office
guaranteed the orderly functioning of the Roman bureaucracy.”19 In his Imperial Ideology
and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire, Ando’s approach is rooted in a series of
sociological theories. However, two of the larger problems associated with this work are
glaring. First, there is once again a large focus on power and how it is exercised through
conditioning. Once again conditioning does not define human behavior, especially if it is
not conjoined with a set of constraints. Behavior appears to be much more in tune with
the freedom the individual is granted. What held the empire together after the so-called
crisis of the second century had less to do with a unifying imperial ideology, than the
actors’ choices within that given set of conditions. A choice between economic and
political uncertainty in a rogue kingdom was a less attractive proposition to a notable.20
Whatever could be salvaged from the Empire at that point offered more to the same
notable. This is related to a second issue to the application of theory. The work fails to
account for the role of the provincial elite in the manner in which vertical power
emanated from the center. On the contrary, C. Ando discredits most scholarship’s
tendency to assign agency to such a collective term. That is only in part correct. A social
class lacks objective determinants, but the political field nevertheless mobilizes it,
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creating a class’ sense of identity.21 In fact, the imperial center did not have any difficulty
mobilizing it to administrate its large tracts of lands. The relationship was reciprocal, as
both benefitted in different ways. Both parties committed their resources for different
reasons. The emperor was able to oversee the administration of his empire; the notables
were able to accumulate capital, to make career advancements, to ensure a promising
future for the next generation of their families, amongst many other motivations.22
The study of the administration of Roman law is exhaustive. However, here I
shall limit the analysis to a brief overview of the diocese and the province. The inquiry
will focus particularly upon the general duties in the legislative area and the size of the
bureaucracy involved. The provinces that were targeted by Justinian’s provincial reform
program in the 530’s were largely in Asia Minor. The judicial system was rather complex
with several layers in its mechanism and these included Constantinople, the praetorian
prefecture, the diocese and the provincial governorship. However, due to the nature of the
reforms, attention will be paid to the two latter.
Under the jurisdiction of the Praetorian Prefecture of the East, the Diocese of
Pontus was the intermediary between the former and the provinces. In this very diocese,
its vicar presided over the provinces of Bithynia, Galatia, Paphlagonia, Honorias, Galatia,
Cappadocia I, Cappadocia II, Helenopontus, Armenia I and Armenia II.23 The vicar was
at the head of the diocese and this institutional apparatus was largely bent on
administering justice throughout a given diocese. He had three hundred imperial
functionaries at the behest of his office. For example, in the case of Africa in A.D. 365,
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three hundred officiales constituted the vicar’s staff. The size of his retinue seems to have
been initially unnecessarily large, as later legislation would in one case set a vicar’s staff
at only 25% of the originally mandated size.24 One of its most important roles involved
inter-provincial crime. Brigandage crossing over provincial lines was not uncommon and
in that particular circumstance the governor was powerless to pursue perpetrators outside
his jurisdiction. The task then fell to the Vicar in such cases.25 With respect to the judicial
system’s mechanism, the vicar was technically a channel for appeals from cases in the
provinces.26 Generally the administrative role of the diocese is otherwise not very much
known to us, but by the beginning of Justinian’s reign this specific layer of the legislative
branch seems to have been very unpopular. Its traffic rate decreased substantially since its
inception.27 In sum, the vicariate’s size was rather large, when taking into consideration
its effectiveness in the legal system. In addition, with respect to fiscality, it had also lost
most of its importance to the tractatores whom the Praetorian Prefects sent to supervise
the provinces directly.28 Thus, in the grand scheme of things, this specific branch’s
bureaucratic value was very much in doubt.
The province is often considered to be the next subordinate unit in the
administrative machinery of the Empire. However, that hierarchy of governance found in
the Notitia Dignitatum can be rather misleading, as it shall later be discussed. The
governor oversaw his province in theory, but the evolution of the provincial bureaucratic
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machinery proved otherwise. In every province, the governor was responsible for the
administration of justice to a certain extent. The governor’s office lost its judicial
authority over the public as the centuries passed following the Tetrarchic reforms. The
governorship’s powers within the legislative branch of the Empire were no longer sought
as a reliable recourse. A quaestor was created for the city of Constantinople to handle the
enormous amount of congestion in the capital stemming from the appeals of
provincials.29 Therefore the appeals system is a rather compelling area that substantiates
the decline of the governor’s authority in the administration of Roman law. Oft times
appeals would be made to the Prefecture, to the capital or to the vicar, notably to the two
former. The governor would be leapfrogged in many cases. This was one of the many
problems associated to the appeals system, as it was flooded.30 Individuals would often
resort to private petitions. Wealthy and powerful individuals steadily became an
increasingly viable recourse in this particular circumstance.31
Despite the waning power of the office, the governor had the luxury of a rather
large retinue. The reforms indicate how this was problematic to the capital. In Novel 29,
Justinian specifically mentions the practice of sending delegates as representatives to
cities. He forbid any such practice and instructed the governor to effectuate his tasks
directly.32 Yet the governorship had become a shell of its former self. It did not carry the
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weight it once did within the administrative framework. In some respects, its decline was
not unlike that of the consulship, whose office holder was also to a certain extent
decorative in the administrative machinery. Both were increasingly hallowed as the
administration evolved, particularly the consulship. In essence, there appears to be much
dead weight within this specific bureaucracy, as can be noted by the size of the vicar’s
retinue.
The justice system was rather large and very complex. The provincial
administration as a whole did not appear to be any different. As it has been established
above, the governorship had become a shell of its former self institutionally by the
beginning of Justinian’s reign, yet the office still commanded a great amount of personnel.
Then again, the Tetrarchic reforms caused the number of provinces to grow exponentially,
multiplying the number of governorships and staffs. Thus, the provinces reduced in size
nevertheless had a governor, whose efficiency was questionable, with a large staff at its
head. This may in fact be the reason for the Diocese’s inception. The multiplication of
provinces necessitated an increase in supervision. Evidently, the central apparatus would
have to delegate this task by creating intermediary bureaucracies, i.e. the Prefecture and
the Diocese. Due to the tiers within the system, it is difficult to accept C. Roueché’s
proposition. She argues that the subdivision of provinces was primarily intended to
alleviate logistical issues governors had to face as judges.33 It was one reason, but surely
not a priority. The Empire found itself in fiscal and financial turmoil during the period.
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The internal threat stemming from ambitious men in the provinces such as Maximinus
Thrax or Gordian I was a stark reality.34
The Tetrarchs also further expanded the personnel by dividing the civil and
military branches in each province. As it has been discussed in a previous chapter, the
division of the military and civil branches was effectuated for a multitude of reasons.
However, Diocletian sought to quell two of the most glaring needs of the center: fiscal
solvency and military security in internal affairs. Hence, the civil and military
administrations were no longer a unit. On the contrary, they had their respective heads
and the governor was still in the mix. In most provinces, the governor was mandated to
focus mainly on fiscal and legal duties.35 His military duties for the most part were
relinquished. Nevertheless, A.H.M. Jones’ estimates for the bureaucracy’s expansion
under the Tetrarchs range anywhere between 10,000 and 15,000 men just in the
provincial and diocesan administrations.36 However, in A.D. 396, Arcadius instructed the
Governor of Illyricum to collect taxes with a group of imperial officials. There, curiales
did not perform the exactions. On the contrary, one hundred men staffed this tax
collection unit.37 As a result, this total excludes the other branches of the provincial
administration in Illyricum. It does not include those who staffed the justice and military
branches within the province. Therefore, by extension, the numerical estimates of A.H.M.
Jones listed just above might be slightly modest.
34
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The reason for dividing the civil and military administrations is not specifically
known to us. The sources of the period are lacking and a sizeable amount of the
information we do possess dates from later periods. Therefore, such attestations are
shaped in hindsight after the reforms themselves. Nevertheless, due to the historical
context of the reforms under the Tetrarchs, one might surmise that the division was
intended to reduce the power of provincial governors. The dux commanded whatever
troops were stationed in the province. In Egypt, soldiers were mainly used for policing
while in other regions such as Armenia the military was used primarily in matters of
foreign policy. Constantine oversaw the crystallization of this institutional development.
He, as his predecessors, feared challenges from within and thus such a reform was
calculated. Nevertheless, the division was part of the larger phenomenon, which saw the
imperial government grow tremendously with the object of a firmer control over taxation,
the legal system and the military.
The growth of the imperial administration is not a subject of debate. However, the
final product of the Tetrarchic reforms offers different interpretations. As it has been
noted above, the size of the legal system was considerable. At this point, it is important to
determine its actual effectiveness. In other words, did the bureaucracy administering
Roman law perform its tasks proportionally to its size? Many areas are of interest in this
particular discussion: accessibility, corruption and institutional obsoleteness or
redundancy. With regard to the accessibility, the commoners’ access to the justice system
will be investigated. In the area of corruption, an examination of extortion and injustice
amongst others will be conducted; accessibility will also play into the fold. Lastly, offices
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and entire bureaucracies will be scrutinized with respect to their real value and
functioning within the judicial apparatus.

A SURVEY OF THE ROMAN GOVERNMENT’S MACHINERY
The imperial capital, the prefecture, the diocese and the province each had its role in the
administration of justice. There appears to have been a conscious effort to systematize the
procedures under the Tetrarchs. However, that quickly unraveled. Appeals flooded a
system, which could not effectively manage them. As a whole the legal system had
become unnecessarily complex. Average Roman citizens could not gain fair access to it.
Sportulae, generally, were fees that were either deemed legal or illicit by the central
government. An inscription at Timgad describes these fees as mechanisms, which
enabled the emperor to exempt himself from paying bureaucrats. To be more specific,
they did not factor into the fiscal apparatus.38 In the case of the justice system, sportulae
were bribes or “fees” paid by an individual at each phase of litigation; they were
necessary only to have access to the courts. This process could be long and drawn out
depending on the situation. The imperial court was very aware of these. Regardless of the
individual’s resources, a litigant had to travel to the governor’s court only to encounter
long delays at that very place. This indeed incurred tremendous costs.39 In the case of a
small farmer, he would have to leave his crops for an indefinite amount of time. That
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time could be worsened by the long waits and other legal technicalities that could take
place in the court itself. Also, he would have to spend money for his travels and then for
access to the court. It was a rather very unattractive endeavor for a person of modest
means, even one who was blatantly wronged.
The logistics mentioned above were not the only drawback, as the courts were not
immune to corruption. Yet J. Harries argues: “There was therefore a perhaps surprisingly
generous attitude towards access to the legal process, which was in theory available to all,
more so than was to be the case with later systems, including our own.” Epigraphic
evidence does not concur with this statement.40 Here I shall discuss two instances among
many that describe the inequities of the courts. In the fifth century, Priscus tells of his
encounter with a Greek merchant who decided to remain with the Huns after being
released as their prisoner. Priscus accuses the merchant of treachery, who retorts sharply
that Roman taxation is too heavy and that Roman courts are corrupt. In the latter case, he
specifically underlines the accessibility issue, which prescribes the wronged prosecutor to
pay a judge and his staff for justice to be administered. The length of trials is also subject
to his critique. In addition, he sharply criticizes the application of Roman law itself. He
argues that the laws are only applicable to those who do not have much capital. Hence,
the wealthy, he asserts, are not subject to justice.41 The sportulae were used to alter the
course of a case. The case could dramatically be shaped by the difference between the
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prosecution’s and the defense’s sportulae.42 Often the one who provided the larger bribe
would purchase the judge’s partiality. Novel 82 refers to this specific problem, where the
law delineates fees to be collected by the judge when a case is over 100 gold pieces.
Furthermore, the law specifies that higher judges be compensated with two pounds of
gold annually and
…they should be content with that alone, they should not be bought and
they look down upon money altogether. Because of this, we have chosen
to reduce our income, to the point that each judge will be content with our
largesse and with the allotted four aurei will keep his hands clean in front
of God, Us and the law…43
The vocabulary is very telling. By urging judges to keep their hands clean in the eyes of
God, the emperor and the law clearly testify to the illicit inclinations. This validates the
existence of unwritten “rules” (i.e. bribing judges) that accompanied standard procedures.
Theoretically, the system of legal procedures was systematized and thus the results were
to a certain extent predetermined. Outside of it, this left everything related to the process
in an area where maneuverability was at a premium. Hence, charging unofficial fees
solely to hear a case was technically outside the system of processes. Furthermore,
legislation against such actions could have generally been ineffective. There was no
paper trail nor could its evidence be provided with ease. These bribes are ententes made
behind the scenes only to favor the judges (and to a lesser extent the wealthy perpetrator).
Hence, the ability to exploit such an area of the administration came without much toil
42
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and moreover it was undoubtedly very lucrative. With respect to the sportulae in their
broader occurences, laws speak of the preponderance of bureaucrats exploiting zones of
uncertainty. When a sportula was legalized, officials would soon find new illicit venues
to exact new fees.44
A second critique of the fourth century is also rather pointed. Referring to the
practice of law, Ammianus Marcellinus asserts:
Thirdly, there are those who, in order to win distinction in their
mischievous trade, whet their venal tongues to attack the truth, and often
gain a hearing wherever they choose by their brazen impudence and
disgraceful clamour. When the court is already deeply perplexed they add
complications which cannot be disentangled, and make it their business to
prevent any peaceful outcome by raising knotty questions to embarrass the
judges. When courts are properly conducted they are temples of justice,
but when they are corrupt they are blind and treacherous pitfalls. Anyone
who falls into them will not escape till many years have elapsed and he
has been sucked dry to the very marrow.45
Ironically, not much has changed in that regard to this day. At any rate, on the one hand,
one might notice how such the process cannot be feasible to a common inhabitant of the
Empire. On the other hand, this particular reality favored the wealthier segments of
society. Litigants with modest means, who were wronged by a richer individual, either
did not bother to seek justice from the onset or must have given up during a long process.
The process could be drawn out not only due to lawyers and loopholes. Judges were also
known to be incompetent in jurisprudence. Often they had no training in the area. Hence,
assessores were vital to judges in this specific circumstance.46 The inexperience and lack
of knowledge could prolong cases. Judges would have to defer to the expertise of others
and this could take time. Therefore, litigants would most likely incur heavy monetary
44
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losses due to the delays and to the varying layers of the system, which each charge
sportulae. In fact, the findings of Di Segni et al. demonstrate this. They assert that “the
ordinary provincial in a lawsuit at Caesarea paid about 5 solidi in court costs altogether.
This amount was almost equal to the cost of feeding a person for one year…Not many
people could have afforded it; those who were less well off – probably the vast majority –
resorted to other means of conflict resolution…”47 This excludes the bribes (sportulae)
paid to judges. As a result, Harries’ assertion alleging the generous accessibility to
Roman courts is very much an overstatement. On the contrary, it appears to have been far
from it.
If the initial phase had not discouraged the victim, this part of the process surely
would. The wealthy perpetrator could in fact benefit by having a lawyer draw out the
process. Obtaining a good lawyer, well versed in his field and in rhetoric, was a
commodity that a commoner could not enjoy. In practice, on the one hand, the shrewd
lawyer was obeying the system of procedures. In theory, on the other hand, he was not,
for he was provoking a war of attrition in which its toll would benefit his client and
simultaneously devastate the other party. Law was of no concern. Jurisprudence calls for
the law to be administered blindly; perpetrators to be punished; victims to be vindicated.
However, the exploitation of the system voids the three former truths through the
intimidation of its costs. That very point was the foundation upon which the legal system
was not grounded at least according to the legal sources, which survive. In Roman
jurisprudence (as it is today), the ability to use the system against itself was a necessary
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evil. Legislating against this could compromise the entire system48 and so such a zone of
uncertainty only favored the wealthier.
Thus, accessibility to the justice system intersects with corruption in these
particular instances. It appears that the systemic problems were not limited to one
particular period. On the contrary, they were endemic to the Empire in Late Antiquity.
The pool of litigants must have been considerably smaller than it should have been
because of the costs associated to the entire process. Then again, the administration of
justice must have been largely inhibited by that very fact. The amount of real or potential
defendants with deep pockets could conscientiously extort land, for example, from
another Roman with meager resources. Therefore, the three layers of the judicial system
that included the Prefecture, the Diocese and the province were thickly staffed, but surely
did not see as many cases as there were supposed to be. Even then, we are told that the
system was very congested.
The problem with accessibility forced the general populace to explore new venues.
If justice could not be administered in many cases, the common inhabitants could still
seek it through another channel. Ironically, the disenfranchised population sought a
resolution to this situation amongst the segment of society, which was culpable of the
original problem. The recourse was found in petitions. Since the judicial system was
exclusive, petitions were a viable alternative.49 They were no novelty to the period, as
they were the accepted Roman method of voicing complaints to the authorities. In a
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previous chapter, such a mechanism was highlighted with Dioscorus of Aphrodito. Due
to the poor state of the legal system, these very inhabitants lacking the financial resources
for litigation requested the aid of wealthy landowners whose large estates became
somewhat of an unofficial institution of the municipia. The great houses did not have any
official public power in these specific instances. However, they did possess a certain
form of formal public authority, due to the vast social, economic, cultural and symbolic
capital they wielded. Though that does not preclude such families from holding several
prestigious offices, but these were not directly pertinent to these petitions.
For example, there are instances of petitions made with conflicting jurisdictions
and also one made to a wealthy woman. In the first case, writing to Apion in the middle
of the sixth century, a certain Anoup sought relief from his debts. A misfortune caused
his cattle to die and so he borrowed money to replace his losses. He was therefore unable
to pay his taxes to Apion. Interestingly, Apion, being the Duke of Thebaid, had no
jurisdiction over the affair, as Anoup was a colonus from Oxyrhynchus.50 In another
instance, a certain patrician named Sophia was the recipient of a petition.51 It is highly
unlikely that she held any authority in the public arena of law due to that field’s gender
exclusivity.
There is thus a clear indication that these petitions did not necessarily have a
direct link to the legal apparatus of the Empire. Then again, this may be a telling sign of
the effectiveness of the apparatus itself. A semi-official institution seems to have been a
better recourse for the common inhabitant of the Empire. In the past, petitions were made
to local representatives, the governor and other officials, whose clearly defined
50
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jurisdictions and administrative positions were approved by the imperial machinery of
government. That appears to have changed fundamentally. Moreover, this appears to be
the emergence of an unofficial power structure parallel to the Roman legal system. In
turn, this appears to be another area, which escapes both the systematization and
predetermined results of a standard apparatus of the bureaucracy. This therefore creates
another area in which aristocrats could wield disproportionate power by seizing power in
an area outside the scope of regulation. Much capital, particularly social and symbolic,
was made available to the great houses as a result.
Accessibility to the justice system was exclusive, despite the manpower involved
and the resources spent. It had become so ossified by the beginning of the reign of
Justinian that areas of uncertainty within it had been exploited to the utmost for a
protracted period. Such areas included the real and phantom costs incurred by its use. The
associated costs enabled whomsoever that had great resources to commit crimes willingly
or unwillingly. In both cases, the perpetrator could easily escape the hands of justice if he
or she possessed vast amounts of capital. Economic and social capital could purchase
one’s freedom and/or enable one to escape punishment due to an influential social
network. Dioscorus of Aphrodito’s story that was mentioned in the previous chapter
illustrates this point. Pagarchs sought to squat on his town’s autopragia. The pagarchs
persisted, undeterred by the hefty players involved on Dioscorus’ side, which included
the Empress Theodora amongst others.52 In many respects, this is a glaring example of
the systemic failures of the justice system. Local events and realities escaped the rather
short reach of the capital. The zones of uncertainty enabled this phenomenon. The
52
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administration of justice was not often a reality for the majority of the population due to a
significant gap in capital with the highest segment of the Roman social order. The more
the imperial court attempted to systematize the legal apparatus, the more the former lost
its power. The zones of uncertainty it had created coupled with the fact that the
systematization entailed predetermined resulted in a deterioration of the hierarchy. The
apex of the power structure in the hierarchy loses its power to govern. Repeated attempts
to address the system’s pitfalls were ineffective.
Above, accessibility was intertwined with corruption. However, corruption on its
own in the legal system was rampant. Corruption stemmed from one of the perpetual
problems associated to the government: the venality of offices. Because of it, arguably,
the governor was perceived as the least reliable recourse in the courts. As a result,
appeals flooded the dioceses, the prefectures and the capital. This caused tremendous
congestion and was seen as a significant institutional nuisance in Constantinople.53 The
reason for this is a simple question of proportion. As mentioned in Justinian’s reforms,
particularly Novel 8, governorships were often purchased. Furthermore, the price tag was
often recouped through practices that were both rife and illicit. Hence, the amount spent
to purchase the office was a benchmark for a newly appointed governor. Evidently,
meeting and surpassing that benchmark could not have been uncommon. Justinian was
very adamant on eradicating the venality of the governorship due to a multitude of
reasons. Ironically, Justinian himself condoned the practice prior to this law.54 Prior to the
530’s, governors were often the perpetrators and, the willing or unwilling accomplices of
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illicit actions. The latter is one of the major concerns of the capital. The governors were
too weak in the face of local magnates.55 The combination of this with the effects of
venality made for a centralized government that lost its hold over the periphery.
There are multiple examples in the sources, which testify to this reality. In the
Codex Theodosianus, it is succinctly detailed in multiple places. For example, a law of
A.D. 383 states:
All trial judges and judges ordinary shall keep their hands off money and
patrimonies, nor shall they consider another man’s litigation as their prey.
For a judge of private litigations who is at the same time a vendor shall be
compelled to undergo the same loss of status and life as that which
customarily involves those guilty of peculation.56
The law is rather short, but very telling of the complications at the provincial level. Its
few lines are a concise summary of the rampant corruption discussed here. Governors
saw court cases as their “prey” for the sheer fact that sportulae were considered
paradoxically to be illegal, but both accepted and standard. In court, governors could
easily recover much of the expenses made in the purchase of their very own office. Three
years later approximately, another law encourages whistleblowers to come forth to root
out corrupt governors.57 Yet it is reasonable to ask how many whistleblowers could come
forth. The repercussions of whistleblowing could be devastating, particularly since the
whistleblower more than likely would be a victim. By extension, a victim in all likelihood
lacked the capital to withstand the fallout. In such specific cases, the governor was not an
unwilling accomplice. He actively sought to fill his pockets. This evidently eradicated
55
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any chance of a fair trial, particularly for those with more modest resources. Furthermore,
it validates the claims of Priscus’ interlocutor above. The inability to curb this
phenomenon for centuries is manifest in later evidence. In A.D. 600, Pope Gregory
reports that a governor of Sardinia accepted bribes from pagans. The pagans were
essentially purchasing their right to practice their religion without legal ramifications.58
However in other cases, the governors could be bullied. In the Confessions,
Augustine recounts an episode of his friend Alypius. Although not a governor, as an
assessor, he encountered a situation in which his ethics were put to the test. In Rome,
certain senator, whose social and economic capital was formidable, attempted to bribe the
court. Augustine describes his social network as extremely influential and his financial
resources as considerable. The amount of capital possessed by the senator wreaked fear
into those who were offered the bribes. In this case, the bribe was less attractive than
provoking the senator’s ire:
Alypius opposed. A bribe was offered. He laughed it off. Threats followed.
He brushed them aside. People were astounded at this rare cheekiness, that
he neither cultivated as a patron, nor feared as a foe, one famously
equipped to advance or destroy careers in a multide of ways.59
In addition, Augustine also mentions a judge involved whose ethical standards appear to
be below those of Alypius. The incident illustrates how one’s titles, that is symbolic
capital, can prove to be valuable not only in career advancement, but also in the social
dynamics of every day life. Those with higher ranks could use their symbolic capital
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against those who held inferior titles.60 More importantly, the senator here demonstrates
how valuable social and economic capital was in the period. It could be used for wellintentioned endeavors, but also for unlawful purposes. In this case, we might recognize
how the courts could be corrupted from without and not only from within. For this reason,
Justinian attempted to rehabilitate the provincial governors in his reforms.61 Their status
diminished their ability to withstand the impetus of the powerful elite. In essence, the
judicial system was under siege. Justice had become a word whose definition was in flux.
As it has now been determined, the Roman court system was large with limited
accessibility and rather corrupt. With these characteristics defined, it appears that the
system’s overall efficiency cannot prove to be anything less than detrimental. There are
many areas in which a bureaucratic layer seems to have had no true value within the
system itself; that many were relics of well-intentioned designs. This ossification of
select areas of the bureaucracy served as the breeding grounds for corruption; it inhibited
adaptability to new challenges and thus created areas within the bureaucratic machinery
that fomented uncertainty. In turn, uncertainty enabled systematic exploitation. The
sportula is a great example of this. It was illegal and yet became standardized due to the
imperial administration’s inability to tie up loose ends. Marcian’s Novel 1 serves as an
illustrative example. Despite this law being issued, the practice was well alive in the
fourth, fifth, sixth and even seventh centuries.62 This is not a testament to the
ineffectiveness of laws. On the contrary, it is an illustration of the central administration
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ineffectiveness at shutting down zones of uncertainty. Laws could be created, but one
stark reality remained. If an emperor were intent on stamping out the sportula system, a
thorough diagnosis of the situation would be necessary. In other words, the imperial court
would have to determine what was the system of causation that led to its inception,
persistence and endurance. Threatening to apply the law to the law is a paradox in itself.
In other words, creating legislation with stiff punishments to a body that is tasked with
applying the law appears to be a cul-de-sac. That is not to mention the potential blowback
whistleblowers might face when taking into account the account of Augustine above.
Reform could have limited effects to rectify the situation. The legal system, as proposed
above, was so thoroughly systematized and ossified, that attempts to enforce verticality in
the hierarchy became futile.

EVALUATING THE BUREAUCRACY’S PERFORMANCE:
I) THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The effectiveness of the judicial system was dismal. Many areas proved to be either
redundant or obsolete. Redundancy and obsoleteness are defined as follows. With respect
to the former, a certain branch of the bureaucracy might have duties that are duplicated in
another for no rational purpose. The latter proves that one layer of the administration
might serve no valid purpose in the machinery of government. Or it might also have
grown to serve little purpose despite the long list of duties it theoretically had. The
consulship in the sixth century illustrates this point. In the next few pages, the judicial
system will be analyzed in that light. As it has been determined above, it was not a small
sector of the bureaucracy. It was rather large and so an assessment of its bureaucratic
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efficiency should demonstrate roughly a proportional relationship between its size and
performance.
However that is not truly the case. An entire layer of its bureaucracy served very
little purpose. The Diocese was intended to serve as an intermediary in the court system
between the capital and the province. The hierarchy was not as clear-cut as it is in the
Notitia Dignitatum, as there were many appeals, which defy its order. Nonetheless, the
value of this bureaucracy evolved greatly over the centuries since its establishment.
A.H.M. Jones argues that the diocese ceased to function in the fifth century.63 However,
that is only partially accurate. In A.D. 548, Justinian restored the Vicar of Pontus for two
reasons. Inter-provincial crimes were on the rise and the appeals system appears to have
still been a nuisance to Constantinople.64 The edict does not necessarily mean that the
Vicariate of Pontus was an absolute essential in the administration of justice. Though it
does signify a persistent issue within the appeals system, which is largely systemic. In
addition, it also speaks of the lack of foresight in Novel 8, which effectively abolished the
office. Thereafter, inter-provincial crime thrived due to the governors’ unwillingness to
leave the boundaries of their jurisdictions, which would incur additional expenses.
Moreover, the official slated to help and stifle crime would not be present.65
As a whole, the Diocese fell victim to institutional evolution to which it had not
adapted. Instead it ossified, but maintained relatively the same amount of personnel.
Generally, ossification seems to have been somewhat of an eventuality within the
bureaucracy. The vicar was already losing ground in fiscal matters to the Praetorian
Prefecture. The latter sent tractatores as deputies in the provinces, as mentioned above.
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Although that is unrelated to the court system, it is illustrative of the office’s evolution. In
the system of appeals, the Diocese was often leapfrogged. Small cases would make their
way to the highest judges and not to the intermediary judges.66 Returning to Jones’
assertion about the Diocese, there is some validity. Throughout the late fifth and into the
sixth centuries, Constantinople began to recognize that the vicariate could be trimmed
considerably and even abolished in certain places. Anastasius did away with the Diocese
of Thrace only to restrict two vicariates to the Long Walls.67 These two were military and
civil vicars that would proceed to be troublesome for the central administration.
According to Novel 26, Justinian grew tired of both offices and disparaged them; he
claimed that their primary goal had become to quarrel with one another. Therefore, he
decided to eliminate both offices.68 Justinian also proceeded to dispose of the Dioceses of
Asiana and Oriens.69 These were added to the list, which already included Pontus, the
Long Walls and Thrace. Yet, as it was mentioned above, Pontus’ diocese was restored,
but with a considerable overhaul.
In addition, the Diocese of Thrace was later reestablished, but at an unknown date.
An inscription dating from A.D. 567 testifies to this development. Interestingly, the
inscription does not specify the type of the vicar involved.70 I am inclined to agree with
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Jones’s proposition that the restoration of this very office occurred under Justinian. He
does not provide a reason for this assertion, but in all likelihood it was a result of the
Kutrigur and Bulgar invasion in A.D. 558-559. The united tribes pillaged Greece, Thrace
and even marched on the capital. One segment of their army was able to breach the Long
Walls. If this was not the event that caused the restoration of the office, it may have
happened in the fifteen years prior to the combined Kutrigur and Bulgar invasion. A
series of peoples pushed across the Danube and wreaked havoc in the Balkans, including
Thrace.71 Taking into consideration the historical context of its restoration and the
perpetual difficulties the Romans encountered in the same geographic area in the sixth
century, it appears the vicar would not have been of the civil nature. Most likely the
office would have been bound to the military due to the considerations just listed above.
The revived vicar most likely had no judicial responsibilities.
There is one broad trend regarding the diocese. Justinian and the central imperial
administration considered this specific part of the bureaucracy to be expendable. The
conscious efforts to shed off this administrative unit like dead weight were no
coincidence. However, some of its functions were still valued, such as inter-provincial
policing. Yet generally the diocese in many respects ceased to be of any great
administrative value, unlike the Praetorian Prefecture (which would later suffer the same
fate). A.H.M. Jones’s assertion that the diocese ceased to function in the fifth century

[θ´]ἐπὶ Ἀρµάτου Βικαρίου Θρακῆς, διά Χρυσαφίου ἐργολάβου: CIG 8646; SGLIBulg 198; C.J.
Tissot, "Antiquités d'Eski-Zaghra," BCH 6 (1882). See A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire,
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requires emendation.72 The diocese in fact ceased to be a necessary unit in the
bureaucratic machinery. With regard to administrative capability, it lost most of its
judicial and fiscal value. Inter-provincial policing would require much less than the
diocese to be effective. Its diminishing value can be noticed in the sources. As it was
proposed in a previous chapter, the level of silence in the sources regarding an office is
proportional to its value. Moreover, it appears that obsoleteness was not the only concern.
Corruption was very common and so not only was this branch of the bureaucracy
unnecessarily absorbing imperial expenditures due to its lack of value, but also due to
illicit behaviors. In fact, G. Tate proposes that John the Cappadocian’s reforms were
intended to eliminate the intermediary levels between he himself and the provincial
administration. The objective of this was to eliminate as much unlawful behavior as
possible. This includes: an illicit cooperation between bureaucrats and magnates,
magnates playing off bureaucratic rivalries in the administrative hierarchy and illegal
land annexations.73 In fact, above, we have seen that these were realities that plagued the
justice system prior to Justinian’s reforms.
The strata of the judicial system were in some respects wasteful for an empire in
such dire straits fiscally. The reason for this bold statement is rather simple. T. Honoré
summarizes this succinctly when explaining that the application of Roman Law (and the
imperial government in general) was at the mercy of provincial social dynamics.74 The
provincial court system was intended to be a first line of defense in the appeals and court
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system, but it never truly was. Appeals were clogging the system. The ultimate judge in
the provinces, the governor, had become institutionally weak, as dynatoi could massage
the process. Furthermore, when the governor did preside over court cases as judge, the
party whose pockets were deepest defined justice. To make matters worse, the stratum
above it, the diocese, had largely grown to become institutionally hollow in the judicial
machinery. In sum, the justice system prior to Justinian’s reforms was not truly a justice
system. It was an amalgamation of many bureaucrats who finagled or enabled the
corruption of the process in every way possible. Hence, the relationship between size and
effectiveness is entirely disproportional. Its size, elaboration, complexity and hierarchy
were in some respects a veneer masking a decrepit nucleus.
Zones of uncertainty were plentiful, ossification was its trademark and therefore
laws attempting to punish the perpetrators were hopeless. The system utterly failed to
fulfill its duties. For example, in the case of sportulae, much of the court process was
systematized. Laws were enacted, the pecuniary brackets for appeals determined, lawyers
were hired, the summons issued, the delivery of the plea was made and judges were
appointed to hold court at specific locations. Litigants were to travel to that designated
court and plead their case. However, the sportula became a standard yet unofficial fixture
of the process.75 As the procedures were not thoroughly systematized prior to the
beginning of a case, a judge could easily welcome an “auction” with the sportulae being
the bids. However, the highest bidder purchased the judge’s partiality. Threats of
punishment for this illegal behavior were made in laws, such as those mentioned above,
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but the system saw no true change to its structure. This thus enabled the exploitation of
the phase immediately preceding a trial. In addition, the judge was not the only player
vying for control of this area. External players could also temporarily assume control and
subjugate the judge through threats of retaliation. Therefore, unofficial parallel power
structures were a reality of the process. Capital, particularly social, economic and cultural,
were of utmost importance in the control of these zones.
In theory, bringing forth a legitimate case to the authorities and hiring a lawyer
were two elements that appeared to be sufficient according to the official process. Yet the
creation of these parallel power structures caused the judge’s decisions to be thoroughly
disjointed from Roman jurisprudence. In other words, his mission in his field was
disengaged from that of the administration, which he served. Conclusively, change was
needed, but fundamental reform might only bridge this gap. Legislation with threats of
punishment could only be symbolic and produce meager results. For example, CTh 9.27.6
encourages whistleblowers to come forth, but the law could only be inept for the most
part. If the case involved one or more defendants with considerable capital, the accuser
would likely suffer repercussions. This was a systemic problem that was compounded by
the fact that the entire justice system was far from lean.

II) THE GOVERNORSHIP
Above, the provincial administration was revealed to be rather large in size. Provinces
were small, its military and civil branches were separate and governors had large staffs.
In a previous chapter, it was also established that curiales sought greener pastures in the
expanded imperial bureaucracy. Many of those left behind were not of the same pedigree,
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as the wealthier components of the town councils obtained better offices that rewarded
them with a more considerable amount of capital. In this section, I will allude to that
particular discussion, but the focus will be on the topics mentioned just above. Namely it
will be ascertained whether the smaller provinces and their bureaucracies were
effectively accomplishing their tasks. Again here the assessment will be targeting
institutional redundancy, obsoleteness and corruption.
There is much to be written about the system implemented by the Tetrarchs. The
governor headed the civil branch of his province and was mainly responsible for fiscality
and for the administration of law. The governor was entitled to a staff that was usually
limited to one hundred officials. In some cases, that number could swell up to four or
even six hundred, as was the case for the proconsul of Africa and the dux of Egypt.76
However, effectively he was not accomplishing roughly half of his task, which
principally fell in the maintenance and application of Roman law. In the area of fiscality,
the governor was in a rather precarious position. Many factors were making this portion
of his duties unsustainable. The municipal councils were faltering due to the fundamental
transformation caused by the Tetrarchic reforms. These administrative units were
denuded of their most prized members, the principales. Yet other important
developments rendered the governorship a shadow of its former self. The institutional
decay of the office will be investigated in the two following areas: titulature and fiscality.
The governor’s titulature and its relationship to the changing social dynamics in
the province are important to the understanding of the office’s institutional decline.
During the Late Republic and the High Empire, governorships were highly valued
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amongst the politicians in Rome. Governors held much more power within their
jurisdiction, as there was a lack of intermediaries between themselves and the capital.
Provinces were seen as prey for a multitude of rapacious practices, including extortion,
embezzlement and the intentional misapplication of law. One might recall a few incidents
that illustrate this point. Verres and Appius Claudius Pulcher’s machinations and Juvenal
lamenting the practice in the early imperial period serve as great examples.77 These
practices eventually persisted for centuries, but the symbolic capital associated to the
office diminished significantly over time. This was especially the case after the Tetrarchs
overhauled the administration. Economic capital was still readily available to be had in
the provinces, but more lucrative ventures became available to the aspiring Roman
politician. The governorship in fact tumbled significantly down the pecking order in the
larger scheme of things administratively.
After the late fifth century, epigraphic evidence for governors is very scarce. As
argued in similar circumstances, this appears to be an indication not of the office’s
disappearance but of its cultural, social and political insignificance. Its substance was not
indispensable in the acquisition of social capital. Moreover, in the same regard it did not
carry the symbolic capital it once did. It did, however, serve as a venue to acquire
considerable economic capital. As a result of this institutional development, an inversely
proportional phenomenon developed. The more the governorship became insignificant
the more local magnates became formidable and immovable fixtures in the periphery.
These notables did not originate from the municipal councils for the most part as they
77
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once did. They were very powerful with social networks that spread far and wide. They
held prestigious offices that were far above those of a curialis; some were pagarchs and
others senators, for example. Centuries earlier, Verres and Appius Claudius Pulcher could
muscle their way into the pockets of provincials while at the head of a province. By the
fourth century, the opposite could be said. Two laws are rather revealing and both
underline the problems caused by status descrepancies. Governors were confronted with
subjects that had loftier titles than themselves. This in turn enabled flagrant disregard of
the governor’s authority.78 By the early sixth century, the opposite could be said.
Governors were not even able to withstand the power of influential magnates.79 In fact,
Justinian’s provincial reforms of the 530’s largely targeted this issue. Yet, the problem
persisted through his reign. On the eve of these very reforms, notables essentially had
many zones of uncertainty at their disposal to exploit. They could injure the less wealthy
without the fear of repercussion, they could compromise the justice system thanks to their
tremendous amount of capital, they could finagle their way out of paying taxes and they
could distort realities on the ground in the chain of communications to the capital. These
are some amongst many other possibilities that could be exploited.
In Italy, C. Roueché sees an effort to rehabilitate the governor after the reconquest.
Yet the sources do not necessarily appear to support that proposal.80 The Roman Empire
had just regained control over the territory before the issuance of the Pragmatic Sanction.
The law itself was designed to ratify officially Roman administrative control. By
extension, the Pragmatic Sanction thus reiterates what was done institutionally to the
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governorship in the 530’s when suffragia were specifically outlawed in the selection
process of officials. Interestingly, the law grants local notables and bishops the power to
elect their governor. This further debilitated the status of the governor, as he would be
indebted to those who voted him into office. The effort was designed to extirpate the
consequences of venality and not to enhance the governor’s status. The latter seems to
have been of no concern, as the law did the opposite. The law was a capitulation to the
realities on the periphery. This is illustrative of the occurrence in the judicial system,
where systematized procedures and pre-determined results inhibited the apex of the
hierarchy to exert its vertical authority.
The weakening of the governorship entailed many consequences that were
detrimental to the central government. The governor’s deteriorated status hindered any
pursuit of justice against notables, particularly in fiscal areas.81 One case discussed above
demonstrated how a senator’s capital could be converted into illicit behavior, namely
circumventing the judicial process.82 This was a considerable problem for the central
government, especially in fiscal affairs. One development that occurred in the early sixth
century was designed to ensure the proper functioning of the fiscal machinery,
particularly with respect to the notables. The vindex was an official, likely designated by
the praetorian prefect, whose role was to supervise tax collection in the cities. However,
the extent to which this office was implemented is highly debatable.83 Furthermore, as
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mentioned above, the tractatores were appointed by the praetorian prefect to oversee tax
collection.84 Taxation was already a constant challenge for Constantinople. Corruption
within this particular area remained a problem, as it had been for some time. It will be
central to the subsequent section of this analysis. At any rate, although there are many
examples of illicit behavior in the fiscal apparatus of the empire, the governor once had
the capacity to administer justice in the case of fraudulent behavior, notably in the case of
magnates. However, by the time of Justinian’s early reign the governor had long lost the
ability to do so.85
Certain individuals could withstand the governor’s judicial inquisitiveness.
Pagarchs possessed a high degree of symbolic capital and could withstand almost any
onslaught in such situations. The pagarchy itself was a duty assumed by the great
aristocratic families. Also, in the case of notables, the capacity to exercise physical power
was not negligible.86 J.E. Lendon states:
Yet it was precisely those local strongmen, with their castle-like houses
and their swarms of well-armed slaves and club-wielding tenants, whose
force could dwarf that which the Roman had at his disposal. When official
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and local strength clashed, local strength often won. In the empire the
power to collect taxes might well presuppose, also, the power to resist
taxes.87
Moreover, the ability to resist paying taxes could be made possible by fortified houses
and armed force.88 However, that was not a commonality, but nonetheless it testifies to
the disparity of power between the governor and notables under his jurisdiction. Instead
of violence, notables pursued less confrontational means in such areas as tax evasion by
using varying forms of capital. For example, using one’s social capital was a simpler
method by which tax evasion could be achieved. Phantom officiales are great illustrations
of this behavior. Bureaucrats of this sort, in theory, held offices in municipal councils, but,
in practice, would circumvent the rules by exploiting zones of uncertainty.89 Then again,
using one’s symbolic capital to intimidate any official’s investigation or court case could
also achieve the same ends.90
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In the immediate period leading to the early reign of Justinian, the sources do not
reveal a common trend of overt violent opposition to the central government. Yet, there is
the occasional exception such as the case of Valerianus of Emesa.91 Otherwise, there is a
multitude of instances in which notables resorted to subterfuge in order to achieve their
objectives. Such machinations more than often involved the exploitation of zones of
uncertainty. For example, local aristocrats craftily forfeited their property in order to
exempt themselves from serving on their municipal councils. Such a ruse appears to have
been common until laws were issued.92 Challenges facing the imperial government were
not only limited to the governor’s subjects. The governor could conspire with many
elements in order to fill his pockets. There is evidence of governors purchasing the
silence of imperial superintendants and sharing the spoils with their staff and their
superiors.93
The governorship’s titulature was not of particular help in disputes, which
involved individuals from superior tiers of the hierarchy. For the most part, governors
held the grade of praeses prior to the end of the fourth century. This grade was associated
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to the rank of perfectissimus. Thereafter, most governors received the superior grade of
consularis, whose clarissimus rank was of a higher dignity. Above the clarissimi was the
first tier in which many individuals with significant amounts of capital lied. The illustres
contained the likes of praetorian prefects, urban prefects, masters of soldiers and major
palatine officials.94 Yet, there is evidence that actually demonstrates a much longer
timeframe. Cappadocia I’s governor, for example, does not receive a promotion of grade
to consularis until the very beginning of Justinian’s reign. Meanwhile, the governor of
Cappadocia II did not receive the same promotion until Justinian’s reforms of the mid
530s.95 However, based on conjecture, there is a possibility that the elevation from
perfectissimus to clarissimus occurred before this timeline.96 By the fifth century, in order
to make further distinctions amongst the upper tier the titles of magnificentissimus and
gloriosissimi were added. Pagarchs too acquired such lofty titles.97 Nevertheless, prior to
Justinian’s provincial reforms, governors were at a distinct disadvantage in any endeavor,
which involved notables from the upper tiers of the hierarchy. Some of them who were
inferior with respect to administrative duties could be of a significantly higher dignity,
such as a pagarch. This conflict of status diminished the authority of the governor. It
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appears to explain the minimal involvement of the governor (dux) in Dioscorus’ run-ins
with neighboring pagrachs.
Whether it be in taxation or in judicial affairs, governors stared at a significant
gap in symbolic capital with their colleagues that held superior titles. This gap inhibited
any pursuit of justice against individuals that held the title of clarissimus (in some cases),
magnificentissimus, gloriosissimi and illustris (in all cases). Even in cases of equal
standing with respect to dignities, the scale could tip to one side due to a disparity in
capital. In large part due to their enormous amount of capital, magnates could ignore the
arm of the law. There are several incidents in the sources, which account for this reality.98
One interesting example can be found in an incident involving Constantius II and Rufinus.
Investigators, including the Praetorian Prefect Mavortius and the Count of the Sacred
Largesses Ursulus found Rufinus guilty of conspiring with a woman against her husband.
This led to the execution of both Rufinus and the woman in question. Because
Constantius II held Rufinus in high regard,99 he denounced the investigators and
demanded clarification. Ursulus came to the emperor’s court only to have his passage
barred physically by courtiers, surely connected to Rufinus, from accessing Constantius
II. Ursulus, in danger due to the relationship between the emperor and Rufinus, broke
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through the courtiers to state the truth.100 In this case, the two investigators did have more
symbolic capital than Rufinus, a princeps officii of the Praetorian Prefect of Illyricum and
a leader of the Praetorian Guard.101 However, Rufinus’ social capital was very
considerable due to his proximity to the imperial court. A standard governor would most
likely not have the opportunity to break through a wall of courtiers to have a man of such
power prosecuted. He would almost certainly not be a governor for that matter, if he
could. As mentioned above, the office fell victim to administrative inflation, which
significantly devalued the symbolic capital attached to it. It is no coincidence that
epigraphic evidence for governors in Late Antiquity substantially declines.
Although the following account does not directly relate to the titulature of the
governor, it is illustrative of the social dynamics stemming from symbolic capital.
Symmachus describes an incident in which Valerianus, a vir clarissimus, ignored the
calls of Praetor Junior, a man of equal rank. After Valerianus persisted in his ways,
Symmachus was defeated and had to resort to the emperor, beseeching him “soli enim
iure corrigitis admissa potissimae dignitatis.”102 In Relatio 28, Symmachus is aware of his
vulnerability in the administration of justice specifically when a perpetrator happened to
be a member of the senatorial aristocracy.103 Individuals, who reached such heights as the
title illustris, did not do so haphazardly. Significant connections had to be made, wealth
accumulated and prestige stockpiled; social capital amassed through extensive networks,
economic capital through careers and all that was attached to them, and in the process
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both titles and ranks added to growing dossiers. Simultaneously all three forms of capital
could be causative vectors and/or subsidiaries of the others. As a result, this made any
effort to investigate corruption within these upper strata rather perilous to a governor who
did not have the necessary social nor symbolic capital. The potential fallout of such an
enterprise could have proven disastrous to the individual of less stature.
The governor’s titulature and its decline appear to have been a problem without
solutions. The administrative complexity of the Empire created an insurmountable gulf
between the center and periphery. The pursuit of renewed control over the provinces was
rendered impossible by the layering of bureaucratic structures between the imperial court
and the provincials. Whatever bureaucratic institution was created to facilitate control
seems to have done the opposite. It was absorbed by the problem in a similar fashion to
that of a spy becoming a double-spy.104 The evolution of the imperial administration in
Late Antiquity assured this development. The way in which the bureaucracy was
structured and the way in which it was intended to function created a significant gap
between the apex of the pyramid and, in theory, its subjugated strata. The rationalization
and expansion of the Roman bureaucracy stripped the emperor of much of his control and
influence over the periphery. Justin II would later confirm this weakening of verticality in
A.D. 569, but this was not limited to Italy as in the Pragmatic Sanction.105 It appears that
only a complete collapse would enable the Empire to rehabilitate its ability to govern
effectively.
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In sum, in the context of the objectives of the Tetrarchic reforms, J.-M. Carrié
accurately asserts: “Du côté de l’administration civile, la réduction de stature et de
prestige des gouverneurs s’est retournée contre le pouvoir central dont l’autorité a été
bafouée à travers leur personne.”106 In other words, the Tetrarchic reforms’ intent on
curtailing the power of the governors was actually achieved, but to such a degree that it
was excessive and even counterproductive. Furthermore, the division of powers between
the military and civil branches in the province also created its share of problems. As
Carrié remarks, prior to Justinian’s reforms, the division of powers had become
increasingly blurred in the military’s favor.107 The dux progressively gained the
upperhand over the governor institutionally. At the beginning of Justinian’s reign, the
governor was an institutional liability to the Empire. His status in the larger
administrative framework was in many respects negligible. The Tetrarchic reforms
caused the governorship to decline substantially. Its ability to tax and its power were
severely debilitated. Therefore, it is rather justified to ask whether its continued existence
was necessary to the functioning of the imperial administration. If it was, it required a
dramatic overhaul either stripping it of many of its so-called duties or enhancing it. The
latter would necessarily involve a great deal of innovation to the entire machinery of
government. Its place could not be reconditioned without making fundamental changes to
other strata of government. Even then, the fabric of the administration was static and even
ossified. Creating new officials, moving others around and granting some powers while
removing some from others could accomplish little, as the law codes tell us. Even a series
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of reforms equaling or even surpassing the breadth and magnitude of those under the
Tetrarchs would surely have the same fate. The general evolution of the imperial
administration, despite its ebb and flows, trended downwards.
Just above, it was determined that the governorship had become a hallowed office
by the early reign of Justinian. The governor had difficulty completing one of his main
duties, which was the administration of justice. The status of the governor within the
administrative complex of the Empire suffered tremendously after the reforms of the
Tetrarchs. The once supreme authority in the province had become a very weak part of
the central administration’s intended verticality. The governor’s other duty, which the
most essential to Constantinople, was in the area of taxation. Fiscality, a strong military
and harmony within imperial boundaries were the most pressing issues for the capital.108
In a previous chapter, it was established that the expansion of the bureaucracy caused a
considerable loss of crucial personnel in the municipal councils. Principales sought much
greener pastures within the expanded imperial administrative machine. Such a move
came with many coveted benefits such as tax immunity, enhanced symbolic capital, the
acquisition of greater social capital through an expansive network and generally greater
economic capital.
Corruption was the subject of discussion above, but it was limited to the governor.
In general, it was a common feature in the Roman Empire, as it was in the Republic and
so many more polities up to this day. Hence, there is nothing exceptional and unique
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from a broader historical perspective. The degree to which it was commonplace and the
nature in which it exhibited itself is of interest. With respect to fiscality, R. MacMullen
and B. Palme maintain that taxation grew harsher in the Later Empire and thus the
sources provide many more accounts of extortion in the same area. Furthermore,
MacMullen estimates that the fiscal administrative machinery increased a hundredfold
compared with the High Empire and that this in itself explains the rise in illicit taxation
practices.109 Outside of the justice system, fraudulence could be found in taxation and in
real estate, amongst others. For the provinces, these two areas were of prime concern to
the central government. The influx of fiscal revenues into the imperial capital was a
fundamental concern to the vitality of the Roman Empire itself. This was especially an
immediate concern in Justinian’s case, whose objectives seem to have been ambitious to
the point of being considered rash at the beginning of his reign.110
Venality has been the subject of some discussion above and it was a causative
force in administrative corruption. For centuries, it had been a common and longstanding
practice in the Roman administration. Late Antiquity is no different apart form the size of
government, which in fact exacerbates the issue.111 Aspirants to a certain office sought to
purchase their appointment for a reason. There was money to be had if the office was
won in the bidding process. To compound the issue, the imperial government sanctioned
this behavior from which it profiteered. During the reign of Anastasius, Severus of
109
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Antioch laments the venality of church offices and relates it to the common trend in
municipal government.112 Interestingly, in his early reign prior to Novel 8’s release,
Justinian maintained and even increased the sale of offices.113 Venality had its
repercussions however. Officials not only received their salaries, but also sought to
alleviate and preferably annul their expenditures through fraudulent practices. For one,
the judicial system was an area of opportunity, as argued above.
In the case of Salamis mentioned above, Cicero, as Governor of Cilicia,
discovered that Brutus had engineered a complex taxation scheme. This occurred in the
Republic, but there is ample evidence to be found in the imperial period, including the
Late Empire. The episode of Aphrodito mentioned in the previous chapter is a glaring
illustration of this. The µεγαλοπρεπέστατος Theodosius was able effectively to collect the
village’s taxes and pocket them for his very self.114 This incident occurred after
Justinian’s reforms and evidently is beyond our scope. Yet it is revealing in several ways.
Theodosius was a man directly connected to the imperial government, as he held the title
of comes.115 Furthermore, for him to commit such an egregious act in all likelihood he
purchased his office. Another clergyman, Maximus of Turin also writes about the issue in
one of his sermons. He however includes extortion committed by the military:
Some of the brethren who are in military service or who occupy public
office are accustomed to excuse their sins, when they sin gravely, by
saying without further ado that they are soldiers. And if sometimes they do
not act rightly they complain that they are involved in an evil
occupation…For it is not a sin to be in military service, but it is a sin to
soldier for the sake of plunder; nor is it a crime to hold public office, but
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to act toward the common weal in such a way that you increase your
private property is understood to be condemned. On this account a certain
foresight has provided payments for soldiers lest plunder be taken in a
search for recompense.116
This sermon, written approximately at the turn of the fifth century, demonstrates to what
extent the common citizens were easy prey to imperial officials of both the military and
civil services. Taking into account the judicial system’s woes and venality, a common
Roman citizen did not have much defense to what appears to be a widespread
phenomenon. Although such practices were centuries old, the breadth of extortion in Late
Antiquity must have been greater if we were to consider this matter in terms of
proportionality. By proportion, I am drawing comparisons between the size of the
imperial government before and after the Tetrarchic reforms.
Evidence from the civil service substantiates the reality. Approximately a decade
before Maximus of Turin, Symmachus writes with contempt about tax collectors in Italy,
whom he accuses of plundering.117 This is further evidence of the justice system’s failure,
but it is secondary in this case to the abuses committed by the imperial government in the
fiscal area. Symmachus critiques a longstanding problem that was targeted in legislation
decades earlier. Evidently, the legislation was not terribly effective. The Codex
Theodosianus highlights such behavior on numerous occasions. Laws tell of officials
exacting fees from poorer citizens. Though taxation is proportional to land and capitation,
officials were extorting additional fees from those who did not have many means. Valens
and Valentinian demanded accountability from their bureaucracies and thus implemented
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stiff penalties to eradicate this corrupt behavior, which evidently was a gross abuse of
power. Officials knowingly committed such extortion, for many citizens did not have the
capability to seek justice (as mentioned above). Governors were therefore threatened with
hefty fines totaling twenty pounds of gold. If a governor were to be caught, his staff was
to be fined forty pounds of gold also.118 As it can be deduced from the evidence, there
were fundamental glitches in the taxation machine. The situation was constant in itself,
but its magnitude seems to have increased over time. Anastasius, who was one of the
better managers of fiscal affairs, concluded that there were too many hands in the till.
Therefore, he attempted to alleviate the problem by regimenting the collectors.119
Officials in the provinces did not limit themselves to targeting the citizenry. Their
boldness was not only limited to the common citizens, but also to another surprising area.
Remarkably, the properties belonging to the imperial house were also subject to the
machinations of the emperor’s administrators. Officials were appointed by the emperor to
oversee his lands in such provinces as Cappadocia. In A.D. 396, Theodosius issued laws
regarding this very issue. Written to Drepanius, the comes rerum privatarum,120 the law
indicates that the res dominica was subject to systematic fraud:
If any stranger lets herds of sheep or of mares into the forest pastures of
the res dominica, they shall be immediately claimed for the fisc. But if it is
discovered that a connivance of a bribable procurator is attempted
hereafter, we order the perpetrators to be subjected to severe
punishment.121
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The rest of the law (CJ 11.67 (66)) targets the same illicit practice. Within it, there are a
few elements to stress. First, this is further evidence of corruption at the governorship
level. In addition, other sources corroborate the fraud committed by officials managing
imperial property.122 Some procurators, also assigned to manage the properties of the
emperor, deliberately sold and/or rented these very lands to other individuals. The
situation persisted well beyond the reign of Theodosius I, as there is evidence confirming
that this illegal industry thrived to the detriment of the central government. Justinian’s
provincial reforms of the 530’s indicate that the praedia tamiaca of Cappadocia were
thoroughly exploited. The law states that the lands lost most of their value due to their
dilapidated state.123 Although this law is beyond the scope of this analysis, it
demonstrates that, up to that point, years of corruption caused the lands to deteriorate in
value. In other words, it appears that the situation may have worsened since the fourth
century. Interestingly a practice of manipulating property boundaries appears to have
been common in certain areas. One reform even alludes to the fact governors might have
even been complicit in these illicit activities.124 The reason for doing so was once again
pecuniary.

The Roman imperial administration prior to Justinian’s reforms of the 530’s appears to
have been in a state of disrepair. Its size was rather considerable for a government of the
period. To clarify, with the technology of the Antique period, the difficulty in
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maintaining a government so large could only prove to be extremely challenging.
Effective supervision and oversight could only be minimal; assessments and the
collection of data were difficult; the transfer of information slow. From the information
we do have, the relationship between the size and effectiveness of the Roman imperial
administration is inversely proportional. The larger the government grew the less
effective it became at performing its duties.
The justice system was layered and employed a substantial number of individuals
while the provincial administrations were no different. The cause of this expansion
evidently stems from the reforms initiated by the Tetrarchs. The judicial and civil
administrations were subdivided and stratified. That is not to mention the general
separation of the civil and military bureaucracies in the province. The reforms intended to
tighten the oversight on many levels, particularly in the areas of fiscality and security
from internal threats. However, in a strange paradox, the central government sought to
exert its control over the administration by expanding it. In other words, the intent to
rationalize the bureaucracy further was counter-productive. The reforms exacerbated the
symptoms it attempted to treat. It could be argued successfully that the only exceptions
were in internal security and the currency’s health. Usurpers and rebellions were trimmed
to the minimum and the solidus in many respects was a stabilizer.
Nevertheless, the Roman Empire always had its share of problems with respect to
administrative efficiency. In that respect, it does not differ from other polities, past and
present. The numerous mechanisms implemented, which were designed to reinforce and
expand vertical authority, in many regards undercut it. The attempt to systematize the
judicial system through its expansion and stratification caused a tremendous amount of
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problems to Constantinople. For one, the diocese quickly became an inert bureaucratic
stratum of the system. What was supposed to be an intermediary between the prefecture
and the province was nothing short of an administrative miscalculation. As a result, a
significant drain was added to the treasury, which already was a problem in itself. In
many respects, it appears that C.N. Parkinson’s view of the British colonial bureaucracy,
specifically the relationship between the task at hand and the size of staff, may apply
here: “Factor I — an official wants to multiply subordinates, not rivals; and Factor II —
Officials make work for each other.”125 This proposition, although anachronistic, is
compelling, for this branch of the bureaucracy to have become so quickly a monument to
redundancy. Interprovincial policing could have been achieved without the existence of
the diocese. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the inception of the reforms. Yet,
the end result is telling: the breadth and even more so the existence of the diocese was far
from an administrative necessity.
The diocese was only a part of the legal system’s woes. Accessibility issues,
corruption and redundancy plagued it. For the Roman commoner, accessing the system,
especially when the individual was a victim of a crime, was not an attractive proposition.
Based on the standard legal costs in fees and other expenses, the drawback was too
considerable. That does not include extraneous factors. The system was littered with
corruption and that particular reality caused its use to be severely diminished. The
common Roman citizen would have already many expenses, but with the addition of
mandatory bribes, the whole endeavor was made unfeasible. Bribes to the judge were
necessary to initiate litigation in court and the disparity between the two parties’ bribes
affected the praeses’ partiality. Corruption also came from without, as notables could
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also bribe or outright blackmail the judge. Moreover, aristocrats are known to have
purposefully injured the more modest citizen. The repercussions were non-existent if not
negligible, due to their ability to manipulate the system’s flaws. In sum, to put it bluntly,
the system was rigged against the little man.
The provincial administration was also a source of problems for Constantinople.
Redundancy and corruption played a significant role with regard to ailments plaguing the
provinces. The governor’s titulature was a significant weakness in the machinery. It
exposed him to the machinations of notables possessing more capital, particularly of the
symbolic type. The more the governorship weakened institutionally, the more the
notables dictated affairs at the local level. This development created a power vacuum in
which power was exerted vertically, but not from the hierarchy’s peak. Power seems to
have been exerted from the lower tiers of this theoretic power structure. Lower tier does
not involve the lower stratum of Roman society. On the contrary, it is a reference to the
way in which power was supposed to emanate (from the capital to the periphery).
Governors became a weak link in the vertical link from Constantinople to the province.
Their ability to apply Roman law was already in question while their ability to ensure
effective taxation was no different. The municipal councils were drained of their key
members while an increasing amount of notables obtained tax exemptions.126 The capital
began to seek for alternatives to keep its fiscal health. These developments made the
governor unable to control abuses effectively.
With respect to corruption in general, much has been discussed. Venality was one
of the causative forces in this area. Contrarily to C. Kelly’s argument, it was not a
mechanism implemented by the imperial court to maintain its power over the
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bureaucracy.127 The sheer budgetary figures behind such a policy would indicate
otherwise. Governors, for example, paid for their appointments and thereafter sought to
recoup their financial losses through illicit means. One method was to charge illicit bribes
when in court. Other mechanisms could be found in taxation. Governors would create
opportunities and even excuses to tax individuals illicitly. Corruption saw no limits and
so individuals grew so rash as to contrive ways to defraud imperial properties. Generally,
it appears that the duty was not of importance. Being an effective administrator appears
to have been one of the lesser concerns. Using the excuse to become an administrator for
illicit reasons was the priority. Why else would one pay for an office?
The Roman imperial administration’s expansion in the late third and early fourth
centuries aggravated the symptoms it attempted to treat. The aristocracy became a tamer
fixture of the Empire in appearance. Its members were not conspiring to usurp imperial
power or to participate in such an enterprise. They saw the newly revamped and
expanded bureaucracy as a new method to achieve a significant amount of capital. The
bureaucracy enabled this to occur. The Roman bureaucracy created a system of
predetermined results with its systematized procedures. This eventually led to the
deterioration of Roman imperial power, which was manifest in its vertical form of
authority. C. Kelly is of a very similar opinion, but ultimately thinks that the emperor
could change the rules arbitrarily.128 At the same time, the bureaucracy’s systematization
led to its ossification. It was unable to respond to its demands in a successful manner.
Attempts to redress such pitfalls appear to have been in vain. Whatever institution was
created to exert more central control was absorbed by the problem itself, namely the
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centrifugal forces embodied in the notables. This is illustrative of the break between the
central government and the periphery. The imperial court lost much of its vertical
authority due to the reasons above.
Lastly, the bureaucracy’s inertia in the face of evolving social and political
dynamics enabled another stark reality to develop to the point of becoming industries.
Zone of uncertainty were impossible to avoid, but the archaic technology further gave
license to profiteers. Anything outside the realm of the bureaucracy’s systematic
procedures and pre-determined results was thoroughly exploited by those who staffed it.
For example, the governor, as judge, had no control over the judicial process in itself in
theory. He was expected to be impartial in his application of Roman law. However, in
reality, he had usurped much power over the entire process. The preliminary phase of
litigation was entirely at his mercy. He could refuse to hear a trial if the bribes were
unsatisfactory. He determined the winners and losers, but the decision had little to do
with Roman jurisprudence in practice. Efforts to curtail this abuse were hopeless. The
exploitation of these zones of uncertainty created power structures paralleling the
legitimate power of the Roman administration. In sum, the Roman imperial
administration’s course of evolution appeared to be predetermined. The center appeared
to be designed along the lines of the Hellenistic despot, but in reality authority was
fleeting, fleeing and transitioning to the periphery.
The negotiation of power between the imperial court and the provincials shifted
drastically with the inception of the Dominate. In the relation, what was once heavily
tilted in the emperor’s favor swung in the opposite direction. By pooling their resources,
the relation was reciprocal in the sense that both drew benefits from their respective aims.
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The central government was able to administer the empire while the notables were able to
ensure lucrative career advancements for themselves, amongst many other considerations.
However, before the Dominate, the relation favored the emperor, as he obtained more
advantageous terms due to the small size of the bureaucracy. Yet, both always maintained
a certain degree of freedom, notably the emperor. The imperial court received obedience
from the aristocracy in some respects; rebellions were not frequent as they once were. It
also received its income through taxation and a large source of manpower to serve both
the civil service and the military. In turn, the notables received a substantial amount of
capital. With the Tetrarchs, the expansion of the bureaucracy caused the imperial court to
cede unwittingly its commanding authority in the relation. It grew to become much more
dependent on the other party, namely the notables, to receive its part of the exchange. In
theory, the emperor’s office, whose essence was rooted in caesaropapism, could do away
with the notables (in effect, erecting a proscription list, as Sulla once did). In theory, the
emperor was sublime and omnipotent. Constantius II’s parading entry into Rome
substantiates this succinctly.129 Yet, at what cost could this be achieved? A systematic
collapse from within would undoubtedly be the result. The notables had established
complex networks, which they used to their own ends, but also to the ends of the imperial
129

Ammianus Marcellinus describes Constantius II as somewhat of an infaillible being above
humanity in his physical demeanor and in his day-to-day dealings: Amm. Marc. 16.10.10. Many
other examples describe the lofty status of the emperor. See the tropes comparing Honorius to the
Olympian gods: Claudian, De IV Cos. Hon. 197-202; 523-526; 537-538; 602-610; for his
attributed divinity, see Claudian, De IV Cos. Hon. 136-137; 647-648; De III Cos. Hon. pr. 1516; De VI Cos. Hon. 131-132; Pan. Lat. 12.4.5; Firm. Mat., Math. 2.30.6; for comparisons of
emperors to stars: Pan. Lat. 11.2.3; Amm. Marc. 21.10.2; 22.9.14; Claudian, De III Cos.
Hon. 131-2; De IV Cos. Hon. 170-91; Symm., Or. 1.7 (in MHG, Auct. Ant. 6.1.320). For modern
literature on the subject, see A.D. Nock, "The Emperor's divine comes," JRS 37 (1947), 108-109;
F. Burdeau, "L'empereur d'après les Panégyriques Latins," in Aspects de l'Empire romain, ed. F.
Burdeau, N. Charbonnel, and M. Humbert (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 10-33;
J. Béranger, "L'expression de la divinité dans les Panégyriques Latins," MH 27 (1970), 252-254;
B.S. Rodgers, "Divine Insinuation in the Panegyrici Latini," Historia 35 #69-104 (1986), 69-104.
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administration. Then again, such an act, if accomplished, would be in vain. The system
itself would only see their replacement with men of perhaps more modest means. The
conditions (i.e. the system) would remain unaltered and would only enable replacements
to acquire the capital lost by their predecessors. In essence, the relation of power would
remain untouched, due to the way in which the imperial administration was established.
The tendency to exploit one’s freedom remains, as would have been the emperor’s
dependence on the bureaucracy to administer the Empire. The bureaucracy had become
so complex, stratified and systematized that it could only ensure continuity with regard to
the relation of power. Only the abolishment or even collapse of what was in place could
resolve the plethora of problems created by the Tetrarchic reforms.130 For this reason, it is
difficult to accept the second half of C. Kelly’s position that the emperor maintained
absolute power over the bureaucracy and could circumvent it at any point. The emperor’s
authority in any form, such as the capacity to enact reforms, could only minimally
alleviate a problem, but also compound it more often than not.
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See J. Haldon’s discussion of the evolution of government and the elite in "The End of Rome?
The Transformation of the Eastern Empire in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries CE."
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CHAPTER V:
JUSTINIAN’S PROVINCIAL REFORMS

The sixth century can be deemed the transitional phase during which the long evolution
of several institutions began to show signs of extreme decay. The cracks in the
institutional structures of the empire were increasingly giving away signals that the
foundations were prone to make the entire system collapse. In the middle of the A.D.
530s, Justinian sought to quell some of the Empire’s institutional woes. In a series of
novellae, efforts were made to revamp the administration of select provinces drastically.
Some provinces were reunited and combined and/or others saw a fusion between civil
and military offices, among other reforms. This series of legislation may serve as a
template for the reforms that were initiated in the early reign of Justinian. In the
following pages, an examination of the emperor’s legislation in relation to the imperial
administration shall be conducted in the context institutional reform.
From a broader perspective, scholars such as M. Maas argue that Justinian’s
legislation was used as an ideological apparatus, which further publicized the emperor’s
designs to be the head of an autocratic regime. He claims that a synthesis between both
Christianity and the Roman past produced the new autocratic government under Justinian
and that this is exhibited in his legislation.1 M. Fögen and J. Harries similarly argue that
his legislation was intended to demonstrate the unlimited amount of imperial power and
legislative competence by subordinating the economy, beliefs, private life knowledge and

1

M. Maas, "Roman History and Christian Ideology in Justinianic Reform Legislation," DOP 40
(1986), 17-31; M. Maas, John Lydus and the Roman Past: Antiquarianism and Politics in the Age
of Justinian; J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, The Decline and Fall of the Roman City.
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faith to the imperial will.2 More specific to the topic at hand, C. Roueché also believes
that these reforms were purely ideological. The legislation was a blunt reassertion of
Roman identity within the debate of the use of the Greek and Roman languages in the
imperial administration, which equated to a reassertion of central control.3 Conversely,
the legislative reforms themselves are often considered to target imperial institutions,
which were in need of attention. A.H.M. Jones and E. Stein argue that the series of
reforms in question was intended to resolve a complex judicial problem, which was
particularly due to the status of provincial governors and the appeal system.4 Then again,
J. Haldon asserts that Justinian initiated his reform program with an ideological agenda,
but that John the Cappadocian had his own institutional objectives with an intention to
increase the bureaucracy’s efficiency.5
To ascertain the validity of the scholarship above, a thorough analysis of the legal
documents will be conducted. This will be supplemented with other primary sources such
as those of John Lydus and Procopius. The examination itself will inevitably investigate
the state of affairs within the institutional structures of the empire, above all the fiscal and
judicial systems. Both, especially the former, were of utmost importance for
Constantinople. For the latter, the hierarchy in the judicial system was faltering as many
cases were brought to the capital itself. Moreover, the importance of revenue and the
method by which to procure it was paramount to each and every emperor, first and
2

M.T. Fögen, "Legislation in Byzantium: A Political and a Bureaucratic Technique," in Law and
Society in Byzantium, 9th-12th centuries, ed. A. Laiou and D. Simon (Washington: Dumbarton
Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1994), 53-70; J. Harries, Law and Empire in Late
Antiquity, 212-215. Also, for imperial ideology as a unifying force between center and periphery,
see C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire.
3
C. Roueché, "Provincial Governors and their Titulature in the Sixth Century," 83-89.
4
E. Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, 463-464; A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284-602,
493-504.
5
J. Haldon, "Economy and Administration," 49.
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foremost for Justinian due to his grand and ambitious designs. However, before any of
this is achieved, it is important to define the purpose of the language used in the laws
pertaining to the reforms. Therefore, an examination of the prose used in the legislation
will serves as a foundation to the understanding of the reforms themselves in the first part
of this analysis. In the second part, the reforms themselves will be the subject of
discussion.

I) RHETORIC IN IMPERIAL LEGISLATION
The monumental legislative compilation, the Justinian Code, which was assembled in the
early reign of the emperor, has given rise to many contentious interpretations in
scholarship to this present day. Notably, when facing the issue of the rhetoric employed
within the work itself, there has been a myriad of methods utilized to understand the
nucleus of the legislation. Laws, particularly in the proimia, are draped in a thick cloak of
imperial vocabulary that is the source of the diverging interpretations. Yet, in this
segment, the analysis shall be limited to the recurring theme of ανανέωσις, which may be
translated into English in several ways: renewal, revival or restoration. The theme itself is
used in many contexts and thus requires an across the board inquiry, which will indeed
effectively reveal any possible patterns, if present. The objective of this section is to
uncover how does administrative reform relate to classicism in the context of the
Justinian Code.
Herein, the reforms will be limited to institutional ones, particularly fiscal,
administrative and judicial. Classicism is a slippery term to define. I shall elaborate on
the definition in Section II. Briefly, the definition employed herein is closer to the more
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current one, namely the adherence to ancient standards set in artistic and literary culture.
In the field of Late Antique history, it can be associated to a tension between classical
culture and Christianity. However, the interpretation of the theme here is far removed
from the Hegelian rubric.
As it has just been mentioned above, there is a wide array of interpretations of
imperial rhetoric, which has molded and shaped the landscape of scholarship. There are
two chief methods employed to examine the legislation; ideological and literary. F.
Dvornik examines the imperial law as two separate realities at odds, which are
diametrically opposed, Roman and, Oriental and Hellenistic. The former reflects more of
a Republican ideal, which involves a bureaucratized system that includes: esteem for the
law and the enactments of the predecessors, and judicial constancy. The two latter
embody the stereotypical view imposed by Western civilizations of the time upon eastern
kingdoms, that is, a highly centralized system led by a despot, who himself is law
incarnate, and with his lofty status, was deemed deified. The climax of this tension
culminated under the reign of Justinian when Hellenism prevails and results in a rhetoric
that Dvornik deems to be “Hellenistic ideology in Christian garb.”6 Then again, in the
context of the reforms, S. Puliatti claims:
Esse dipendono bensì, e in misura non meno rilevante, anche
dall’intervento di un ideologo, come era appunto Giustiniano, il quale, a
livello diverso rispetto a quello pragmatico di Giovanni, ma con pari
consapevolezza, avvertiva l’urgenza della soluzione dei problemi dello
Stato.7

6

F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, 716722, esp. 720.
7
S. Puliatti, Ricerche sulla legislazione regionale di Giustiniano: lo statuto civile e l'ordinamento
militare della prefettura africana (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1980), 5.
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More recently several scholars have utilized this same method. Many have been
mentioned above in the general context of the reforms. Here, I shall narrow the focus to
their understanding of the prose in the laws. M. Maas asserts that there was a tension
between Christianity and romanitas: “As a result, the figure of the emperor as legislator
realized a potential for the reconciliation of independent Christian and Roman
expressions of authority,”8 and thus asserts that “for the synthesis to be successful”9
Justinian was required to justify his legislation through the appeal to Roman power of a
pagan past but develop a new theory of imperial power rooted in the Christian God.10
Even more recently, J. Harries argued that there was tension between the legal and
imperial cultures, but she added one interesting element: “[the emperors’] main interest
was the public assertion of their power, through the language of their legislation.”11
Using a multi-method approach, C. Ando suggests “that provincials internalized imperial
ideology during the long periods of tranquility that characterized the first and second
centuries A.D. and, therefore, that the empire survived its crises because of what had
been achieved in times of peace.”12

8

M. Maas, "Roman History and Christian Ideology in Justinianic Reform Legislation," 29. Also,
for a broader context, see A. Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: the Development
of Christian Discourse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Particularly Chapter
Four “The Power over the Past” argues for the Christian appropriation of Classical discourse.
This follows her earlier work: "New and Old in Christian Literature," in Major papers of the 17th
International Byzantine Congress (New Rochelle: A.D. Caratzas, 1986), 45-58.
9
M. Maas, John Lydus and the Roman Past: Antiquarianism and Politics in the Age of Justinian,
39.
10
M. Maas, John Lydus and the Roman Past: Antiquarianism and Politics in the Age of Justinian,
39.
11
J. Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity, 212.J. Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity
(New York: Cambridge, 1999), 212; M.T. Fögen earlier proposed a very similar interpretation in
"Legislation in Byzantium: A Political and a Bureaucratic Technique," 53-70.
12
C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire, 12. From a broader
standpoint, D. Slootjes sees the rhetoric used in the communication between governors and their
provincial subjects as representative of reality. She does not judge the rhetoric as a superficial
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On the other hand, there are scholars who utilize a classicist (literary) approach in
order to decipher the rhetoric in legislation. M. Kruse has examined the laws in context
and argues that the language therein expresses a true attempt to restore. He draws
parallels to other contemporary authors and points out the trending tropes involved.13 H.
Hunger conducted one of the most prominent works of this style. In his work, the
Prooimion, Hunger analyzed imperial legislation and argued that the mere fact that there
is meaning does not indicate that there is a rational expression of an Idea, for it depends
upon which socio-political context the cliché is employed. Also, with respect to
ecclesiastical affairs, D. Olster and M. Kahlos have employed the same method more
recently and have further demonstrated the validity of Hunger’s argument.14
Above, the definition of Classicism was briefly addressed. This particular concept
now requires full attention. The interpretation that follows diverges from the tensionbased rubric and is centered upon human behavior. As a result, the term Classicism used
here is closer to the more common definition: the adherence to ancient standards set in
artistic and literary culture. This however comes with a stipulation. With regard to

expression of ulterior motives: The Governor and his Subjects in the Later Roman Empire
(Boston: Brill, 2006).
13
M. Kruse, "A Justinianic Debate across Genres on the State of the Roman Republic," in
Shifting Genres in Late Antiquity, ed. G. Greatrex, H. Elton, and L. McMahon (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2015), 233-245.
14
H. Hunger, Prooimion: Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden.
Also see, H. Hunger, "On the Imitation (ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ) of Antiquity," DOP 23 (1969-1970), 15-38.
In the article, Hunger argues that the quality of a writer is found in his choice of arranging the
tropes in a fitting manner. Therefore, it is necessary the options available in order to understand
the meaning. Even if the literal meaning of a word stays the same, its rhetorical setting can shift
its meaning. D. Olster uses the same method: "Justinian, Imperial rhetoric, and the Church," 165176; M. Kahlos, "Ditches of Destruction – Cyril of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Public
Security," 659-690. Rhetorical training can be noted well into the Middle Period of Byzantine
History. For a discussion, see: I. Nilsson, "Narrating Images in Byzantine Literature: the
Ekphraseis of Konstantinos Manasses," Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinisk 55 (2005),
121-146; P. Marciniak and K. Warcaba, "Racing with Rhetoric: a Byzantine Ekphrasis of a
Chariot Race," BZ 107 #1 (2014), 97-112.
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hermeneutics, this definition affixes a superficial meaning of the term and it is in many
respects teleological. In other words, it does not provide a system of causation. Therefore
it is important to refine the definition by addressing this very lacuna.
The immediate problem, which stems from the void, centers on the reason for the
structure’s existence. The answer to this problem lies in a human desire, that is, mimesis.
Contrarily to a dialectic in which the tension between Christianity and Classical culture
expresses itself in Classicism, the following definition also contains three elements, but
does not base itself on a linear equation. On the contrary, it is rooted in the interaction of
three elements: the author’s desire, the model and the object. In this case, the model
consists of an author, often long deceased, whose symbolic capital in literary culture is
often beyond measure. With respect to the object, Late Antique authors sought the
recognition, acclaim and reputation of their predecessors. Therefore, literary culture, in
many ways, remained stagnant.15 If the model and the object were of prime interest to the
Late Antique author, any deviation (i.e. innovation) could only be met with resistance.
Moreover, any such act would also by extension hinder any hopes of legitimacy and
repute from the ambitious author. As a result of this structure, a bank of literary and
rhetorical clichés, which were the trademark of a good author in the period, developed. In
other words, authors would appropriate lines (verbatim) and tropes from a large
collection.

15

Here I am paying particular attention to historical narratives and panegyrics amongst others.
Mimesis in the domain of literature is not restricted to the aforementioned genres. The emergence
of the hagiography genre is another discussion in itself, but is in many respects a derivative of the
classical biography. See The Limits of Ancient Biography, ed. B.C. McGing and J. Mossman
(Oakville: David Brown Book Co., 2006), 657; J. Elsner, "Beyond Compare: Pagan Saint and
Christian God in Late Antiquity," Critical Inquiry 35 #3 (2009). For the ancient origins of the
Christian Chronicle, see R.W. Burgess and M. Kulikowski, Mosaics of Time: the Latin Chronicle
Traditions from the First Century BC to the Sixth Century AD, vol. 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013).
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The lack of a system of causation might be found in one notable author. Procopius
and his work, the Wars, provide a good illustration. Much scholarship has been produced
on the topic. The native of Caesarea emulated the likes of Thucydides and Xenophon
amongst others.16 However, the relationship between Thucydides and his masterpiece,
History of the Peloponnesian War, is of utmost interest. Procopius not only sought to
emulate Thucydides’ work. The former sought the feeling of satisfaction felt in the latter;
that is not to mention the Athenian’s lasting legacy. In other words, Procopius was in
pursuit of the recognition and legitimacy that Thucydides reaped from his work. This
concern was more focused on his contemporaries and probably less so on his very own
legacy. Therefore, events such as the plague under Justinian, for example, must be
regarded with skepticism. That is not to say that it never occurred, but the model
inherently molded Procopius’ description of the event itself.
The plague the Wars is subject to debate, specifically with respect to its
virulence.17 Indeed, science has validated the existence of the plague, but the scholarly

16

See A. Cameron, Procopius and the Sixth Century (London: Duckworth, 1985), 37-43; G.
Greatrex, "Stephanus, the Father of Procopius of Caesarea?," Medieval Prosopography 17 #1
(1996), 125-145; C. Pazdernik, "Procopius and Thucydides on the Labors of War: Belisarius and
Brasidas in the Field," Transactions of the American Philological Association 130 (2000), 149187; A. Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea: Tyranny, History, and Philosophy at the End of
Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 24-38, 246-265; C. Pazdernik,
"Xenophon’s Hellenica in Procopius’ Wars: Pharnabazus and Belisarius," GRBS 46 (2006), 175206. For Procopius’ references to Xenophon in Buildings: K. Gantar, "Prokops ‘Schaustellung der
Tapferkeit’," Ziva Antika 11 (1962), 283-286.
17
Many scholars argue for the plague’s disastrous effects on imperial institutions. E. Stein deems
the plague as being most terrible. However, he does remark that the recovery was very rapid:
Histoire du Bas-Empire, 758-765. J.-N. Biraben’s work on the Black Death attests to a loss of a
third of Europe’s population: Les hommes et la peste en France et dans les Pays Européens et
Méditerranéens, 2 vols. (Paris: Mouton, 1975-1976), 25-48. He also believes that the plague
occurring in the sixth century was cataclysmic: "RAPPORT: La Peste du VIe Siècle dans
l’Empire Byzantin," in Hommes et Richesses dans l’Empire Byzantine, ed. V. Kravari, J. Lefort,
and C. Morrisson (Paris: Lethielleux, 1989), 121-125. P. Allen’s conclusions are just as extreme:
"The ‘Justinianic’ Plague," Byzantion 49 (1979), 5-20.Averil Cameron claims that it contributed
to the empire’s weakness: The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity, A.D. 395-600, 85. Michael
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consensus portrays the event as catastrophic.18 However, when comparing and
contrasting the narratives of both Thucydides and Procopius there are structural
similarities that are not coincidental.19 On the one hand, the outline of Thucydides’
account is roughly structured around six themes: the geographic origin of the plague, its
spread, a vivid description of its symptoms and effects, the resulting compassion, human
vices emerging due to the plague, and finally how the virus spread from the point of
interest (Athens in the case of Thucydides). In the same order of appearance, Procopius
constructed his own account in the Wars. Even some details are eerily similar. For
example, both authors mention Egypt as an important spawning ground for the virus.20

McCormick is of the same opinion: The Origins of the European Economy: Communications and
Commerce, A.D. 300-900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21, 35, 39-40.
J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz argues that 540 was a turning point: The Decline and Fall of the Roman
City, 409-411. Also see C.c. Morrisson and J.-P. Sodini, "The Sixth-Century Economy," in The
Economic History of Byzantium, ed. A.E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library
and Collection, 2002), 193-195, 220; C. Zuckerman, Du village à l'empire: autour du registre
fiscal d'Aphroditô (525/526), Centre de recherche d'histoire et civilisation de Byzance (Paris:
Association des amis du centre d'histoire et civilisation de Byzance, 2004), 207-212; A.E. Laiou
and C.c. Morrisson, The Byzantine Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24,
38.
On the other hand, few scholars believe that the plague was overstated. A.H.M. Jones is very
cautious in stating its magnitude: The Later Roman Empire, 284-602, 288, 1043-1045. G. Tate
argues that the crisis of the sixth century in Northern Syria was not due to the plague not the reopening of hostilities with the Persians. Though, he does concede that there were negative effects,
but they were not catastrophic. He proposes that the overpopulation of the region exceeded the
number of resources available to it: "Les Campagnes de la Syrie du Nord à l’Époque ProtoByzantine," in Hommes et Richesses dans l’Empire Byzantine, ed. V. Kravari, J. Lefort, and C.c.
Morrisson (Paris: Lethielleux, 1989), 75-77; Les campagnes de la Syrie du Nord du IIe au VIIe
siècle, 335-342. J. Durliat argues that the sources’ dark descriptions are hyperboles reflecting the
work of Thucydides. Moreover, in the Anecdota, Procopius does not label the plague as a divine
wrath incurred on the Romans and this would have conveniently fit his agenda. His analysis of
papyrological, epigraphic, legislative, archaeological sources indicate that there was barely any
room attributed to its catastrophic destructiveness: "La Peste du VIe Siècle: Pour un Nouvel
Examen des Sources Byzantines," 107-119.
18
I. Wiechmann and G. Grupe found Yersinia pestis in a burial site in Aschheim, Bavaria:
"Detection of Yersinia pestis DNA in Two Early Medieval Skeletal Finds From Aschheim (Upper
Bavaria, 6th Century A.D.)," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 126 #1 (2005), 48-55.
19
Thucyd., Hist. 2.47-55; Proc., Wars 2.22-23.
20
Thucyd., Hist. 2.48.1-2 (ἤρξατο δὲ τὸ µὲν πρῶτον, ὡς λέγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου,
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ Λιβύην κατέβη καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλέως γῆν τὴν πολλήν.); Proc., Wars
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The similarity between the outlines of both accounts is not accidental. It appears
that Procopius used Thucydides account and even expanded its length to describe the
event of his time. Hence, it is less a matter of doubting the existence of the plague. On the
contrary, it is more a question of questioning the magnitude of the plague in the sixth
century. Thucydides’ timeless literary description was used as a model to depict a
somewhat similar occurrence. In all likelihood, the virus was destructive, but not to the
extent Procopius’ narrative.21 If an analogy were used to explain this literary style, a
panegyric is a distant genre yet similar in one respect. In order to describe one person,
event or thing, someone or something of great repute is used to expound it.22 It must be
noted that the panegyric’s objective is evidently far different but the rhetoric is similar.
Though the rhetorical device in itself is ancillary to the mimetic nature of the
phenomenon.
It is of no coincidence that there is no evidence in the neighboring empire of the
Sassanid Persians, which was roughly as large and as populated.23 Moreover, the Persians

2.22.6 (Ἤρξατο µὲν ἐξ Αἰγυπτίων οἳ ᾤκηνται ἐν Πηλουσίῳ. γενοµένη δὲ δίχα πὴ µὲν ἐπί τε
Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Αἰγύπτου ἐχώρησε, πὴ δὲ ἐπὶ Παλαιστίνους τοὺς Αἰγυπτίοις
ὁµόρους ἦλθεν, ἐντεῦθέν τε κατέλαβε τὴν γῆν σύµπασαν, ὁδῷ τε ἀεὶ προϊοῦσα καὶ χρόνοις
βαδίζουσα τοῖς καθήκουσιν.). The plague is now thought to originate in the Far East. See W.J.R.
Simpson, A Treatise on Plague Dealing with the Historical, Epidemiological, Clinical,
Therapeutic and Preventive Aspects of the Disease (Cambridge: University press, 1905), 6.
21
For other literary sources, see: Proc., Anecd. 4.1; 18.44; 23.19; Marc. Comes, Chron. s.a. 543;
Evagrius Schol., Hist. Eccl. 4.29; V. Théod. De Sykéon §8, p.7; The Life of Saint Nicholas of Sion
§52, p.82; Mirac. Dem. 1.3, 13; La vie ancienne de S. Syméon Stylite le jeune §69, pp.59-60; V.
de Syméon le fou §18; John Moschus, Pratum Spirituale §131; Victor Tonnennensis, Chron.
A.542; Corippus, Iohannis 3.343-360; John of Ephesus, Ecclesiastical History in Chronique de
Michel le Syrien, t. 2, pp.236-238; Le Liber pontificalis, t. 1, pp. 291, 308-309; Greg. of Tours,
Hist. p.477.
22
For example, see the discussion on the theory of imperial power in Chapter 3. Claudian’s
panegyrics involved the use of divinity to describe Honorius.
23
Apart from Procopius who claims the Persians suffered the same fate, there are not many
sources corroborating his claim. Under Emperor Maurice, in A.D. 598, a Turkish embassy arrived
in Constantinople. Theophylact writes that the Turks never suffered from the plague: δυσὶ δὲ
µεγὶστοις τισὶ τὰ Τούρκων ἔθνη µεγαλαυχεῖ φασὶ γὰρ ἄνωθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξ ἄρχῆς µηδέποτε
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would have had to encounter its virulence prior to its arrival in the Roman Empire, if we
were to follow the ancient trade routes moving from East to West. Trade is one of the
most important mechanisms that enable the spread of an epidemic.24 This particular event
is an excellent illustration of literary classicism in Late Antiquity. Others include letters
written by Sidonius Apollinaris and Ruricius of Limoges, both of whose prose is dotted
with references to classical works. Sometimes the presence of these inclusions appears to
be only for the sake of showcasing symbolic capital.25 Above all, the pronounced usages
of previous authors’ words and ideas are undoubtedly related to the human mimetic
desire. Not only did it make one’s symbolic capital conspicuous, more importantly it also

λοιµῶν ἐπιδηµίαν θεάσασθαι, τῶν τε σεισµῶν σπάνιν εἶναι κατ’ ἐκείνην τὴν χώραν (Hist. 7.8.13).
An earlier passage of his (Hist. 5.10.15) is rather ambiguous in its mention of the Turkish race (ἐκ
τοῦ ἔθνους τῶν Τούρκων) suffering from a plague. Interestingly, the Turks were in contact with
the Persians and the Romans in the sixth century prior to this embassy: Menander frg. 13.5;
Theoph. Byz. 3 (FHG 4.270-271); John of Ephesus, Ecclesiastical History 6.23; John of
Epiphania 2 (FHG 4.273-274); The History of Vaxt‘ang Gorgasali 217-218/229. Trade from the
Far East through the Turks was not uncommon. Hence, if the plague originated in the Far East
and was as cataclysmic as often proposed, there would be much more to be told in the sources.
24

For skepticism involving the spread to Persia, see for example, I. Shahîd’s critique of L.
Conrad, whose translation of Hassan is riddled with errors: Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth
Century (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995), 291 ff. The
translation is shaped by predetermined preconceptions of the plague: L.I. Conrad, "The Plague in
the Early Medieval Near East" (Thesis (Ph D ), Princeton, 1981).For the Persian sources that
remain, there is silence. For example, the Chronicle of Arbela makes no mention of the plague
despite the chronology and geography. For the Chronicle’s authenticity, see S. Brock, "Syriac
Historical Writing. A Survey of the Main Sources," Journal of the iraqi Academy Syriac
Corporation 5 (1979), 1-30; O.J. Schrier, "Syriac Evidence for the Roman-Persian War of 421422," GRBS 33 (1992), 75-86; R. Burgess, Studies in Eusebian and Post-Eusebian Chronography
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 255.
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With respect to Sidonius, F.E. Romer asserts: “Literary evidence of the living conditions in
Italy at this time is scattered and fragmentary. Even when there is personal correspondence to fall
back on, as in the cases of Symmachus (ca. A.D. 340-402) and Sidonius Apollinaris (ca. A.D.
430-post 479), the concerns and literary classicism of the privileged classes are more clearly
revealed than the problems of daily life,” (see "Famine, Pestilence and Brigandage in Italy in the
Fifth Century A.D.," in A Roman Villa and a Late Roman Infant Cemetery: Excavation at Poggio
Gramignano, Lugnano in Teverina, ed. D. Soren and N. Soren (Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider,
1999), 466. For an analysis of Symmachus and Sidonius, see W.E. Heitland, Agricola
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1921), 402-408, 426-431.
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served to validate its user amongst his peers, namely the elite. Such instances serve as
very fitting examples to begin the analysis.
With the Tetrarchic reforms, a vast overhauling of the empire’s administrative
map was accomplished. As it has been argued above, Justinian’s provincial reforms were
not an expression of imperial ideology. On the contrary, the rhetoric, which adorns the
novellae, is just simply rhetoric. Yet this rhetoric has much less to do with the great
orators of the past than with human behavior, as it has just been proposed above. Rhetoric
remained a variable in a linguistic formula that could be adapted to different social,
political and economic contexts, within which different meanings could be attributed to
clichés. Within these formulae, the attention should not be diverted from the most
important variable; specifically, the variable is an expression of the reforms. If the second
variable, i.e. the rhetoric, is granted an excess of scrutiny the underlying objective of the
law can be overlooked. The rhetoric was an expression of human behavior centered on
the triangular relationship between the author, the model and the object. In this instance,
the authors pursued what stemmed from the model’s relationship with the object, namely
credibility, accomplishment and validation.
Therefore, the laws are not an expression of a synthesis between Christianity and
the Roman past. On the contrary, the laws are a clear illustration of an enduring structure
in Roman society, classicism. For example, the author of the laws, Tribonian, was
deemed to be one of the better, if not the best, products of the educational system, paideia,
in his day. In that regard, it is no coincidence that he had a marked ability to draw upon
ancient knowledge in the composition of the laws.26 His reputation could only be derived
26

Proc., Wars 1.24.16: Τριβουνιανὸς δὲ φύσεως µὲν δυνάµει ἐχρῆτο καὶ παιδείας ἐς ἄκρον
ἀφίκετο τῶν κατ̓ αὐτὸν οὐδενὸς ἧσσον…
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from his works. Thus, this is a fitting illustration of the definition provided above. His
familiarity with the bank of classic literary works was a reflection of his erudition and
this inevitably affected his reputation positively. Nevertheless, the aesthetics of the laws
were but a testament to his abilities in that area.
Rhetoric in law was considerably important to Justinian’s administration. His
reign is known for its lavish expenditures due to which he squandered the enormous
treasury, which was left by his uncle’s predecessor, Anastasius. The imperial
government’s expenditures vastly outweighed its revenues during this period, as we must
note the numerous occasions upon which there was a clear struggle to ensure that the ship
of state remain afloat. For example, this may be understood on numerous occasions when
Justinian employed a general military strategy of triage with regard to his frontiers to the
especial detriment of the Balkans. The expedition in Italy was protracted also due to the
inabilities of the imperial government to sustain a sufficient expeditionary force on the
peninsula. Therefore, there was a paramount necessity for fiscal reform in order to quell
the wildfires caused by Justinian’s ambitious projects, whether they might be
architectural or martial in nature and this was understood to be inevitable early in his
reign.
Thus, the imperial court’s drive to bridge the gap between expenses and revenue
were of utmost concern. Therefore in many instances in the Codex Iustinianus, one might
find exhortations similar to these:
…the public tribute should be paid for these purposes without diminution,
freely, and at the legally fixed times. Hence, if you zealously respond to
the magistrates, they can easily and expeditiously pay the tribute to us; we
Although it must be stated that Procopius then immediately proceeded to berate Tribonian for his
alleged corrupt pursuit of material wealth.
John Lydus is of the same opinion as Procopius (John Lydus, De Mag. 3.20.10-11).
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can thus praise the magistrates for their diligence and commend you for
your voluntary action, and there will be entire and concordant harmony
between those that govern and the governed.27
This passage can be found in the pivotal reform, Novel 8, which laid the foundations for
several others. It drastically revamped the provincial administrations in certain regions
and in many ways. It serves as a clear indication of the empire’s struggles to maintain a
fine balance between its expenses and its revenues, with the former significantly
outweighing the latter. Also, it underlines the imperial imperative to collect taxes in a
more efficient way and at a greater rate that also comprises the creation of new taxes for
which John the Cappadocian was notorious. Therefore, under these circumstances, the
proconsul:
…must deal honestly with our subjects, as we have often stated. This is
our most earnest desire, and because of it we have disregarded the large
amount of money and the expenditures in great wars, in which God
permitted us to bring the Persians to terms of peace, to subjugate the
Vandals, the Alans, and the Moors and to recover all of Africa as well as
Sicily, so as to give us hope to retain the government of the other countries
between the confines of the two oceans, subject to the ancient Romans, but
thereafter lost by sloth. We shall, with the aid of God, make a change in
that respect, for we do not seek to avoid even the gravest difficulties, but
submit to sleeplessness, hunger and hard labor for the benefit of our
subjects.28
The stress in this passage is placed upon the necessity for citizens to bear the brunt of the
27

Nov. 8.10 (Blume’s translation, passim): …pro quibus competens est fiscalia tributa sine
imminutione et devote et secundum definita exigi tempora. Quapropter si vos quidem devote
occurretis iudicibus, illi vero facilem et praeparatam fiscalium illationem in nos exhibuerint, et
iudicum laudabimus studium et vestram approbabimus voluntatem, et undique una quaedam erit
optima et consona praesidentium et quibus praesident congruentia (Mommsen’s edition, passim).
28
Nov. 30.11: Et pure nostris subiectis (hoc quod saepe diximus) utetur, causam festinatam nobis
et pecunias neglegere procurantem magnas, utique in tantis expensis et in bellis maximis, per
quae dedit nobis deus et apud Persas agere pacem Uuandalosque et Alanos et Maurusios religare
et Africam universam insuper et Siciliam possidere, et spes habere bonas quis etiam reliquorum
nobis detentionem annuet deus, quam prisci Romani usque ad utriusque oceani fines tenentes
sequentibus neglegentiis amiserunt; quas nos divino solacio confidentes in melius convertere
festinamus, nihilque nos pigebit horum quae ad novissimam difficultatem tendunt, vigiliis et aliis
universis laboribus pro nostris subiectis semper uti.
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weighty needs of the imperial administration and to comply with the new systems of
imperial exactions implemented by John the Cappadocian. The fiscal reforms, which
were initiated by the great Praetorian Prefect, intended to bridge the gap between both the
expenditures and the revenues destined for the imperial treasury. The discontent that
arose due to John’s initiatives is well known, as any government’s increasing vigilance
with respect to taxation is seldom met with enthusiasm.29
As it has just been mentioned above, Justinian and his Praetorian Prefect, John the
Cappadocian, initiated a series of provincial reforms and Novel 8 was its foundation.30
Other provinces also received attention by John the Cappadocian who appears to have
had a resolute program to make cuts where it was feasible (in terms of financial, political
and military security).31 This reform program did not only concern Asia Minor and the
Aegean basin, but also extended itself beyond the East. In the West, after the lands of
North Africa were recovered, the new administration that was implemented did not
reflect the general trend of the period, that is, a large and intricate bureaucracy, on the
contrary as E. Stein declares: “…sa structure était d’une simplicité remarquable…”32
Thus, it must be noted that there was a clear intent on attempting to establish more costeffective provincial administrations in order once again to bridge the gulf between
imperial expenses and revenue. All of these reforms do reflect one single event in the
early reign of Justinian, when, during the debates, which took place on the eve of the
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For example, see Lydus, De Mag. 3.69; Proc. Anecd. 23.4.
Nov. 8; 24-31; for a thorough analysis of Nov. 8, see R. Bonini, Ricerche sulla legislazione
giustinianea dell'anno 535: Nov. Iustiniani 8 Venalità delle cariche e riforme
dell'amministrazione periferica (Bologna: Pàtron, 1980).
31
See J.-M. Carrié, "Séparation ou cumul? Pouvoir civil et autorité militaire dans les provinces
d'Égypte," 116.
32
E. Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, 463. Also see A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284602, 590. For the establishment of the new administration: CJ 27.
30
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North African campaign, John ascertained the liabilities bound to such a bold
enterprise.33 John’s financial aptitude was unquestionable during the period and served
his emperor dutifully, but with trepidation due to the latter’s grandiose ambitions, and he
highlighted many financial difficulties that could possibly arise. Evidently, his concerns
would soon materialize as the Roman expeditions to North Africa and Italy were initially
successful, but the resources required to sustain these military efforts both in the
expansion and in the consolidation of the new territories were scarce and this ultimately
led to a series of blunders, such as the mutiny in North Africa.34
Returning to Novel 8 and the subsequent legislation stemming from it, it is now
important to determine the extent of the reforms themselves. Several key issues were
addressed among others: the military and civil branches of the provincial administration
were fused, the governor’s office was promoted in status and assumed more judicial and
military power, the venality of the governorship was outlawed and provinces were
consolidated and the provincial bureaucracies were downsized.35 Thus, as it has just been
noted above, there was an unmistakable agenda of reducing both expenses and personnel
where possible and, when this is taken into perspective along with the fiscal reforms, also
highlighted above, these are rather apparent signs of the difficult circumstances, which
John the Cappadocian was required to address. The ramifications of these reforms were
evidently unpopular, for the path, which John the Cappadocian pursued, would easily
incur the malevolence of not only the commoners due to the fiscal reforms in term of
ampler exactions, but also the bureaucrats. The latter evidently fell victim to the
circumstances in which the empire of the period found itself, as John sought to reduce
33

Proc., Wars 3.10.7-20.
Proc., Wars 4.28.
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Nov. 8; 24-30.
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expenditures and maximize income where it was possible and this obviously entailed the
reduction in provincial personnel in these reforms. When he sought to make the
bureaucracy leaner, he inevitably challenged the underpinnings of multiple social
networks. Not only would some officials lose out as a result, others would also see their
patronage networks undermined, and by extension and more importantly their social
capital impacted. Hence, the Praetorian Prefect in question was playing a very dangerous
game in which popular upheaval and political conspiracies could abound.36
During the reign of Justinian, there were many issues, other than fiscal and
administrative, which drew much of the emperor’s attention and one of the few prime
concerns lied in the judicial system whose fissures seemed too visible to ignore. Hence,
with regard to this institution, the emperor addressed a multitude of different issues in his
legislation, as legislation was issued in a multitude. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the
appeals system was in dire need of reform, for it reached a point of crisis, in which the
lower institutional levels were often bypassed, and thus the imperial government sought
to quell this problem.37 Once again, there is a benchmark set in legislation that is directly
related to the very same series of provincial reforms, and the latter have already been
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For example, the Nika Riots posed an existential challenge to Justinian’s reign. John the
Cappadocian was deposed in response to the rioters demands. For analyses of the Riot, see J.B.
Bury, "The Nika Riot," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 17 (1897), 92-119; A. Cameron, Circus
Factions (New York: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1976), 278-281; A.A. Chekalova, "Narod i
senatorskaja oppozitsija v vosstanii Nika," Vizantiskij Vremennik 32 (1971), 24-39; A.A.
Chekalova, Konstantinopolʹ v VI veke: vosstanie Nika (Moscow: Izd-vo "Nauka," Glav. red.
vostochnoĭ lit-ry, 1986); C. Gizewski, Zur Normativität und Struktur der Verfassungsverhältnisse
in der späteren römischen Kaiserzeit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988); G. Greatrex, "The Nika Riot: A
Reappraisal," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 117 (1997), 60-86.
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See J. Gascou, "Les pétitions privées," 93-103.
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discussed formerly.38 However, on this occasion, the legislation takes root in Novel 23,
where the institutional problems with the appeals system are underlined and addressed:
Our highest judges are occupied with the most unimportant cases, and
litigants are, in such cases, burdened with large expenses, to exceed,
perchance, the total amount involved in the action.39
What may be remarked from this particular law is the institutional decline of the appeals
system. This perturbed the high officials as much as the commoners, who desired to
utilize it. The fees involved in these court cases often eclipsed the property’s value at
stake and this evidently brought about some considerable repercussions. This either
impoverished the litigant or permitted the more influential defendant to evade
prosecution. This could not only permit him to escape the law, due to the plaintiffs
inability to cause the case to materialize, but could also promote further abuses from the
influential elements of society. As a result, the legislation targeted the decline of the
intermediaries in the legislation in order to restore them.40
Still within the confines of this discussion, that is, judicial efficiency, Justinian
underlined a problem in the mechanism by which summons were made. Litigants were
flocking to the capital and consequently “abandoning their provinces and coming [to
Constantinople] to ruin themselves and die, after having been deprived of their property,
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These are the provincial reforms in Asia Minor: Nov. 24-31.
Nov. 23.3: …super minimis causis maximi nostri iudices inquietentur et homines propter
minimas causas magnis fatigentur dispendiis, ut forsitan totius litis aestimatio ad sumptus
iudiciales non sufficeret.
40
For a more complete discussion on the pitfalls of the justice system, see Chapter 3. Nov. 23.3-4;
also see, Nov. 8; 24-31 in which there is a repeated insistence upon the revitalization of the
province as an essential layer in the appeal system. Roofs were also established in order to
minimize the number of judicial cases being taken beyond the province. At first the sum of 500
solidi was established (Nov. XXIII-XXXI), but this was thereupon augmented to 720 solidi (Nov.
103); also for the declining role of the governor as an intermediary see C. Roueché, "The
Function of the Governor in Late Antiquity: Some Observations," 31-36.
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as well as forfeiting the right to be buried with their fathers.”41 The undesired influx of
citizens into the capital plagued the city with a series of effects, which the emperor
sought to extirpate and thus it was deemed that the situation had reached a boiling point.
In order to rectify this state of affairs, the law concludes that:
…and the defendant shall have, not only ten days, as formerly, but twenty
days, in which he may, if he wishes, object to the judge (referee) or ask
that another sit with him, or in which he may acknowledge the debt and
come to an amicable settlement with his adversary, so that he may not,
through wrong fraud, fall into the power of a judge, who may, perhaps, be
suspected by him, perhaps may be unfavorable to him, or may have
something personal against him, and so that a man who is sued may not be
deprived of an opportunity to know the reason for which he is
summoned.42
Therefore, the summons period was not only the source of loopholes that the plaintiff
could exploit in terms of the amount of time granted to the defendant to present himself,
but this law also demonstrates how it was the source of many other problems, which have
been touched upon just above. The abuses committed by the more influential could
manifest themselves in their ability to manipulate the judicial system by influencing the
selection of judges. Generally, patronage itself was a threat to the integrity of the legal
process and evidently this issue was one target of this reform.43
Justinian’s effort at reforming the fiscal, administrative and judicial institutions,
amongst others, is significant due to the nature of the reforms themselves. Anything
considered rash and new was not welcomed by the Romans of the period, as for example
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Nov. 80.10.
Nov. 53.3: et non secundum antiquitatem decem solummodo dierum habere eum qui admonetur
indutias, sed duplices, hoc est viginti, ut sive repudiare voluerit sive et cum eo alium iudicem
petere, licentiam habeat hoc facere aut forte cognoscere debitum et liberare se ab adversarii sui
contentione amicabiliter, et non per calumniam et circumventionem sub iudice constitui forsan
suspecto, forsan ingrato, plerumque autem aliquid etiam proprium contra reum dispensante, et eo
qui litem sustinet nullum habente tempus ad cognoscendum, in quibus conventus occurrit.
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the change from Latin to Greek in administrative affairs tells. John Lydus not only
lamented this, but also retorted sharply to this development with a venomous invective
against John the Cappadocian after discussing this linguistic shift in the administration.44
More importantly, when John Lydus pursues the topic, he employs a vocabulary that is
very noteworthy and this is key to this entire discussion: “For in his actions, his writings,
his innovations and shakeups of old-fashioned ways in every manner…”45 The terms
καινοτοµῶν and τρόπου σαλεύων τὴν ἀρχαιότητα are clear rebukes and demonstrate the
insistence on John Lydus’ part to maintain a high degree of continuity with the past,
when taking this excerpt in its context. He justifiably despised any form of innovation, as
many others did in the administration, for he himself entered office because of his
interests in antiquities.46 Understandably, he was uneasy with all forms of innovation,
notably when they threatened the employment of his peers; such as it did with the
provincial reforms in Asia Minor. Furthermore, taxis was personified in the emperor
himself and any threat to it was undesired, as there was a general “horror of ‘novelty’ or
innovation.”47 The series of words that John Lydus employs, which have been stated
above, fit into a broader structure of Roman civilization and this is the uneasiness with
and even contempt for innovation itself. Innovatio opposed the well-established structure
of Classicism. Hitherto it has been noted that Justinian and particularly his Praetorian
prefect, John the Cappadocian, initiated a flurry of reforms, such as the transition from
Latin to Greek languages in the administration, which can be deemed innovative. Hence,
44

Lydus, De Mag. 3.68.3 where the author defines his subject as γραώδη and χαµαίζηλον. The
former term is doubly insulting for he uses the feminine (senile old woman).
45
Here, I provide my own translation of the passage: Πράττων γὰρ γράφων καὶ καινοτοµῶν καὶ
ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου σαλεύων τὴν ἀρχαιότητα… (Lydus, De Mag. 3.68.4)
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For Lydus: John Lydus, De Mag. 3.28.
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D.M. Nicol, "Byzantine Political Thought," in Cambridge History of Medieval Political
Thought c. 350- c. 1450, ed. J.H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 60.
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it is now important to discover how innovation stands in between innovations, or in other
words rash reforms, and classicism.
The rhetoric employed in the legislation is of utmost importance in the pursuit to
uncover how its audience, which contained the likes of traditional bureaucrats, aristocrats,
lawyers and others received these innovations. Innovations, as previously mentioned,
were frowned upon. Therefore, the approach, which the imperial government took, when
implementing anything of the sort, was exceedingly important. S. Barnish, A.D. Lee and
M. Whitby have outlined one technique of doing so:
…it was more common for processes and structures to evolve gradually,
through the introduction of a new official or procedure which ran
alongside existing arrangements until the innovation either demonstrated
its effectiveness by marginalizing its predecessor or proved unequal to the
task.48
The evidence does substantiate this and, in fact, this process was not coincidental. The
creation of a parallel institution would be more amenable than a brash innovation.
However, this paradigm cannot apply to the new provincial administration in North
Africa or to the reforms in North Africa. The consolidations of the military and civil
administrations, and the reduction of the provincial bureaucracies evidently did not
permit a period of transition. However, these same historians do add an important
element to their argument, which should be stressed. When innovations were necessary,
emperors often resorted to employing new men, talented bureaucrats of the lower order,
to complete the tasks and consequently ignore the aristocrats, who would usually have
received promotion.49
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The reason for choosing men like John the Cappadocian or Peter Barsymes was
rather clear: they did not possess the vested interests of the established elite, and thus
would not fear to prompt any novelties, which would vex the blue-blooded elements of
the empire, and, finally, their employment depended strictly on the beneficence of their
master and thus they would owe him their allegiance. In addition, the amount of cultural
capital accrued by a man like John the Cappadocian could only be seen as a tremendous
asset to the emperor.50 A man from without with a high degree of know-how would not
fear to challenge the ossified bureaucracy. Justinian saw in this perfect type of candidate
an opportunity to address the imperial office’s loss of unadulterated and not symbolic
power over the bureaucracy.
Hence, if innovation per se was taboo, there must have been another or other
methods by which Justinian and John the Cappadocian were able to mollify potential
opponents. These possibilities now require exploration. Classicism, as it has been
mentioned at the beginning of this inquiry, was a cultural structure of the period. The
near obsession with literature of the golden age, which includes a plethora of celebrated
authors such as Plato, Cicero or Euripides, amongst others, was commonplace. Even
within literature, innovation was not something one would come across with regularity.
Although there were exceptions such as the genre of hagiography, mimesis was more
often the norm than not.51 Accordingly, the nostalgia evoked in the reforms was mainly
aimed “to provide precedents and pretexts”52 so that innovations may not appear for what
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they are, that is, a break with the established administrative standards and structures. A
break such as this could only be seen as an attempt to reign in the bureaucracy.
Let us then return to the fiscal reforms and examine how the rhetoric employed in
the legislation influenced its appearance and reception. When Justinian’s reign is
examined from a broad perspective, the large tracts of land that were conquered are some
of his trademarks that come to mind. The expansion of Roman imperium to Africa and to
Italy was an extremely costly enterprise and, as mentioned above, the emperor’s
Praetorian Prefect, John the Cappadocian did not fail to voice his displeasure at these
grandiose undertakings that would entail a substantial amount of stress on the fiscal
system, for which he, in large part, was responsible.53 Before the expedition to Africa was
agreed upon, John protested and lamented the potential dire straits in which the empire
would find itself as the financial ramifications of these military expeditions that John
envisaged were expressed in the laws issued during the same emperor’s reign:
It is also necessary for you, my subjects, since you know how much we
look after you, to pay all your public tribute zealously without waiting till
the magistrates compel such payment, and you should be so obedient as to
show us, in turn, by your very acts, your suitable thanks for our kindness,
and that you have, because of your devotion, just claim on every favor and
care on the part of the magistrates. Since the magistrates must, at all
events, collect the tribute and it is clear that they perform this duty at their
peril, you, too, knowing this, should avoid all contumacy and should not
exhibit disobedient minds, which would require the use of severity,
necessary on account of the unavoidable collection of taxes. It is, indeed,
known to you, my subjects, that the expenses of the soldiers and the
pursuit of enemies require much care, which cannot be met without money
and admits of no delay.54
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Proc., Wars 3.10.7-20.
Nov. 8.10: Oportet quoque vos nostros subiectos, scientes, quantam vestri posuimus
providentiam, cum omni devotione publica sine imminutione tributa persolvere, et neque
administratorum egere necessitate, sed ita devotos vosmet ipsos praebere, ut nobis ex ipsis
ostendatur operibus, quia et ipsi pro huiusmodi clementia propriam nobis devotionem restituetis
et merito habebitis omnem a iudicibus occasione devotionis favorem et providentiam: illud
scientes, [ut] quia iudicibus imminet undique fiscalium periculum, et manifestum, quia in proprio
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It is imperative to note the imperial drive for income to fund these very large ventures in
the vocabulary, which alludes to the urgency and insistence upon the prompt payment of
taxes in full. However, this rhetoric employed here is for one and only one design, which
immediately follows this last passage above: “Nor could we tolerate a diminution of the
Roman territory. We have, on the other hand, recovered the whole of Libya, have
subjugated the Vandals, and with the help of God hope to do even greater things…”55
The message conveyed in this particular section of the Novel indicates that the territory
was not conquered but restored (reparavimus) to the emperor and his empire, after being
lost by careless emperors of the past. Hence, it was in the emperor’s right to recover these
lands, for they were once his and thus the aggressive wars, which were launched in the
A.D. 530s were undoubtedly just.
The rhetoric employed is intended not only to justify Justinian’s campaigns, but to
substantiate the pleas for effective and, as it is widely known, greater taxes, which have
been examined above. Thus, the restoration or ἀνανέωσις of imperial domains through
the reacquisition of lost territories is used in order to ensure that:
…the public tribute should be paid for these purposes without diminution,
freely, and at the legally fixed times. Hence, if you zealously respond to
the magistrates, they can easily and expeditiously pay the tribute to us; we
can thus praise the magistrates for their diligence and commend you for

suo periculo administrationes assumunt: et vos hoc agnoscentes ex omni modo evitate
indevotionem et nolite vestras voluntates ita praebere inoboedientes, quatenus eorum egeatis
vehementia, quam necessarium est eos assumere propter inevitabilem fiscalium exactionem;
scientibus vobis nostris subiectis, quia militares expensae et hostium insecutiones multa egent
diligentia, et non possunt citra pecunias haec agi, causa videlicet nullam recipiente dilationem…
55
Nov. 8.10: neque nobis concedentibus despici Romanorum terram diminutam: qui et Libyam
omnem reparavimus et Vandalos in servitutem redegimus et plurima adhuc et maiora horum
speramus a deo percipere et agere.
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your voluntary action, and there will be entire and concordant harmony
between those that govern and the governed.”56
Then again, the significant amount of symbolic capital Justinian gained from the
conquests certainly served as leverage against his bureaucracy in a struggle for power.
The implications of the Nika Riot must not be forgotten. Certain elements of the senate
were opportune enough to use the riot as a tool to undo Justinian’s power, not to mention
the Praetorian Prefect of the East John the Cappadocian and the Quaestor Tribonian,
whose duty involved using spin in the law code.57
On another occasion, in Novel 30, which delineates the provincial reforms of
Cappadocia, there is a slight tangent, which discusses the reconquest in a similar light and
the negligence of previous rulers is blamed:
…so as to give us hope to retain the government of the other countries
between the confines of the two oceans, subject to the ancient Romans, but
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Nov. 8.10: pro quibus competens est fiscalia tributa sine imminutione et devote et secundum
definita exigi tempora. Quapropter si vos quidem devote occurretis iudicibus, illi vero facilem et
praeparatam fiscalium illationem in nos exhibuerint, et iudicum laudabimus studium et vestram
approbabimus voluntatem, et undique una quaedam erit optima et consona praesidentium et
quibus praesident congruentia.
57
Marc. Comes, Chron. s.a. 532; Proc., Wars 1.24; John Lydus, De Mag. 3.70; Malalas 18.474ff.
and fr. 46; Ps. Zach., Chron. 9.14; Theophanes, Chron. AM 6024; also, see J.B. Bury, "The Nika
Riot," 92-119; A. Cameron, Circus Factions, 278-281. The two sources resting the riot’s blame
on John the Cappadocian are not coincidentally part of the bureaucracy and thus see the
praetorian prefect as a suitable target. The well-concerted effort to remove Justinian’s cabinet
members appears to corroborate the claims of Marcellinus to a certain extent. It would appear to
be a riot in which some members of the aristocracy saw their opportunity to rid themselves of the
reformers. I do not believe that the riot’s inception was designed by these same elements of the
aristocracy. However, G. Greatrex does not consider the role of the conspiring senators to have
been significant: "The Nika Riot: A Reappraisal," 60-86. The removal of officials during a riot is
nothing new, he argues. However, a quaestor sacri palatii has little bearing on the populace in
comparison to a praefectus urbanus such as Theodotus. It is even unlikely that Tribonian’s name
was known to the commoners of the capital due to his office. Though Tribonian was known to the
aristocracy and his tenure of office as quaestor was not very helpful to that segment of society, as
argued throughout.
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thereafter lost by sloth. We shall, with the aid of God, make a change in
that respect…58
Thus, again, the topos of ἀνανέωσις is found in the rhetoric and once again it serves as a
prelude to underline the necessity to collect taxes in a more efficient way and at a greater
rate that also comprises the creation of new taxes for which John the Cappadocian was
notorious. Hence, “we do not seek to avoid even the gravest difficulties, but submit to
sleeplessness, hunger and hard labor for the benefit of our subjects.”59 The stress in this
passage is placed upon the necessity for citizens, once again, to answer to the weighty
needs of the imperial administration. This burden is softened by the rhetoric that
accentuates far more the restoration of the Roman Empire of old and the refurbishment of
the reacquired land along the correct lines, which are evidently Roman, than the drive for
greater income. Furthermore, the topos’ association to the reconquest is used as a
legitimating device for the demands of increased revenue. This argument that supports
the case of renewal indeed plays on a sense of Classicism to achieve the desired ends.
This same topos, that is, the restoration of lost lands to the Roman Empire, is used
in the Codex, yet in a different context, this time in the institutional context. The reforms
of A.D. 535-536 drastically overhauled the administrative structures of the provinces in
Asia Minor for the most part and these were clearly innovative. In addition, once again,
the newly acquired lands of North Africa were also subject to these administrative
reforms after the reconquest. Justinian writes to Archelaus, the Praetorian Prefect of the
new prefecture:
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Nov. 30.11: …et spes habere bonas quis etiam reliquorum nobis detentionem annuet deus,
quam prisci Romani usque ad utriusque oceani fines tenentes sequentibus neglegentiis amiserunt;
quas nos divino solacio confidentes in melius convertere festinamus…
59
Nov. 30.11: …nihilque nos pigebit horum quae ad novissimam difficultatem tendunt, vigiliis et
aliis universis laboribus pro nostris subiectis semper uti.
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This grace of God was not granted to our predecessors, who were not only
not permitted to liberate Africa, but who saw Rome itself captured by
these Vandals, and all imperial ornaments transferred thence into Africa.
Now, indeed, God, in His mercy, has not alone delivered Africa and all its
provinces to us, but He has also restored the imperial ornaments to us
which had been captured at and taken from Rome.60
God, who also has a recurrent role in the legislation previously analyzed above,
commands much more of a presence in this particular instance. However, the overall
topos remains unchanged and, on this occasion, it serves as a prelude to justify the
establishment of an administration, which possesses the same characteristics as those in
Asia Minor that were subject to John the Cappadocian’s reforms. Not coincidentally in
the series of reforms the same model is utilized, but in a different fashion. The intent to
drape the rash innovations targeting the provincial administration, here, is conducted by
demonstrating how previous Roman emperors failed to reconquer the lost territory. The
restoration (restituit) of these lands to Justinian, under the auspices of God, serves to
display how his divinely sanctioned military endeavors serve as a buttress to his designs.
He intended to make the transition as smooth as possible to implement a small and
atypical bureaucracy in the region. This is especially a consideration due to the North
African elite, which was brought back under the umbrella of Roman governance. This
local aristocracy would have to do its share in the administration.
The necessity to drape the implementation of a smaller administration in the new
prefecture of North Africa with a thick blanket of imperial rhetoric had its own aims.
There was an intent to placate the likes of traditional bureaucrats such as John Lydus,
60

CJ 1.27.6-7: Quod beneficium dei antecessores nostri non meruerunt, quibus non solum

Africam liberare non licuit, sed et ipsam Romam viderunt ab eisdem vvandalis captam et omnia
imperialia ornamenta in Africam exinde translata. Nunc vero deus per suam misericordiam non
solum Africam et omnes eius provincias nobis tradidit, sed et ipsa imperialia ornamenta, quae
capta Roma fuerant ablata, nobis restituit.
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who was rather vocal about Justinian’s chief administrators’ unorthodox fashion of
conducting governmental affairs. C. Roueché’s interpretation of the matter is twofold.
She views the reforms as a reassertion of Roman identity. This would enable a firmer
central control over the provinces.61 Her argument has its merits, but it also poses a very
important quandary. The selection of imagery rooted in the old ways of operating
government (whether of the Republic or of the High Empire) would be a conscious
decision to use paradoxical trope. During the periods, the opposite was the truth;
comparatively to the early sixth century, there was a lack of institutional and of political
control of the periphery. A very large number of civil servants gained access to their field
through a rigorous system of education (paideia), which involved the teaching of the
classical works. With many bureaucrats like John Lydus that were familiar with classic
authors in which these realities were portrayed, that is, a centrifugal authoritative
apparatus, it would not be very effective to use this imagery to reassert firmer imperial
power over its realm. This is especially true, for example, when such widely read authors
as Polybius or Cicero exhibited these realities in their works.62 Though, the reassertion of
central power is somewhat of an interesting point, C. Roueché makes, and this merits
further investigation in the coming pages.
In the legislation examined above, God’s role in the restoration of the Roman
Empire under Justinian is no novelty. It is a traditional trope in ancient literature, which
can be found, for example, in the Corpus Hermeticum, a collection of ancient works with
a wide range of subjects including philosophy, which is attributed to Hermes
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C. Roueché, "Provincial Governors and their Titulature in the Sixth Century," 89.
Polybius, Hist. 30.3; Cicero, Ep. ad Atticum 5.21 are two of several examples. The former
highlights the Lycian revolt while the latter highlights a scandalous loan made to the Salamians
by a Roman official.
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Trismegistus. Most of the fifteen tractates contained within the work are dated to the
second and third centuries A.D.63 In the Hieros Logos, the motif found in Justinian’s
legislation is summarized in a few lines:
[Thus] there begins [men’s] living and their growing wise, according to
the fate appointed by the revolution of the Cyclic Gods, and their
deceasing for this end…For every birth of flesh ensouled, and of the fruit
of seed, and every handiwork, though it decay shall of necessity renew
itself, both by the renovation of the gods and by the turning-around of
Nature’s rhythmic wheel.64
From this excerpt, one might note the similarities of the broader themes implicated in the
legislation and in the short tract, the Hieros Logos. The decay can be attributed to the
previous Roman rulers, who were negligent in their management of the imperial realm.
Inevitably, the empire would be renewed out of necessity by a divine hand and by the
cyclical character of Nature. This evidently took place under Justinian, who therefore was
selected by God to be the emperor at the culmination of this cycle. The parallel drawn
here to Justinian is unmistakable, as it served as an effective tool to enhance the image of
the emperor in his ambitious endeavors. Whether or not the inspiration is rooted in the
broader trope or directly to the mystical work is debatable. However, the latter cannot be
discounted, as the Corpus was not unknown to an educated audience, which included the
likes of Augustine.65
Then again, in a similar fashion, both Menecles of Barca and Athenaeus (the latter
using the former’s work) discuss the state of education in the Levant in the period
63

See Nock who dates it between A.D. 100 and 300 in Corpus Hermeticum I, ed. A.D. Nock,
trans. A.J. Festugière (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945), iv-v; also see Reitzenstein, who argues
that most was written in the second century A.D. in Poimandres: Studien zur GriechischAegyptischen und fruhchristlichen Literatur, ed. R. Reitzenstein (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1966), 2-36, 207-211, 248.
64
Corpus Hermeticum 3.4. Translation provided by G.R.S Mead: Corpus Hermeticum (London:
J.M. Watkins, 1949).
65
Aug., De Civitate Dei 8.24.
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following the death of Alexander the Great. They both claim that the encyclic mode of
education had fallen into a dismal state due to the unremitting period of strife during the
Wars of the Diadochi. The blame was laid upon Alexander’s successors for the
destructive commotions. However, the regeneration of many types of learning took place
under Ptolemy VII Cacergetes, when the Alexandrians began to reeducate the Greeks and
the barbarians, both authors claim.66 Thus, once again, one must note the similar pattern
being employed in the legislation; the blame is placed upon previous rulers and the
regeneration thereafter takes place in a glorious fashion. As a result, one can thereupon
justifiably surmise that the rhetoric employed in the Codex is drawn from a literary bank
of clichés that aids the author to utilize a selected cliché in different contexts, as it has
been seen above where it was noted that the renewal or restoration of the empire was
affixed to both fiscal and to institutional interests. These clichés conveniently drew upon
classical authors and thus seem to be a product of classicism as a structured structure.
The reforms of the judicial system, which was riddled with troubles, were already
analyzed above. As it has been seen above, was utilized in different contexts, but in this
instance, it was employed in order to attain bureaucratic efficiency in the justice system.
Novel 23 has already been visited and the rhetoric employed in the legislation is of
interest:
And in this third chapter, provision must be made in a matter which was
formerly well regulated, but has in recent times been neglected. Anciently
magistrates were properly divided into three grades, the higher, the middle,
and the lower. Appeals from the lower judges were not sent to the highest,
but to the judges of worshipful rank (middle), the latter hearing the
appeals in our place. In recent times this practice has been abandoned.67
66

Menecles, Hist. fragmenta, frag. 9.7; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 4.83.
Nov. 23.3: Illud etiam in tertio capitulo disponendum est, quod antiquitas bene statuit, novitas
autem neglexit. Cum enim veneranda vetustatis auctoritas ita magistratus digessit, ut alii maiores,
alii medii, alii minores sint, et appellationes a minoribus iudicibus non solum ad maximos iudices
67
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The rest of this passage has already been cited above, but the method by which it was
introduced here delineates the institutional decline of the appeal system. The rhetoric in
this instance is typical. The method by which affairs were conducted in the past was far
more efficient, but by the time of Justinian, there was a significant amount of tension on
the upper strata of the appeal system. By extension, the lower echelons had become
obsolete, particularly at the provincial level, but not by the intent of the central
administration. The provincial judicial system was rife with corruption and
misadministration of justice, as it has been discussed in Chapter 3. On this particular
occasion, a true return to the past was sought, as it appears, for the evolution of the
judicial system had devolved in a direction, which diminished any level of efficiency.
Then again, in Novel 47, in order to ensure judicial efficiency, once again there is
an insistence upon the old ways. An increased amount of effectiveness could be achieved
through standardization:
We make this further addition: since obscure and antiquated signs are used
in courts in order to denote the time, we order that after these ancient signs
others shall be written which are clear and commonly used by all, which
can easily be read by all…68
Therefore, the complications, which took root in the diverse types of script used in dating
judicial documents, inhibited their usage per se. There is no insistence on the restoration
of the ancient script, but its standardized usage and thus by extension its revival ensures
that it “…denote[s] the time of the proceeding, so that those who want to know the time

remitterentur, sed ad spectabilium iudicum tribunal quatenus et ipsi sacro auditorio adbihito litem
exercerent, novitas autem hoc dereliquit…
68
Nov. 47.2: Illud quoque adicimus: quoniam hi qui tempus in iudiciis designant, cum incertis
illis et antiquis litteris hoc declarant, observetur in omni iudicio, ut post illas litteras antiquitatis
alias subdant, id est has communes et omnibus notas et quae legi ab omnibus facile possint…

199

may not be left in ignorance till he finds someone who really understands these signs.”69
Therefore, once more, one may note the desire to renew the old ways in order to reach a
desired level of efficiency, but this time through standardization. Furthermore, it is also
an illustration of the structure, classicism, especially in Late Antique high society. Due to
the law itself being published, the habit of employing the ancient script seems to have
been a commonality. This indicates how prevalent the structure of classicism truly was
for it to be present in such a specific area as dating. The use of this type of dating testifies
to the cultural and symbolic capital of its author.
There is still more to be discussed regarding the relationship between ἀνανέωσις
and judicial efficiency. It has been underlined above how litigants were flocking to the
capital and how the summons system was rather corrupt and inefficient. The imperial
administration strongly opposed these inadequacies and sought to rectify the situation.
The fact that the more influential components in society benefitted from the lack of
reform is of importance here. Hence, in order to seal the zones of uncertainty and to
establish a more equitable system, the past is once again present in the rhetoric as there
was yet another renewal:
Indeed, our predecessors who enacted laws before us and set the state in
order, gave careful attention to these matters, provided for proceedings
against idleness and carefully looked into all things pertaining to strangers.
Nor is this anything new or an unusual zeal for the benefit of matters, but
praiseworthy and ancient, but which was, in the meantime, neglected
through a sloth which affects everything adversely, gradually came into
danger of being weakened and parish, until we, finding it useful and
serviceable, introduced it anew in our state.70
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Nov. 47.2: …et significare gestorum tempus: ut non fatigentur requirentes id tempus, deinde
errantes expectent, donec hominem quemcumque comperiant litteras illas pro veritate lecturum.
70
Nov. 80.10: …eo quod et ante nos ponentibus leges et rempublicam constituentibus haec non
transitorio studio fuerunt, sed et pigritiae fuit quaedam scriptura et peregrinos omnes
perscrutabantur. Et neque novum neque leve hoc causis studium, bonum quidem et antiquum,
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The situation is resolved by controlling the migration of litigants to the city but more
importantly, as it was noted above, when analyzing the writings of Menecles and
Athenaeus, the same formula reemerges, that is, the decline due to negligence and a
renewal thereafter. Yet even more importantly, there is an addition to this trope: memory.
The old customs with regard to the management of incoming litigants into the capital had
not been enforced regularly and therefore these old norms and procedures were on the
verge of being entirely forgotten, but the central administration “knowing them to be
useful and advantageous” implemented them once again in order to restore order.
Rhetorically, this was a conventional cliché, dating back to Plato, if not earlier, who
argued that one does not learn but recollects. His epistemological system, ἀνάµνησις,
which was established in the Meno,71 was eventually taken up by many successors such
as Themistius, for example, in the late fourth century, who asserts that “τί µὲν οὖν ἐστιν
ἀνάµνησις, εἴρηται, ὄτι µνήσις ἀνανέωσις. ὅθεν δὲ συµβαίνει, δῆλον.”72
Interestingly, approximately three centuries after the creation of the Codex, the
prooimion of Leo VI’s Novellae provides an interesting parallel:
The vicissitudes of human affairs, the inconstancy and diversity of the
various conditions of life, have given rise to a great number of laws which,
embracing matters of every description, determine with reference to each
what is good, and what is otherwise, hence they act as guardians and
physicians of Our lives; for, as on the one hand they prevent evil from
arising and spreading through society, so, on the other, they correct what
they were unable to foresee or prevent, and as they extirpate every kind of
vice, they do not permit it to become confirmed. But as the course of
human affairs resembles an ebb and a flow, while it alters and overturns
all legislation, and frequently substitutes what is bad for that which has
already been justly established, and plunges some laws into oblivion, so
neglectum vero in medio ab universa laedente neglegentia paulatim periclitatum est corrumpi et
perimi, donec nos prodesse hoc et utillimum invenientes rursus in rempublicam introducimus.
71
Plato, Meno 86b.
72
Themistius, Themistii (Sophoniae) in parva naturalia commentarium, p. 8 ln 14.
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they become as thoroughly unknown as if they had never before been
heard of, in this way it equally attacks all legislation by enveloping some
of it in profound silence, and by giving rise to controversies respecting
other enactments, either because those who promulgated them, having had
neither steadfastness nor uniform opinions, contradicted themselves, or for
the reason that their successors permitted customs to be introduced or laws
to be passed in opposition to what has already been settled. Hence it
happens that legislation becomes perplexed, and no small amount of injury
is inflicted upon mankind, some laws being substituted for others, giving
rise to the same confusion which results as when darts are cast at
random.73
The imagery in this particular excerpt confirms to what extent Leo’s laws are not
independent of previous authors just as the Codex or, in other words, to what extent the
thesaurus of rhetorical clichés held such a prominent place in Late Roman and Byzantine
law. The Platonic influence upon this particular statement can be found in the vocabulary
employed; how previously established legislation becomes obsolete, falls into disuse and
is thereupon supplanted, only to be forgotten, but does not fade into oblivion. Yet
ultimately this formula is complete with this particular declaration:
Therefore, being of the opinion that it would be disgraceful to permit
matters which are vital to the safety of the Empire, and which should be
decided and confirmed in an invariable way, to remain in such disorder,
We have deemed it advisable to renew and examine the laws with the
greatest diligence and care.”74
73

Leo III, Novellae pref. (translation by S.P. Scott, passim): Τὸ ποικίλον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
πραγµάτων καὶ τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς τοῦ βίου καταστάσεως πολλοῖς καὶ παντοδαποῖς νόµοις
παρέσχε λαβεῖν γένεσιν, οἳ τῷ πλήθει τοῖς πράγµασι συνεπεκτεινόµενοι τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς
παραθέσει πᾶν ὅ τί τε καλῶς ἔχει καὶ ὃ µὴ διακρίνουσιν. Εἰσὶ τοιγαροῦν ὥσπερ τινὲς φύλακες τῆς
ζωῆς ἡµῶν καὶ ἰατροί, ἃ µὲν κωλύοντες παντελῶς εἰς τὸν βίον ἐλθεῖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν δὲ
λαθόντων καὶ παρεισδεδυκότων τὴν βλάβην ἐπανορθούµενοι καὶ οἷον ῥιζοτοµοῦντες τὴν κακίαν
καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντες ταύτην κρατύνεσθαι.Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φορὰ καὶ παλίρροια ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω
πάντα στρέφουσά τε καὶ µεταφέρουσα καὶ πολλὰ µὲν εὖ κείµενα κακῶς µετατιθεῖσα, πολλῶν δὲ
λήθην κατασκευάζουσα, ὥστε εἰ µηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὤφθησαν λαχόντα γένεσιν καὶ ἀνεπίγνωστα
εἶναι, οὐ µικρὰ τούτους ἐλυµήνατο, οὓς µὲν σιγῇ κρύψασα βαθείᾳ, οὓς δὲ ἀλλήλοις
ἀντιφθέγγεσθαι παρασκευάσασα, τοῦτο µὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τῶν ἐκτεθεικότων αὐτοὺς οὐ
µεινάντων ἐπὶ ταῖς πρότερον διανοίαις, ἀλλὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀντειπόντων, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν
µεταγενεστέρων ὅπου µὲν ἔθει ὅπου δὲ δόγµατι τούτοις ἐναντιωθέντων, <ὥστε> καὶ ἐντεῦθεν
συµβῆναι µὲν πολλὴν τοῖς νόµοις τὴν σύγχυσιν, οὐκ ὀλίγον δὲ βλάβος τοῖς πράγµασιν, ἄλλων
πρὸς ἄλλας µετατιθέντων καὶ κατὰ κύβους πεττευόντων (Noailles and Dain’s edition, passim).
74
Leo III, Novellae, pref.: Τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἄξιον παριδεῖν κρίναντες ἐν τοσαύτῃ συγχύσει καὶ
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What laws have dwindled into obscurity can therefore be resurrected only because of the
sheer fact that they were not eradicated but only forgotten. Therefore when they return to
the forefront in jurisprudence, they are renewed by the usage of memory. In imperial
rhetoric, this memory evokes a certain degree of nostalgia, which is honed by the
imperial authors and in turn this legislation would seem less innovative than it really was
at its core. Hence, not only can one notice the usage of the theory in which there is a
cyclical evolution (negligence, decline and then renewal) but one might emend the final
element of that formula by making one addition: by recollection.
As a result, at this point, there have been two distinct uses of ἀνανέωσις with their
own subcategories. The first usage of this rhetorical cliché was affixed to the restoration
of the Roman Empire in two different categories; the first being in the context of taxation
and the second in an institutional setting. Then, it has been remarked that renewal in the
judicial context has been utilized for increased institutional efficiency and for
standardization. Therefore, at this point, it has been determined that there is clearly an
absence of ideology within the legislative apparatus of the central imperial administration
due to the diverse appropriations of the clichés in varying contexts. Now, one element,
which has drawn quite a bit of attention in scholarship, remains to be examined and that
is the provincial reforms initiated by John the Cappadocian.
ταραχῇ φέρεσθαι ὧν ἡ γαλήνη καὶ ἀταραξία τῆς πολιτείας ἐξήρτηται, ἐπισκέψεώς τε ὡς ἔνι
µάλιστα ἐπιµελεστάτης τοὺς νόµους ἠξιώσαµεν…
Here, I think it appropriate to translate the verb “ἠξιώσαµεν” as “to renew.” Scott’s translation is
not entirely accurate as it doubles the meaning of the verb from both ἀξιόω and ἐξιόω. The
former is translated in ancient attic as “to deem,” but it loses that specific definition, when it later
becomes “to beg” or “to request.” Therefore, the latter verb appears to offer a better alternative
due to the context. It is translated as “to clean from rust” in the period. See E.A. Sophocles, Greek
Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods (from 146 B. C. to 1100), (New York: C. Scribner's
sons, 1900) For the attic definition, see H.G. Liddell et al., A Greek-English Lexicon, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996)

203

In the prooimia of several pieces of legislation, there are very interesting elements,
which emerge regarding these same reforms and one of a later period has just been
examined above. Also, the reforms have been touched slightly upon above in the context
of the recovery of North Africa. Its administrative settlement was smaller in size than the
norm of the period in other provinces. The reestablishment of these lands within the
realm of the Roman Empire and the structuring of this new praetorian prefecture were
part of a more general trend of the period, which was initiated by the ambitious
Praetorian Prefect of the East, John the Cappadocian, who launched a series of reforms in
the A.D. 530s that commenced a drastic overhaul of the provincial administrations, for
the most part, in Asia Minor. The reforms themselves are laden with classicism, that is,
the imagery of the old ways and the systems, which were in place in the Republic and in
the High Empire, and the desire to implement anew these extinct methods.
Once more, ἀνανέωσις is used in a different context, but this time in a very sly
fashion for it actually masked innovation, which was considered a dreadful thing in this
period. For example, when a law is instituted, which addresses freemen and slaves, and
inheritance, the legislation declares: “We have introduced [the law] not by means of
innovation, but both since it is fairer and since Paulus records in his books, which he
wrote about both Masurius Sabinus and Plautius, that it was acceptable to Atilicinus.”75
One need note the fervent insistence upon the ancient origins of this law in order to
ensure any legitimacy. However, when legitimacy itself cannot be ensured due to the
absence of an ancient origin, the cunning authors of a law might declare that the
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Institutes 2.14 (here, I provide my own translation): hodie vero etiam sine libertate ex nostra
constitutione heredes eos instituere permissum est quod non per innovationem induximus, sed
quoniam et aequius erat et Atilicino placuisse Paulus suis libris quos tam ad Masurium Sabinum
quam ad Plautium scripsit refert.
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innovations “which nature everywhere produces – a preface often used in laws and which
will again be used whenever nature performs her proper functions – have brought about
the necessity for many new laws.”76 Therefore, only when there is a total absence of
ancient legal precedence does Nature assume responsibility for any legislation.
However, the most important point that emerges from this particular issue lies in
the fact that innovation is to be strictly avoided. An established legal authority must be
found at all costs in order to root the new law in tradition and if this were not possible
only then might the emperor wash his hands of the issue by laying the blame on Nature.
Nevertheless, the tendency to seek precedence in former jurists of note goes beyond this
scope. Seeking justification through the past is a deliberate mechanism by which the
innovator could simultaneously achieve two things. On the one hand, he is able to flaunt
his symbolic capital to the members in his field though mimicry. This may not enable the
acquisition of further symbolic capital due to the potential accusations of innovative
designs. On the other hand, more importantly, the author lessens the charge of
accusations by appeasing his detractors.
In this context, the essence of John the Cappadocian’s provincial reforms draws
much interest, particularly with respect to innovation and precedence. When examining
the series of novellae highlighted above, it was clear that John wished to make an abrupt
change to a assortment of provincial administrations. More precisely, the aim of these
reforms was not to renew the old ways of administration, but to implement a new system
of governing the provinces. However, this could not be done carelessly, but in disguise:
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Nov. 84 pref: Multis undique natura novitatibus utens (dictum est iam in legibus hoc saepe
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We are sure that the ancient Romans could not have founded so great a
state from small and slender beginnings, and could not thereafter easily
have acquired the whole world, as we might say, and established their
government therein unless they had been made more illustrious by the
greater magistrates sent into the provinces, and unless they had given them
the authority of arms and the laws, and unless they had been apt and noted
in the use of both of these. These men were called praetors, and they were
given this name because they preceded all others and drew up the line of
battle, and the management of war as well as the making of the laws was
committed into their charge. Hence, they ordered judicial tribunals to be
called praetorian seats (praetoris), and many laws were issued by them.
Many praetors held and administered provinces, some of them Sicily,
some of them the island of Sardinia, some of them Spain, some of them
other land or seas.
Contemplating these facts and reintroducing antiquity into the state with
greater splendor and bringing honor to the Roman name…77
This is one of many occurrences in the series of reforms where the past is invoked by the
author. It is a distinct mark of the cultural structure, classicism. The question, though, is
why return to a form of government that was centrifugal and thus by extension, why
would the central government undermine its own authority; that is if one were to take the
rhetoric as an expression of imperial ideology. This was not the case, however, the
venerated past was used here in these circumstances to soften effects of the following
lines. We have visited these reforms above and noted the rashness of their nature. Hence,
message of this passage above is of no value to the reform per se, that is, it contains no
elements of the reform itself. It is but a rhetorical spin on the reform designed to gild the
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innovation. As we have seen again and again, this is not a novelty in a piece of legislation
that is destined to upset its audience without the usage of such rhetorical devices. The
rhetorical devices in themselves are expressions and even deliberate manipulations of
Classicism.
Conclusively, in the first part of this analysis, the list of reforms that have been
underlined have demonstrated a tendency for innovation in the first half of the reign of
Justinian, particularly under the auspices of John the Cappadocian. To accomplish this
feat, Tribonian was also essential, for he was tasked with dressing the reforms. He
accomplished this feat by acknowledging the structure, Classicism, and using it against
itself. Mimesis is less about the act itself than its desired outcome. In this case, the
accreditation attached to the model was Tribonian’s main focus. Whether it be in the
drastic overhaul of select provincial administrations or in the increasing vigilance in the
area of taxation, innovation per se was despised by the Romans. This is rather evident in
Late Antique literary tendencies, for example. Classicism, as a structuring structure, was
common knowledge and this thus set the frontier between what was acceptable (or wellestablished) and what was innovative. The legislation intentionally blurs the boundary
between both and thus the power from the center exercised in law was used to interfere
and make the audience do or perform something else than it would have done by its own
will. Thus Classicism was not only a structure of Late Antique society, which the
imperial government had to acknowledge in its endeavors to innovate, but it could also be
used to exploit this aforementioned inherent cultural tendency. Therefore, the repeated
references to the past in the novellae are less a question of authorship, as M. Maas

207

argues.78 It was an expression of the cultural norm. In the Codex, we can notice this in a
myriad of locations. The legislation, which lacks any form of ideology, was often
innovative and sought to circumvent the unquestionable consequences of its nature by
invoking the authority of precedence in order to justify its legitimacy erroneously. The
Nika Riot necessitated a change in approach. Innovative reformers could possibly incur
the opposition of the imperial bureaucracy. These reforms affected particularly the social
and economic capital of many individuals, both directly and indirectly. In a strange
paradox, to mollify the inevitable opposition, the structure that inhibited innovations was
used to accomplish them.

II) THE PROVINCIAL REFORMS OF THE A.D. 530s
The provincial reforms of the 530s include a multitude of references to a distant and
nostalgic past. The object of these references is of interest in the following pages. We
shall first examine the inception of diverse reforms in the Codex to thereafter uncover
how classicism became a regular presence within the legislation.
The provinces were divided and thus smaller; the bureaucracy swelled
substantially by the division of both the civil and military branches of the provincial
administrations. In Novel 24, the first element, which is addressed in the prooimion,
discusses the province of Pisidia, which still possessed two distinct administrative
branches. The reform forced a union between both the civil and military administrations
under a revived Roman office, the praetor. This antiquated term, which was also
instituted in the provinces of Lycaonia and Thrace, is one amongst many others that were
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included in the reforms of other provinces.79 Similarly, a comes was installed over Isauria,
a moderator over Pontus, proconsuls over Cappadocia and Armenia I.80
It is thus important to discover why there was a union of these branches. There are
several explanations, which may be explored. The sequence of legislation is also to be
grouped with Novel 8, its precursor, in which there are several important elements
addressed. Above, it has been noted that both A.H.M. Jones and E. Stein have argued that
these innovations were chiefly aimed at the judicial system. Indeed, in this same novel,
the importance of the judicial processes is highlighted. The status of governors was
increased to spectabilis in order for them to hear a greater number of criminal and civil
cases within their own jurisdictions. Their power was thus augmented over their subjects,
bearing in mind that the imperial administration in Constantinople desired that a
substantial decrease in appeals to the higher authorities within the prefectures and the
capital itself would take place. Yet, examining this from a broader view, there is much
more occurring. The emperor loosened his reigns over his provinces. This degree of
autonomy attributed to the governors was intended to release a substantial amount of
stress on the judicial mechanisms and simultaneously the capital wished that its provinces
could handle their own judicial affairs. Appeals to the higher authorities were obviously
still possible, but Justinian took further precautions to limit them.
Justinian first required that the provinces should handle all suits not surpassing the
sum of 500 solidi, but later increased this limit one year later to 10 lbs. gold (720
solidi).81 However, he took care not to bestow too much power upon the revamped
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governorships. He reformed and strengthened the office of the defensor ciuitatis to help
alleviate many issues. First, the office was tasked to serve as a counterweight to the
corruption of the governors. In addition, the defensor was tasked to hear cases involving
300 solidi or less. The ability to hear cases involving lesser sums was more convenient
for the more modest Roman citizen, who, before, had to travel to the governor’s court.82
This is important for it ensures a proper functioning judicial system in both directions.
Furthermore, this could help thwart the provincials from using private petitions or even
from flooding the upper strata of the judicial system. J. Gascou claims that this process,
by which the litigant called on powerful individuals, replaced the recourse to state
authorities in many cases.83 Nevertheless, the imperial administration in the capital had
taken a significant step to install a rigid bottleneck in the office of the governor in the
appeal system and consequently the prefectures and the capital would not have to handle
more suits than they could manage. The reform in itself was a sacrifice on behalf of the
imperial center made; in essence, the reform signified an immediate secession of imperial
power to the periphery. Though, whether this sacrifice was calculated to obtain greater
power over the provincials long term remains to be determined.
The revamping of the judicial system endured further changes. Justinian also
noticed that the office of the vicar had become obsolete. Inversely proportional to this
phenomenon, the praetorian prefecture developed into the principal administrative unit
between the capital and its provinces. The tractores had gradually taken on the financial
duties of the vicars and, in addition, the provincials increasingly sought to appeal to the
prefect and no longer to the vicars, who had grown corrupt and whose repute had
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diminished.84 Therefore, the vicariates of Asiana, Oriens (including Egypt) and of Pontica
were dissolved as the one of Thrace had already been abolished. Moreover, the functions
of the abolished offices were amalgamated into those of the refurbished governorships in
the same dioceses. For example, the governor of Pacatian Phrygia received the powers of
his diocese’s vicar.85 Consequently, the central administration was not only seeking to
render its provinces more autonomous in its legal proceedings, but also to reduce the size
of its bureaucracy. Once again, this appears to be a sacrifice of imperial power. Political
control was being ceded to the periphery.
However much the reforms appear to have been centrifugal, it appears to be much
more layered than at first glance. The dissolution of one of the three large administrative
units is significant, for it rationalized and simplified the structures of the imperial
administration. As it has been argued in Chapter 3, the diocese quickly became an
administrative albatross, which endured over two centuries. Nonetheless, this change did
not come without its problems, as Justinian restored the vicariates of Thrace and Pontica
and other officials were appointed with inter-regional judicial powers. Inter-provincial
policing was a need that was clearly overlooked in the office’s abolition.86 Despite this
reversal of policy, which occurred after John the Cappadocian fell out of favor, the
reform program is quite clear. The imperial government was seeking to trim the
bureaucracy where possible, while still attempting to maximize efficiency. For this
reason, J.E. Atkinson correctly views many of Justinian’s reforms as a broader move
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towards flat structures.87 Inadvertently or not, this entailed a more self-reliant provincial
structure, notably in the areas of organizational coordination and communications.
Though, the reduction of personnel does in many regards benefit the emperor. As it was
proposed in the previous chapter, bureaucratic growth was detrimental to the emperor’s
power. The bureaucracy by definition standardized processes and thus that in itself leads
to predetermined results. Therein, the emperor’s power, which was absolute in theory,
was diminished in many respects. The subsequent ossification of the bureaucracy and
proliferation of zones of uncertainty profited the aristocracy in the imperial
administration disproportionately. The relational nature of Roman social space enabled
this development. The upper tier of the aristocracy did not gain the advantage in the
distribution of power due to the amount of capital they accrued. Their ascension in this
very space was due to their amount of capital in relation to the emperor. The emperor’s
power trended much more towards an embodiment of symbolic sovereignty. Yet, this
development did not reach the extent of a constitutional monarchy, for example. On the
contrary, it was far from the case.
In addition to the governor of Pacatian Phrygia receiving extraordinary powers,
the magistrate, who governed Cappadocia, was invested with great authority also. In
Novel 30, the governor of the province received jurisdiction over both the civil and
military administrations and received the title of proconsul. More importantly, the domus
diuinae was inefficiently managed up to that point and, thus, the administration of these
properties was given to the proconsul. He also had the task to supervise the agents of the
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patrimony in Cappadocia and the other provinces of the diocese of Pontus.88 Hence, once
again, there is a clear redistribution of considerable powers to the provincial governors.
This obviously does not fit the paradigm, which claims that Justinian was the epitome of
the imperial autocrat in Late Antiquity. Moreover, this is further evidence of a notable
cutback in the bureaucracy. Hence, Novel 24 increasingly seems to be exemplary of a
larger program.
In another development, the proconsul of Cappadocia assumed the duties of the
comes rei privatae in Constantinople in his province. Specifically, he was given the task
to manage the imperial properties in Cappadocia. In these matters, the cubiculum
replaced the comes rei privatae in A.D. 531, but the direct control of these lands was
given to the governor of Pacatian Phrygia in this novel.89 The evolving institutions of the
capital were increasingly losing their powers to other rising offices. For instance, the
local agents of the sacrae largitiones almost disappear from the sources in the sixth
century as the governors took on all duties in every province. This was occurring despite
the fact that the bureaus of both the res privata and the sacrae largitiones were losing
their powers at an exponential rate to the cubiculum. Furthermore, in general, the decline
of the comes rei privatae and the comes sacrae largitionis was due to the evolving
activities of the governors, the vindices the logothetes and the curatores domus diuinae.90
It is no coincidence, for there is a general pattern, which may be noted here. At this point,
it may be deduced that the reign of Justinian witnessed a certain form of decentralization,
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which saw an increasing amount of power distributed from the center to the periphery,
mainly the provinces and this was initiated under John the Cappadocian. Yet, that does
not necessarily reflect reality. This aforementioned evolution of imperial offices
ultimately led to a considerable centralization of power in the cubiculum, with which the
emperor was able to manage the Empire as if it were his private property.91
In Novel 24, there is more information regarding the reduction of the
bureaucracy’s size. It states that the union resolved the constant bickering between both
the military and civil administrations. Moreover, the union of both the civil and military
branches entailed a reduction of personnel by restricting the praetor’s court to one
hundred officials. This was not only applied to Pisidia, but to all the other provinces in
this same series of reforms also.92 It is quite clear that the central administration had an
agenda when trimming the provincial administration. However, apart from this same
novel and the others, which are part of this sequence of legislation, John the Cappadocian
took further steps to ensure that the provincial governments remained modest in size.
Earlier, in Novel 8, it was strictly ordered that any magistrate could not appoint any
deputies in the cities.93 Nevertheless, at first glance, it is equivocal as to why John desired
that the governor and his court be reduced. This cannot be explained by a defined policy
of financial cutbacks, for the upgraded offices of governors, in which the civil and
military branches were fused, received the pay of both offices. The imperial
administration’s states its reason for this in its desire to reduce corruption by
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remunerating its officials generously, but there seems to be much more to the imperial
rhetoric.
The union of both the military and civil administrations within these select
provinces were not the only mergers occurring. Several provinces were combined and,
thus, increased in size. Conversely, the tetrarchs had divided the large provinces in order
to gain a tighter grip over them, most notably in terms of resources, the judicial system
and the threat of usurpations. Eventually, the latter no longer caused significant trouble in
the sixth century. However, the two former were still considerable concerns for the
capital. The Tetrarchic reforms essentially achieved the opposite in these areas. In theory
the expansion of the bureaucracy could reaffirm central control in the areas of both
fiscality and justice.94 Under Justinian, the judicial system was rationalized and reduced
in size. The financial concerns still remain in this equation. When uniting provinces such
as Paphlagonia and Honoriades, the emperor did not perceive any threats of a military
rebellion.95 Not only were the civil and military administrations consolidated in this
instance, but two provinces also. The imperial administration must have seen the benefits
from effectuating cutbacks in this area in which unnecessary expenditures could be
limited. The fact that both the civil and military branches were united in a court of one
hundred officials under a praetor, where there were two provinces and four separate
administrations, clearly demonstrates this.96
It has been examined up to this point that the emperor was allocating a certain
degree of autonomy to the provinces in order that they might be able to handle a far
greater amount of judicial cases and that the capital and the prefectures might not be
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flooded with appeals. In addition, the increase of the governors’ powers and the size of
provinces seem to indicate a general pattern. Though that pattern was not applied
uniformly, as this formula was not implemented empire-wide. Novel 31 is a relevant
example that is not compatible with this previous category. There were regions
untouched by this reform program, such as in Armenia, where there was a thorough
reorganization.97 Constantinople had very profound interests in this area. Two of the most
important resources were available to the imperial government: military recruits and
precious metals. In addition, J.M. Carrié correctly remarks that areas such as Armenia I
and IV, Phoenice Libanensis and Palestine were not affected by these reforms because of
the potential implications. Applying these changes would have been at an extremely high
risk in foreign policy, he argues.98 It would have thus been disadvantageous to loosen the
grips over such an area. Nonetheless, in areas where the separation between both
branches occurred, some civil magistrates still received important military privileges as
Justinian allocated them certain troupes from the ducal garrison. They had exclusive
powers over these soldiers and the proconsul himself had total power in case of civil
unrest.99 It may thus be deduced that the reforms were implemented only where a
calculated withdrawal of imperial bureaucratic involvement was feasible. In other words,
these changes were implemented where John the Cappadocian thought that the liabilities
were inconsiderable.
The beginning of the reign of Justinian also saw a substantial crackdown on
corruption. Corruption was not a novelty within the empire’s administration. It was as old
97

Nov. 31.
J.-M. Carrié, "Séparation ou cumul? Pouvoir civil et autorité militaire dans les provinces
d'Égypte," 116.
99
J.-M. Carrié, "Séparation ou cumul? Pouvoir civil et autorité militaire dans les provinces
d'Égypte," 116.
98

216

as the Republic and this could be noticed in Cicero’s correspondences. Novel 24 echoes
the declarations made in Novel 8, which orders the praetor and his men to manage an
efficient government and which reiterates the elimination of the venality of the
magistrate’s office (suffragium).100 The intention of this abolition of the sale of offices
was to halt the most common source of corruption. The provincials would essentially foot
the price paid for the office. The new magistrate, who purchased his office, often took
liberties in the administration of his province in order to recover the loss of funds
incurred by its acquisition. J.-M. Carrié argues that the legislation against the venality of
offices was designed to restore the link between the center and the provinces, for the
emperor was unable to control the nominations of candidates.101 However, it seems more
likely that the imperial administration sacrificed the revenue drawn from the sale of
offices in order that its provinces may be governed more efficiently and autonomously.
This shift towards a horizontal organization in this case would also entail a shift in the
power structure. The emperor could reclaim some of his power lost due to the
bureaucratization of the empire. In essence, this has demonstrated that the concerns of the
capital were not strictly monetary, but institutional. The proper functioning of the latter
would ensure a correct flow of income by sacrificing revenue.
Furthermore, in Justinian’s campaign to reduce the bureaucracy’s size in the
prefecture, sportulae were diminished.102 The goal of its reduction was to enable more
litigants to have access to the judicial system. In addition, the totality of these judicial
reforms on the provincial level permitted the system to function more autonomously. As
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a result of these pieces of legislation, the governor had more authority over the
provincials, but due to the increase in stature of the defensor ciuitatis the powers of the
former did not go unchecked. Novel 8 even states that it is the duty of the citizens to warn
the emperor about the eventual malpractice of his functionaries.103 Furthermore, a more
rigid bottleneck was implemented at the top of the province in its magistrate (the
imposition of higher property value limits in the system of appeals). Therefore, the
province with its simplified administration and its rationalized judicial system was in
itself a more independent entity within the empire.
The result of these measures taken to clamp out the most destructive forms of
corruption in the provinces was to shape a more efficient administrative unit. When
Justinian loosened the bureaucratic grip over this select number of provinces, he still
expected revenue generation at a similar rate. Hence, by issuing legislation against
suffragia and on sportulae, he assumed that the provinces would not self-destruct when
he authorized the change from a hierarchical to flat organization in targeted provinces.
These reforms were intended to remedy these anticipated institutional problems upon the
receipt of a certain degree of administrative freedom.
Hitherto, it has been remarked that, under John the Cappadocian, there was a
campaign to weaken the bureaucracy. This was coupled with a significant reduction in
bureaucracy’s personnel and the entry into the imperial service was made more difficult
as well.104 This was not well received by the bureaucrats evidently. It is not astonishing
then that John Lydus, Agathias and Procopius voiced an extreme amount of displeasure
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due to the reforms. Then again the venomous critiques they aimed at the man who
implemented them, John the Cappadocian, are even less surprising.105 And this great
frustration, which is voiced by Lydus and Procopius, may be explained by the
progressive loss of power and not only to a reduction of personnel. The power wielded by
the bureaucracy, particularly its most eminent parts, burgeoned since the early fourth
century. It manifested itself in numerous ways. C. Kelly correctly points out that it
manipulated information before it reached the emperor himself. Whatever information
coming form the periphery to the center ran its course through countless functionaries,
who deliberately distorted it. There were many reasons for this such as eluding
punishment for corruption and illicit patronage.106 This leads to the next discussion,
which consists of the terminologies used in the legislation with regards to the
bureaucracy.
It has been difficult for scholars to interpret the meaning of the usages of the
antiquated titles, as it has been underlined in the first section above. W. Kaegi asserts that
the revival of antiquated titles was directly correlated to the reconquests.107 However, C.
Roueché disagrees on this particular point and states that there was a keen interest in
antiquated titles in the Synecdemus, which was likely completed in A.D. 529, and in the
reign of Anastasius when the title of vindex was also revived. M. Maas later asserts that
the presence of antiquarianism in the legislation was intended to mask the rash
innovations.108 This would then serve as a method to placate, to a certain extent,
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bureaucrats such as John Lydus, who himself venerated the history of Roman
government. Indeed, that is correct, as it was pointed out above. However, the method by
which M. Maas examines the literary evidence fails to provide a compelling system to
interpret the rhetoric.
The rhetoric used in the reforms did certainly achieve its aims to a certain extent.
Yet the rhetoric could not deceive all of its audience, as some discerned the true agenda
of the reforms. This does explain to a certain extent the hatred directed towards John the
Cappadocian on the part of such figures as John Lydus and Procopius. The alienation of
the traditional bureaucracy would eventually arouse a certain degree of resentment and
opposition. However, it seems more likely that Lydus and others showed enmity towards
John the Cappadocian for a combination of reasons. As it was mentioned in the first
chapter, John earned his way to the apex of the administration with the formidable
amount of cultural capital he possessed. He in many respects was an outsider. Otherwise,
the simple reason could be found in John’s concerted effort to reduce the size of the
bureaucracy by abandoning a hierarchical organization for a flat one in the reformed
provinces. In addition, one must not forget another event that could explain the animosity.
The evidence of the Nika Riot indicates a deliberate targeting of John the Cappadocian
and Tribonian’s tenures of office. Both eventually became administrative casualties in the
upheaval. Although they quickly regained their positions of power, employment security
could not have been guaranteed. With regard to the city of Constantinople, Justinian had
lost much social and symbolic capital too. Thus, the three men treaded lightly in their
endeavours. As it has been stated above, Procopius and Lydus embodied the
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bureaucracy’s disapproval of the imperial court, which saw a senatorial element exploit
the Nika Riot to challenge the emperor and his top officials directly.109
Not only was the bureaucracy being trimmed, but Greek was also gaining ground
very rapidly in government due to his efforts. John then used a clever method to mask his
intentions. In the legislation, there are innumerable references to past glories, whether it
be in the Republic or in the High Empire. This classicism gives the impression that the
Roman government of the past was much more effective and honestly managed.
Therefore, in order to purify the Roman government, the law claims:
We are sure that the ancient Romans could not have founded so great a
state from small and slender beginnings, and could not thereafter easily
have acquired the whole world, as we might say, and established their
government therein unless they had been made more illustrious by the
greater magistrates sent into the provinces, and unless they had given them
the authority of arms and the laws, and unless they had been apt and noted
in the use of both of these. These men were called praetors, and they were
given this name because they preceded all others and drew up the line of
battle, and the management of war as well as the making of the laws was
committed into their charge. Hence, they ordered judicial tribunals to be
called praetorian seats (praetoris), and many laws were issued by them.
Many praetors held and administered provinces, some of them Sicily,
some of them the island of Sardinia, some of them Spain, some of them
other land or seas.
Contemplating these facts and reintroducing antiquity into the state with
greater splendor and bringing honor to the Roman name…110
This passage has been discussed above for other purposes. In this instance, the rhetoric
employed in Novel 24 has the intention to distort the true picture through a deliberate
exploitation of the cultural structure, Classicism. John Lydus came into favour precisely
for his interests in antiquities and the usage of these antiquated terminologies provides a
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contrast to the series of innovations.111 Thus, the ideology contained within the legislation
is what may be understood as a cloak, whose goal was to mask the true objective of the
reforms.
The central administration was intentionally delegating much more of its power to
the provinces to make them more autonomous institutionally and judicially.
Simultaneously, Justinian appears to have deliberately and systematically taken aim at the
intrinsic network of the bureaucracy. Many of its members in the upper tier commanded
enormous amounts of social capital. Moreover, many officials of lesser ranks still
possessed formidable social networks that could easily undermine the rather complex
system of communications in the government’s organization. It appears that Justinian was
attempting to erode the bureaucracy’s power by reducing its size. The end result could
indeed appear to support C. Roueché’s argument if it were not for the shift to flat
organizational structures in the provinces. There is another piece of legislation, which
reinforces this notion.
In the Pragmatic Sanction of A.D. 554, Constantinople made a substantial
concession to Italy. It permitted the regional bishops and the possessores to select their
own magistrates within their own province and it also reiterated the abolition of
suffragia.112 This effectively undermines C. Roueché’s argument. As the provinces had
received an increasing amount of power, as it has been remarked above, this concession
further ensured a more communicative and coordinated system. In another paper, C.
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Roueché argues that the governor’s office declined since its inception. The governor’s
initial tasks were to maintain law and order in newly conquered areas; the office then
took on more of the role of a judge; lastly, the office then became obsolete.113 Indeed at
the end of the fifth century and thereafter in the PLRE, governors are scarcely found in
the fasti and few are found in the historical records. Consequently, she identifies the
Pragmatic Sanction as a failure in the emperor’s efforts to reaffirm his control over the
provinces. However, it seems to be the contrary; this piece of legislation follows John the
Cappadocian’s reform program, in which the provincial administrations transitioned from
hierarchical to flat organizations. The governorship may have declined before the advent
of John the Cappadocian, but his efforts intended to refurbish the office with greater
powers.
In addition, the Pragmatic Sanction was another tool with which the province
could manage itself. The top-down power of the governor had its counterweight in this
law and in the judicial mechanism. Years later, Justin II extended the stipulations in the
Pragmatic Sanction to the whole empire and, once again, repeated that all suffragia were
banned. In the law itself, the emperor claims that its goal was to eradicate the extortion
caused by the purchase of offices.114 However, the abolition of the venality of offices
implicates the presence of a much grander scheme. It permits the province to operate
proficiently on its own without a more involved presence of the central government.
When Constantinople eased its grip over the provinces, it still expected the designated
amount of revenue. By targeting corruption in the upper echelons of this administrative
unit and by ensuring generous salaries, the capital lost an income stream when it
113
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relinquished the revenue from the suffragia. It also could have saved money, when it
downsized the administration by consolidating the civil and military branches. However,
the long-term goal of these reforms was to ensure a lean and efficient bureaucracy, which
required less supervision. Moreover, it enabled the emperor to sap some of the
bureaucracy’s power, which had in many respects hindered the unilateral authority of the
emperor. Hence, although John the Cappadocian’s reforms with regards to the vicariate
were not entirely successful, the program itself was sustained.
Then one question has been left unanswered up to this point. It has not been
explained why and how Constantinople could initiate these reforms. The Tetrarchs had
launched their reform campaign in order to maximize their revenues and to have a much
firmer grip over potential rebellious internal elements. Yet, in the sixth century, the
imperial government seems to have been on the retreat, whether intentionally or not.
Consequently, a link must have materialized between the center and the periphery that
could replace the bureaucracy, which had been shed.
J. Gascou, J.H.G.W. Liebeschuetz, J. Banaji and P. Sarris, amongst others, believe
that the empire’s institutions were evolving due to a new aristocracy, which began to take
shape at the beginning of the Tetrarchic reforms.115 The theory of les grands domaines
has undergone some development since J. Gascou’s initial work, which, in turn, was part
of the reaction against Hardy’s work.116 The latter claimed that the great estate was the
cornerstone of Byzantine provincial feudalism. However, the recent research of Banaji, R.
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Mazza and P. Sarris argues that the great estate was extremely monetarized and
sophisticated.117 J. Gascou’s argument, which proposed that the great estate was an
extension of the public sphere, has been thoroughly revised by J. Banaji and P. Sarris.
Both claim this theory to be an exaggeration. It was an extremely influential institution,
which increasingly made private arrangements that frustrated the central administration.
The state in turn was forced to accommodate the great estate and not vice-versa as it
began to dominate public taxation.118 Though there is some validity to J. Banaji and P.
Sarris’ objections, T. Hickey has recently rehabilitated J. Gascou’s work convincingly.119
There is one important passage in Edict 13 that reinforces this theory. The augustal
prefect was prohibited from removing any pagarch, who was behaving fraudulently. This
included failure to provide the grain supply, the freight charges or any form of public
taxes. It was ordered that they should be reported to the emperor and that he, in turn,
would take the necessary measures to remediate the issue.120 Therefore, the pagarchs did
indeed possess special privileges within the provincial administration. The importance of
their contributions is clearly demonstrated in this edict.
The imperial government’s deference to the great estate is symptomatic of the
series of legislation initiated by John the Cappadocian. He must have realized that the
bureaucracy was redundant due to what was occurring on the ground. The bureaucracy’s
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size was increasingly bogging down the imperial government, for many of its highly
specialized offices had become obsolete. Between the capital and the periphery, the
system of communications and coordination were less than satisfactory. That is not to
mention the ease with which the powerful could exploit the bureaucracy.121 The evolution,
which took place after the Tetrarchic reforms, actually required a withdrawal of the
imperial long arm rather than vice-versa. In Novel 30, this reality is even admitted and, in
addition, when the prefecture of Africa was organized after the reconquest, a significant
number of traditional offices were not implemented.122
This also explains the legislation’s vocabulary, which attempts to paint an
extremely powerful figurehead in the emperor. In reality, the emperor’s ideological goals
not only cloaked the innovative nature of the reforms, but his weakness in the face of
these new social developments. Repeated attempts over the years to establish a firmer
control on the ground failed and, thus, other venues were explored. Hence, John the
Cappadocian realized that it was futile to attempt to undermine this well-developed and
sophisticated system of administration thoroughly. Instead, he tried to adapt the central
administration to the conditions. Therefore, he sought cutbacks where they could be made.
Conclusively, Novel 24 reflects the contemporary state of affairs within the
empire and the direction, which the central administration took under John the
Cappadocian. In the series of reforms that were initiated by him and Justinian, the
imperial administration’s concerns were institutional and by extension financial. The
necessity to adapt to what was occurring on the ground required a transition in the
bureaucracy. Its size was no longer essential to ensure the state’s proper functioning.
121
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Even more so, its size was a hindrance to the unilateral authority of the emperor. Thus it
was necessary to compromise in a somewhat interesting paradox. John granted more
power to the provinces through a transition from a hierarchical to a flat organization.
Simultaneously, the bureaucracy was trimmed. When reading in between the lines of
these pieces of legislation, it is apparent that Constantinople was weak in the face of the
complex web of administration. The bureaucracy’s influence grew exponentially over the
years, particularly in the case of the eminent aristocrats within it. J.-M. Carrié claims that
the class itself came to mirror the senatorial one of the West in its tendency to practice
patronage after having imposed the principle upon the central administration.123 The
imperial bureaucracy had developed into a formidable institution that pumped a
significant amount of money in the provinces and, more importantly, for the capital, it
assumed the important duty of collecting public taxes. Hence, the emperor could not
thoroughly undermine it, but accommodate himself to maintain his power while keeping
a certain degree of fiscality. Previous efforts attempted to reign in the bureaucracy and to
subdue the notables had utterly failed.

The argument maintained by many scholars, which supports the notion of an imperial
ideology, often resulting from a tension between Christianity and Classicism, cannot be
sustained. From the analysis of the rhetoric found within the laws, there is a clear pattern.
The objective or nucleus of the legislation is what is of importance. The imperial court
determines the nature of the objective and thereafter tropes, clichés and rhetorical devices
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are used to drape that very aim. Manuals on rhetoric survive124 but there appears to have
been a bank of rhetorical clichés at the disposal of ancient authors. This is especially the
case with regard to innovative reforms. Innovation was problematic for two reasons. First,
it was in opposition to classicism, a longstanding cultural structure that established the
past as a benchmark. Moreover, this structure demanded legitimization through
longstanding tradition.
The emperor’s alleged ideology, which was to assert his power through his new
judicial compilation and his series of laws, was mere superstructure, for his main concern
was to draw upon the resources of the provincials. Hence, he intended to transform the
bureaucracy into a lean and effective machine, which was not as obstructive to his power
as it once was. The central administration ceded to the bureaucracy but also undermined
its power. Therefore, the strong rhetoric that was employed in legislation was in reality
filled with empty declarations of imperial power. Justinian’s main concern was to nourish
his grand designs, which consisted of an elaborate web of networks in foreign policy, an
impressive construction campaign and expansion, and not to gain the most absolute
power possible over the empire. The sum of these ambitions required a vast amount of
financial resources and thus a makeover of the imperial administrative institutions was
necessary. As C. Kelly claims, the bureaucracy was a mere barricade between the
emperor’s purse and the local resources of the provinces. By reforming it, he hoped to
reduce the distance between himself and the prized resources of his provinces. At the
same time, the emperor could not rid himself of it. The Empire was far too dependent on
its functioning. Moreover, the Nika Riot demonstrated how fragile the emperor and his
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men could be. Hence, the paradox: a reduction in size and a grant of increased autonomy
to the provincial administration.
Thus, it is far too difficult to claim that Justinian was the epitome of the Byzantine or
Roman autocrat. On the contrary, the illusion caused by his legislation leads its readers to
believe so, as it was the intention for his subordinates to do the same. It is thus difficult to
accept that Justinian intended to further centralize the administration as C. Roueché, R.
Delmaire, M. Maas or J. Harries claim. 125 It is quite the opposite, for John the
Cappadocian launched a program, which sought to delegate more power to the provinces
in order that they might become more efficient and require less intervention and
supervision from the center e.g. the imperial bureaucracy. The capital expected its share
of revenue to fuel its ambitions and a less unruly bureaucracy. This program seems to
have persisted for decades through the reign of Justinian until the reign of Justin II.
Whether it was as effective as John the Cappadocian thought it would turn out to be is a
question, which ought to be addressed another time.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

The delineations made between the numerous periods of Roman history are indeed
subjective. However, one may without fault conclude that a substantial change occurred
in the first centuries of the Common Era. In many respects, it is not surprising when
taking into account the breadth of the period in question. If we were to consider the
extent to which Western Civilization changed in the last half millennium, for example, a
similar conclusion would be reached with little surprise. It did not occur at one given
point of time, but one event (or series of events) did trigger a mechanism, which set into
motion the restructuring of Roman Civilization. The Roman Republic’s expansion forced
it to reconsider its mechanism of governance due to the shrinking size of Italy in relation
to the broader territorial acquisitions. By the dawn of the High Empire, the Romans’
ability to govern one of the largest empires in recorded history rested on two cornerstones.
First, the Roman Empire’s military might, in many respects, ensured its provincials’
docility. Although, there were rebellions and other civil wars, the most threatening of
them came form within (i.e. the Roman military and/or government). Second, the capital
depended on the cooperation of a large network of cities. Each had its council and its
duties to the capital, particularly in terms of fiscality.
As centuries passed and the Roman Empire’s expansion slowed to a near halt, the
influx of resources was largely reduced to the domestic product. Never again would
Rome see the regular influx of exorbitant wealth as it did in the final centuries of the
Republic’s existence. Lucius Aemilius Paulus after the Third Macedonian War’s
conclusion, for example, carried home Macedon’s treasury and spoils from Epirus,
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essentially an untold amount of wealth.1 With the consolidation of territory and an
increasing defensive posture, Rome depended more on domestic exactions. The imperial
government remained relatively small for the large tracts of lands in its dominion. Yet, it
could remain so, by depending on local elites serving as delegates of Roman government.
The threat of military might largely ensured obedience. A series of events changed the
capacity to depend on this system. Citizen-soldiers did not form the nucleus of the
military; military equipment grew increasingly expensive; the army’s size was
proportional to the area defended; spoils were no longer used to pacify the troops. The
military was more than likely the most sizeable piece of the Roman budget. During the
course of the second century, fiscal problems grew to be considerable. Septimius Severus
expanded the military significantly and therefore its funding had to be adjusted as a result.
The mints debased the coinage to keep pace and inflation began to plague the Empire.
The third century saw these trends endure. Moreover, instability in domestic affairs
plagued Rome for a better part of that century. Usurpations and rebellions were
commonplace.
When the dust settled, the Tetrarchs attempted to address most of these issues in
short order. Diocletian attempted to curtail inflation and Rome’s propensity for civil wars.
By the end of Constantine’s reign, the currency was largely stabilized with the creation of
the solidus. The Empire’s map was completely redrawn with the creation of many new
provinces and super-administrative institutions, namely the prefecture and the diocese.
More importantly, a plan to mine the provinces more effectively was set into motion.
Increasing fiscal efficiency would redress the Empire’s ability to fund the military. This
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entire enterprise necessitated a drastic increase in personnel. However, with the intent to
redress economic, fiscal and administrative problems, newer ones emerged.
Centuries old structures that remained relatively undisturbed began to undergo
fundamental change. The stratification of Roman society took on a new appearance. In
the municipal councils, the provincial elite was diverse. The principales were at the
summit of these microcosms. With the void created by the expansion of the imperial
bureaucracy, many of these notables flocked to it seeking significantly more lucrative
opportunities. They were not fleeing the curiae; instead they were only pursuing greener
pastures. This in turn created another chasm, but in this case the city councils was its
location. With the migration to the imperial bureaucracy, the municipal councils were left
with the more modest notables to manage civic affairs. Their ability to carry out their
duties was in many respects proportional to their accumulated capital. This was
especially the case with respect to fiscality. The Roman city’s notables were in many
respects the largest asset to the imperial government and to the curia. This very civic
institution taxed their assets and then eventually those exactions were funneled back to
the capital.
With the wealthy curiales move to the imperial bureaucracy came many
ramifications. Many of those who found their way into the bureaucracy either became or
eventually would gain immunities with regard to taxation. Yet, the expectations remained
the same in terms of revenue. Hence, the curiae, from which the imperial government
was increasingly demanding more tax revenue, found itself at a serious disadvantage in
the performance of its most important duty. Emperor after emperor in the fourth and fifth
centuries attempted to gain control over an unbridled social mobility. A plethora of laws
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were written to address this particularly undesired effect of the Tetrarchic reforms. It took
over a century to see a substantial decrease in legislation. This was surely due to the
gradual settlement of this institutional chaos.
However, more corollaries were to come from the reforms. Their implementation
caused a drastic shift in the nature of social, cultural and symbolic capital. In the case of
the provincial elite, for centuries, social capital was largely limited to one or a
combination of the following: the city, the city’s environs and the province. There were
individuals and families whose networks reached the heights of the capital. However, due
to the limited size of the Republic and the High Empire’s government, it was less
common. With the reforms, the expansion of the imperial bureaucracy afforded many of
its elements to develop social networks that would permeate their locality, region,
province, prefecture, diocese and the capital. The power derived from such complex webs
of relationships was formidable. Arms could be bent, laws flagrantly disregarded, favors
made or called in, protection granted or received, and so much more. In essence, not
much changed in the nature of the actions. However, much change occurred in the
complexity, reach and sheer power such social networks could garner due to the
expansion of the imperial bureaucracy. The upper stratum of the municipal elite, which
largely found its way into the central government, was the benefactor of this evolved
social capital. Meanwhile, the less affluent municipal elite stayed behind. The
competition that is the political arena of the city lost its key players. The political arena
for the principales that entered the imperial bureaucracy was so much broader.
The opportunities afforded by the reforms also unhinged some doors to gifted
individuals. While cultural capital always involved institutionalized titles and the
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possession of certain artifacts and education (particularly paideia), specifically one took
on much more importance. Justinian was not bound to the old ways. He did not restrict
himself to selecting candidates for positions on criteria such as pedigree, relationships
and favors owed, to name a few. The most eminent positions were filled based on
meritocratic principles. Hence, know-how became a much more important form of
cultural capital in the period. It enabled the likes of John the Cappadocian to hold
arguably the most eminent position in the Empire after the emperor himself.
In the last area where we might note significant change, one of the most
fascinating areas of Antiquity comes into play. For centuries, the Roman city was
adorned with architectural and engineering wonders: sewers, aqueducts, baths, temples,
theaters, etc. Within the curia, competing elements vying for political supremacy used
symbolic capital to further their agendas and their careers in civic life. This benefitted not
only the competing curiales, but also the inhabitants of the city. However, with the
Tetrarchic reforms, symbolic capital was fundamentally changed. The notables left the
municipal councils for greener pastures. Their career aspirations were no longer in the
city but in the imperial machinery of governance. Slowly but surely the urban landscape
began to change and a general trend of ruralization took place. Urban structures began to
fall into disrepair and newer ones were not emerging as they once did. The notables’ no
longer competed in the municipal political arena, but there still remained the more
modest curiales who clearly did not have the resources to maintain the cadence. In some
cases, the emperor or his officials filled the void.
Christian structures began to emerge however. The wealthy began to patronize
monasteries, churches and other charitable buildings. Financial resources were never
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short despite the decline of the urban landscape. Repeatedly in the sources, we may note
eminent provincials handing over vast fortunes to invaders. This occurred despite
earthquakes, recent invasions, the plague (however overstated it may be) and other
misfortunes. The upper tier elite not only patronized the Church, but they also were more
active in charity. Hence, symbolic capital in many respects can serve as a gauge of the
culture in question. It indicates how a culture prioritizes certain facets while neglecting
others. In this particular case, the evolution of symbolic capital defines the changing
dynamics between the center and the periphery. With the reforms the periphery,
represented by the city, its landscape and its politics, was overshadowed by the center’s
opportunities. In addition, it reveals much about the decline of the Roman urban
landscape.
Prior to Justinian’s enactment of the provincial reforms of the early A.D. 530s, the
imperial bureaucracy was sizeable. That in itself is not problematic. However, when
examining its functionality, one might quickly conclude that its size was not proportional
to its ability to perform its duties. Two areas reveal to what extent this was the case. With
regard to the judicial system, it was decidedly inefficient. The addition of the diocese
under the Tetrarchs soon proved to be an ineffective solution to the Empire’s judicial
issues. It was largely ineffective with very few exceptions and, as a result, the vicariate
would eventually become an extinct institution. Broadly, the justice system was rife with
corruption. Capital was the key to the system. Perpetrators could exercise their influence
over the process with either their economic or social capital, or a combination of both.
The other significant issue plaguing the capital lied in its inability to streamline the
appeals system. The unreliability of the lower circuit judges often led individuals to
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ignore the established hierarchy. In some cases, the entire system would be ignored and
more humble individuals would seek out dynatoi to resolve certain issues. The province
and its governor saw a significant decline due to the Tetrarchic reforms. With the
mutation of the upper-tier elite, came a series of problems. One of them rested in the
governor’s status and his ability to effectuate his assigned tasks. The meteoric rise of
aristocrats of the highest order made the governor ill-equiped to exert his authority. In
addition, taxation was an area where the governor and the provincials skimmed in the
process. In essence, the imperial administration was laden with zones of uncertainty that
were systematically exploited. The efforts to systematize procedures created
predetermined results. Many of the bureaus became ossified, unable to adapt In turn, this
further enabled abuse.
By the time Justinian succeeded Justin, most of these developments had already
crystallized. However, a quick survey of the sources would state otherwise. Justinian is
portrayed in the sources and in much scholarship as an autocrat. The pomp and
circumstance surrounding the reign of Justinian would have us believe this. Yet, with
regard to power, he did not rival an absolute monarch such as Louis XIV centuries later.
Though a bureaucracy did ensure the administration of France’s dominions, the absolute
monarch subjugated the nobility to the crown almost completely and could exercise its
power much more arbitrarily. In Rome’s case, the emperor had to be more careful with
the handling of the aristocracy, particularly of the upper stratum. It is no coincidence that
the reforms of the A.D. 530s demonstrate that.
Broadly, the rhetoric within the reforms is not a novelty. Rhetoric was a discipline
studied for centuries at that point. The tropes and clichés were used as templates to be

236

applied in different circumstances. However, their true meaning is what is of interest.
Long-established structures of Roman civilization could be noted within the prooimia.
The mos maiorum, established in the days of the Republic, speaks volumes of the Roman
propensity to confirm authority through tradition. When discussing the emergence of a
new art, namely Latin rhetoric, Suetonius succinctly expressed this while quoting Lucius
Licinius Crassus:
It has been reported to us that there be men who have introduced a new
kind of training, and that our young men frequent their schools; that these
men have assumed the title of Latin rhetoricians, and that young men
spend whole days with them in idleness. Our forefathers determined what
they wished their children to learn and what schools they desired them to
attend. These innovations in the customs and principles of our forefathers
do not please us nor seem proper. Therefore it appears necessary to make
our opinion known, both to those who have such schools and to those who
are in the habit of attending them, that they are displeasing to us.2
In essence, classicism was a structure that endured many centuries and the tendency
therein could be found in Rome’s mos maiorum and in its acceptance of religions through
ancestry. Innovation was therefore despised.
With the intent to reform, Justinian was in a precarious position. He had just
barely kept hold of his throne during the Nika Riots. Justinian and his ministers’ intent to
overhaul many provinces in Asia Minor could have further weakened his position. The
innovations in the novellae were surely going to anger bureaucrats. The program aimed to
trim the provincial administrations systematically by consolidating provinces and
reducing the personnel involved. To alleviate any potential fallouts, the prooimia were
2
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littered with references to the past. Rhetorically, the purpose of these historical references
and of the restoration of defunct offices and titles was to draw away attention from the
true nature of the reforms themselves. They were simply innovations and so to reduce the
blowback from bureaucratic elements such as John Lydus, Tribonian had to find a
solution. To give the reforms authority and legitimacy, the innovations were rooted in the
past, when Rome was at its zenith.
The Tetrarchic reforms had significantly shifted the balance of power to the most
influential segment of the aristocracy. Hence, Justinian could only achieve so much with
the treasury left by Anastasius. Quickly, the coffers were emptied. Curiously, John the
Cappadocian’s complaints about the North African expedition’s costs might have been an
indication that he was well aware that the coffers would be depleted rapidly. To resolve
the financial quandary, one issue confronting the center had to be addressed. Layer upon
layer of bureaus separated the center from the periphery. Information was easily distorted
and the dynatoi in the provinces could readily exploit this logistical problem. What
plagued the Later Empire was not corruption per se. It was the relationship between the
imperial center and the provinces that plagued the Empire. The balance of power shifted
to the high aristocracy enabling abuses in the justice system and more importantly in the
area of fiscality. The Nika Riots revealed how vulnerable an emperor could be. He no
longer marched at the head of armies nor did he eliminate vast numbers of seditious
nobles with proscription lists. The Riots may have proved how much of gulf there was
between the portrayal of the emperor as despot and reality. A pagarch in Egypt could
flagrantly disrespect the emperor’s patronage network without fear of retribution. The
reforms acknowledged this reality, on the one hand, and attempted to limit it on the other.
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Asia Minor’s targeted provinces were ideal to launch this pilot program. The
security concerns were minimal compared to other regions such as those near the Danube
or the Euphrates. John the Cappadocian sought to delegate more power to these provinces
so that they might be more self-sufficient in the application of justice and so that they
might be less prone to the fiscal avarice of the bureaucrats. Principally, this did not differ
wildly from the High Empire’s relationship between the center and periphery. With these
reforms, Justinian conceded that the scales tipped in the favor of the most elevated part of
the elite collectively. He therefore did not attempt to undo their power. Instead he thought
that he might be able to lighten his disadvantage by reducing the bureaucracy’s size
hoping to make it more efficient. Less hands would be in the till; a till that he so
desperately needed to fuel his grand designs as emperor. The reduction of layers between
him and the periphery would increase the availability of resources and would also reduce
the bureaucracy’s obstructiveness. The Empire’s largest expense, the military, required
sufficient funding to gain and to reconquer territories. That is not to mention, the
expensive peace treaties that were signed and the grand building program. The reforms
were never applied universally throughout the Empire. However, under Justin II, the
policy was extended to Italy. Though the fiscal conundrum came to reach a series of
peaks in the decades after Justinian. Ultimately, it caused a quick reversal of fortunes in
Italy, Emperor Maurice’s death and the collapse of the seventh century. At that point, the
system of governance would eventually be forced to evolve.
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•
•
•

•

Instructor, University of Kentucky, (August, 2012 – Present)
UK 100: Critical Reading APP;
Teaching Assistant, University of Kentucky, (Summer Semesters 2012 – 2015)
CLA 191: History of Christianity (On-Line Course);
Instructor, University of Kentucky, (May, 2015 – June, 2015)
HIS 105: History of Europe, 1648-present;
Teaching Assistant, University of Kentucky, (Spring Semesters 2010 and 2012;
Fall Semester 2011)
HIS 109: U.S. History since 1865;
Teaching Assistant, University of Kentucky, (June, 2011 – August, 2011)
A&S 300-229: History of Christianity (On-Line Course);
Teaching Assistant, University of Kentucky, (2010 –2011)
HIS 105: History of Europe, 1648 – Present;
Teaching Assistant, University of Kentucky, (2008 –2009)
HIS 104: History of Europe, to mid-17th century;
Teaching Assistant, University of Ottawa (Winter Semester 2007)
L’Histoire du Haut-Empire (History of the Early Roman Empire; taught in
French);
Teaching Assistant, University of Ottawa (Fall Semester, 2006)
L’Histoire de la République Romaine (History of the Roman Republic; taught in
French).

PROFESSIONAL AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:
•
•

University of Kentucky, Department of Academic Enhancement (2014 – 2015)
o Member of Curriculum Mapping Team.
University of Kentucky, Department of Academic Enhancement (2013)
o Member of College Retention Research Team.
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